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Adaptation and security framings have gained traction not only to ex-
plain the causal chains and impacts of environmental change and/or mi-
gration, but also to justify land intensive interventions to address them. 
Despite progress in the understanding of the complex links between en-
vironmental change and migration, academic and policy analyses have 
paid scarce attention to the ways in which environmental and migration 
narratives are (re)shaping access to fundamental natural resources and 
changing migration dynamics in the process. Moreover, in the burgeon-
ing literature on land and green grabs, the impacts of migration narra-
tives on land grabs as well as the impacts of land grabs on migration re-
main underexplored. In order to fill these gaps and bridge the diverse 
disciplines that deal with these phenomena, this research uses a ‘variegat-
ed geopolitical ecology’ framework to examine the material and discur-
sive interactions between environmental change, land grabbing, and mi-
gration. Using a global ethnographic approach, the methodology 
involves a historical and multi-scalar analysis together with extensive 
comparative fieldwork conducted in two different socio-political settings: 
Senegal and Cambodia. Notwithstanding important context specificities, 
findings across cases show how environmental and migration narratives, 
linked to adaptation and security discourses, have been deployed – ad-
vertently or inadvertently – to justify land capture, leading to interven-
tions that often increase, rather than alleviate, the very pressures that 
they intend to address. The research shows that despite the opposed as-
sumptions that underpin the ‘migration as adaptation’ or ‘migration as 
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security threat’ narratives, both frames can interact with environmental 
and climate change justifications in ways that create ‘self-fulfilling risks,’ 
which make insecurity and maladaptation a reality that extends well be-
yond the landscapes where land grabs unfold. 
  
xviii 
Geopolitieke ecologie van milieuveranderingen, landroof en 
migratie:  




De causale ketens en gevolgen van milieuverandering en/of migratie 
worden steeds vaker verklaard vanuit het perspectief van aanpassing en 
veiligheid en dit perspectief dient ook om grondintensieve interventies 
om de problemen aan te pakken te legitimeren. Hoewel het inzicht in de 
complexe verbanden tussen milieuverandering en migratie toeneemt, is 
er weinig wetenschappelijk en beleidsonderzoek gedaan naar de manier 
waarop milieu- en migratienarratieven de toegang tot fundamentele na-
tuurlijke hulpbronnen (opnieuw) vormgeven en daarmee de migratiedy-
namiek beïnvloeden. Daarnaast blijven de invloed van migratienarratie-
ven op landroof en de invloed van landroof op migratie in de 
opkomende literatuur over land- en groenroof onderbelicht. Om deze 
lacunes op te vullen en een brug te slaan tussen de verschillende discipli-
nes waarin deze verschijnselen worden onderzocht, wordt in dit onder-
zoek de 'rijkgeschakeerde geopolitieke ecologie' gebruikt als kader om de 
concrete en discursieve interacties tussen milieuverandering, landroof en 
migratie te bestuderen. Vanuit een algemene etnografische benadering 
wordt een historische en multi-scalaire analyse uitgevoerd, in combinatie 
met uitgebreid vergelijkend veldonderzoek in twee verschillende sociaal-
politieke omgevingen: Senegal en Cambodja. Hoewel er belangrijke con-
textgebonden kenmerken zijn, blijkt uit de resultaten van verschillende 
casussen dat milieu- en migratienarratieven gekoppeld aan aanpassings- 
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en veiligheidsdiscoursen - al dan niet per ongeluk - zijn ingezet om het in 
beslag nemen van grond te rechtvaardigen. Dit heeft geleid tot interven-
ties die de druk onbedoeld vaak eerder verhogen dan verlichten. Uit het 
onderzoek blijkt dat de aannames achter het perspectief van 'migratie als 
aanpassing' of 'migratie als veiligheidsdreiging' weliswaar intrinsiek te-
gengesteld zijn, maar dat beide perspectieven te maken kunnen hebben 
met rechtvaardiging van milieu- en klimaatverandering. Hierdoor ont-
staan 'zichzelf waarmakende risico's' waardoor onveiligheid en aanpas-
singsproblemen een realiteit worden; een effect dat zich uitstrekt tot ver 
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Écologies Géopolitiques des Changements Environnementaux, 
de l’Accaparement des Terres et des Migrations :  




L’encadrement des normes de sécurité et d’adaptation ont connus 
une monté en puissance, non seulement pour expliquer les chaines de 
causalité et les impacts des changements environnementaux et/ou 
des migrations, mais aussi pour justifier le recours à des interventions 
à usage intensif des terres. En dépit des progrès dans la compréhen-
sion des liens complexes entre les changements environnementaux et 
les migrations, les analyses académiques et politiques ont jusqu’ici 
accordé peu d’attention à la manière dont les discours environnemen-
taux et migratoires (re)façonnent l’accès aux ressources naturelles 
fondamentales en changeant les dynamiques migratoires. En outre, 
dans la littérature consacrée à l’accaparement des terres et aux accapa-
rements verts, les impacts des discours migratoires sur l’accaparement 
des terres, de même que les impacts de l’accaparement de terres sur 
les migrations, demeurent sous-explorés. Afin de pallier ces lacunes et 
de nouer des liens entre les diverses disciplines traitant desdits phé-
nomènes, ce travail de recherche utilise un cadre analytique « 
d’écologies géopolitiques diversifiées » pour examiner les interactions 
matérielles et discursives entre changements environnementaux, ac-
caparement des terres et migrations. La méthodologie s’appuie sur 
une approche ethnographique globale, impliquant une analyse histo-
rique et multi-scalaire, ainsi qu’un travail comparatif de terrain mené 
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au cœur de pays aux contextes socio-politiques très différents : le Sé-
négal et le Cambodge. Indépendamment des spécificités contextuelles 
importantes, les résultats montrent comment les discours environ-
nementaux et migratoires, liés aux discours d’adaptation et de sécuri-
té, ont été déployés – sciemment ou par inadvertance – pour justifier 
l’accaparement des terres. Ces discours engendrent des interventions 
qui tendent à accroitre plutôt que d’atténuer, la pression qu’ils tentent 
de surmonter. La recherche montre que malgré les présupposés op-
posés qui sous-entendent les discours de « migration comme adapta-
tion » ou de « migration comme menace sécuritaire », les deux peu-
vent interagir avec des justifications environnementales et climatiques 
de manière à créer des « risques autoréalisateurs », qui font de 
l’insécurité et de la maladaptation une réalité qui s’étend bien au-delà 
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Ecologías Geopolíticas del Cambio Ambiental, del 
Acaparamiento de Tierras y de las Migraciones:  




Los marcos de adaptación y de seguridad han ganado terreno no sólo 
para explicar las cadenas casuales y los impactos del cambio ambien-
tal y/o la migración sino también para justificar intervenciones inten-
sivas en recursos de tierras para abordarlos. Pese a los progresos rea-
lizados en la comprensión de los complejos vínculos que existen 
entre el cambio ambiental y la migración, los análisis académicos y de 
políticas han prestado escasa atención a la forma en la que las narrati-
vas migratorias y ambientales están configurando el acceso a recursos 
naturales y cambiando las dinámicas migratorias en el proceso. Ade-
más, en la abundante literatura sobre el acaparamiento de tierras y los 
acaparamientos verdes, los impactos de las narrativas migratorias so-
bre el acaparamiento de tierras, así como los impactos del acapara-
miento de tierras sobre la migración, siguen estando poco explorados. 
Con el objetivo de paliar estas lagunas y de unir las diversas discipli-
nas que se ocupan de estos fenómenos, esta investigación utiliza un 
marco de “ecología geopolítica variada” para examinar las interaccio-
nes discursivas y materiales que se producen entre el cambio ambien-
tal, el acaparamiento de tierras, y las migraciones. Utilizando un enfo-
que de etnografía global, la metodología implica un análisis histórico 
a varias escalas acompañado de un extenso trabajo comparativo de 
campo, realizado en dos entornos sociopolíticos diferentes: Senegal y 
Camboya. A pesar de importantes particularidades contextuales, en 
todos los casos, los resultados muestran cómo las narrativas ambien-
tales y migratorias, vinculadas a discursos de adaptación y seguridad, 
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se han desplegado – de forma advertida o inadvertida – para justificar 
el acaparamiento de tierras, llevando a intervenciones que a menudo 
aumentan, en lugar de aliviar, las presiones que ellas mismas preten-
den abordar.  La investigación demuestra que a pesar de los supues-
tos opuestos que sustentan las narrativas de la “migración como 
adaptación” o la “migración como amenaza para la seguridad”, am-
bos marcos pueden interactuar con justificaciones de cambio ambien-
tal y climático creando “riesgos autocumplidos” que convierten la 
inseguridad y la mala-adaptación en realidades que se extienden mu-
cho más allá de los lugares donde los acaparamientos de tierras se 
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‘Wanderer, your footsteps are the road, and nothing more; wanderer, 
there is no path, the path is made by walking. By walking one makes the 
road and upon glancing behind one sees the path…’  
(Antonio Machado, Campos de Castilla, 1912).   
 
 
This dissertation stems from a detour that became so gripping that I de-
cided to (nearly) abandon the initial project altogether. However, the 
‘discovery’ of the subsequently chosen path was intimately linked to the 
initial one, which served as a compass guiding me through new roads of 
reflection. Due to the importance that the road not taken had upon the 
final path, a word about this initial journey merits attention. Interested by 
the impacts of environmental and climate change on migration, my initial 
research proposal aimed to test a narrative that widely dominates envi-
ronmental migration policy and academic debates today: ‘Anthropogenic 
climate change is driving millions of people into exile by endangering the 
security of the most vulnerable. These migrations can lead to socio-
environmental pressures in receiving regions, thereby feeding a negative 
cycle of insecurity and migration. However, if migration is well managed, 
the skills acquired by migrants at their destination can support the adap-
tation of those remaining at home to climate change through socio-
economic remittances sent by migrants. Moreover, development within 
the place of origin (aided, ideally, through migrants’ involvement in cli-
mate adaptation and mitigation) can prevent forced displacement’. Fol-
  xxv 
lowing this proposition, I set out to understand, if and how, Senegalese 
migrants who were arriving to an agricultural ‘El Dorado’ in southern 
Spain (Almeria), could support the adaptation of their communities of 
origin – offering possibilities of co-development1  between origin and 
host societies.  
In addition to being a highly intensive agricultural area that depends 
on migrant labour, the greenhouses of Almeria have also been referred 
to as examples of what harmless geoengineering could look like. The al-
bedo effect of these greenhouses, which reflect heat outwards, has been 
cited in influential scientific papers, and has inspired policymakers 
around the world to paint their cities white, based on the understanding 
that this strategy could serve as a climate mitigation option. However, as 
I sat around what is known as ‘the sea of plastic’, which is amongst the 
most agriculturally intensive greenhouse areas in Europe, I came to real-
ise not only the impossibility (and naivety of these narratives in the cur-
rent socio-political and economic context), but also their potentially dev-
astating impacts as they drive policy interventions.  
After two months of visiting the greenhouses that feed our supermar-
ket chains and getting to know the people growing our tomatoes and 
lettuces, the possibility that most of the migrants interviewed could sup-
port the adaptation of their communities of origin seemed highly im-
probable or simply impossible. The agricultural sector of Almeria took a 
huge hit with respect to employment and labour conditions as a result of 
the 2008 economic crisis; the crisis deeply affected all sectors of the 
economy in Spain, and the construction sector in particular. Whereas 
Almeria had once been a simple entry point for migrants who intended 
to leave shortly upon their arrival to find better paying jobs within 
Spain’s construction sector, following the crisis it became a refuge for 
the millions who became unemployed due to the crisis. With few availa-
ble jobs and an oversupply of cheap migrant labour, the salaries and 
conditions of these migrants had steeply deteriorated. Consequently, 
these migrants - barely capable of saving themselves - could in no way be 
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in a position to support the adaptation needs of their families and com-
munities of origin.  
By deliberately following the path that I had been encouraged to omit 
from my analysis by the local authorities I contacted, I witnessed how 
labour inspections were skewed to maintain the only sector that was still 
flourishing after the economic crisis. Thriving economically for some, 
but at huge social price for the majority of irregular migrants who pro-
vide a continuous supply of cheap (and/or free) labour, and at a massive 
environmental cost for everyone else. Within the greenhouses, I wit-
nessed working conditions of extreme difficulty and precarity, with tem-
peratures ranging from 40°C to 50°C. I took part in sensitisation cam-
paigns for women migrants who, unable to find employment in the 
male-dominated agricultural sector, had nothing but their bodies to sell 
to their fellow migrants. I met the friends of a Senegalese man who had 
drowned while escaping the police in an attempt to avoid forced depor-
tation. I met many migrants who had not seen their families (or even met 
their children) in years due to their lack of regular status combined with 
personal insecurities and feelings of being perceived as complete failures 
if they were to return home. Discouragingly, I also experienced first-
hand how high-ranking officials consistently ignored (and debated) the 
first-hand information that I communicated to them – and which was 
certainly not new to them.  In this context, the discourse of the ‘cooling’ 
trend associated with this huge greenhouse area – the only structure that 
can be seen from space besides the Great Wall of China – was not only 
exacerbating the exploitation of labour, but was also contributing to the 
destruction of the land and the aquifers upon which it grew. Additional-
ly, and perhaps most striking to me, was that the straightforward dis-
courses of co-development were replicated by some of these very mi-
grants themselves:   
‘The problem is not so much the rain. We have land and we have wa-
ter; we just don’t have machinery or money. You, the Europeans, know 
how to do good agriculture…Look! (pointing to the greenhouses). You 
should just come and do this agriculture at home since our Government 
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doesn’t want to, and we can’t help. That way, at least we get to stay at 
home close to our families’ (Interview, Senegalese migrants, Almeria, 
Spain, 2014).  
 
Although this might sound like an optimal scenario, suspicions over this 
endeavour were highlighted by other migrants: ‘I hear that there are a lot 
of Europeans now investing in agriculture in Senegal, but I also hear that 
these are often stories of land grabs’ (Interview with Senegalese migrant 
in Almeria, Spain, 2014). The atrocious situation that Europe continues 
to offer to these migrants, combined with the repercussions of European 
colonisation, raises a set of questions: What are European investors do-
ing in Senegal, for whose benefit, and on whose backs? Who do the en-
vironmental and migration arguments serve, and with what consequenc-
es? Is framing environmental change and migration in terms of security 
and adaptation productive or counterproductive? While these questions 
had not been envisioned within my initial proposition, they subsequently 
sparked an enormous curiosity within me that became impossible to ig-















We are witnessing one of the most consequential and decisive moments 
in human history. The very existence of the most vulnerable segments of 
humanity is at risk; the stakes could not be higher. As I write these lines, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just released 
its latest report highlighting the urgency for a radical transformation of 
our socio-economic system, if we are to avoid the catastrophic conse-
quences that a rise greater than 1.5 °C in global temperature would entail 
(IPCC 2018). Moreover, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform 
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) has revealed an un-
precedented rate of biodiversity loss – of which land use change for agri-
cultural production is its main driver – and the consequences of which 
are an unparalleled rate of species extinctions and the destruction of eco-
systems upon which humanity relies for its survival (IPBES 2018). 
The impacts of environmental and climate change are already well 
underway with those most marginalised experiencing an exacerbation of 
their pre-existing vulnerabilities. Moreover, today more people are on the 
move than ever before.2 Even if it is extremely difficult to isolate climatic 
and environmental variables from the socio-political, economic, and de-
mographic factors that together shape migratory dynamics, environmen-
tal and climate change are having both direct and indirect impacts on 
human mobility; these impacts can only be expected to worsen as certain 
places become uninhabitable. Research on the relationship between the 
environment and/(or) climate change and human mobility has greatly 
proliferated in recent years and shown many of the complexities and nu-
ances that exist in environment-migration interactions (Gemenne 2011; 
Black et al. 2011).3 The main specificity of migration linked to environ-
mental degradation today lies in the fact that climate change is the result 
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of certain human activities, adding dimensions of responsibility, ethics, 
and justice into the equation.  
At the same time, but in a different research and policy environment, 
there has been growing attention given to what has come to be denomi-
nated as ‘global land grabbing’. Since the convergence of multiple global 
crises in recent years (food, energy, financial), there has been a global 
rush for land at a scale that is unprecedented since the colonial era 
(Borras and Franco 2010). Land grabs can be defined as ‘the capturing of 
control of relatively vast tracts of land and other natural resources 
through a variety of mechanisms and forms that involve large-scale capi-
tal that often shifts resource use orientation into extractive character, 
whether for international or domestic purposes, as capital’s response to 
the convergence of food, energy and financial crises, climate change mit-
igation imperatives, and demands for resources from newer hubs of 
global capital’ (Borras et al. 2012, 851). Although far from being a new 
phenomenon, today we see new characteristics that make land grabs dis-
tinct from the colonial and imperial periods. Particularly, and crucially, 
land grabbing today takes place in a world of ‘formally’ recognised sov-
ereign-states – often through legal yet contested processes. Contrary to 
the previous modes of colonial and imperial grabs that operated through 
force, the mechanism to control and acquire land and other natural re-
sources today is often Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or direct buying 
or leasing (Sassen 2013a).  
In the context of rising environmental and climate concerns, many of 
these land grabs are ‘green grabs’. These are defined as ‘the appropriation 
of land and nature for environmental ends’ (Fairhead, Leach, and 
Scoones 2012, 238). Although the phenomenon of green grabs builds on 
historical resource expropriations in the name of the environment, cli-
mate change has reinvigorated the trend considerably with novel dis-
courses around climate mitigation and adaptation being deployed as jus-
tifiers (Hunsberger et al. 2016; Corbera, Hunsberger, and Vaddhanaphuti 
2017; Franco and Borras 2019). With Bioenergy and Carbon Capture and 
Storage (BECCS) presented in climate policy forums as an essential 
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mechanism through which emissions can be reduced, the rush to appro-
priate farmland has been mainly driven by the desire to increase the pro-
duction of ‘flex crops’ – crops that have multiple uses (food, feed, fuel, 
industrial material). This is because flex crops can now be used to cover 
both financial and climate risk allowing investors to sell in the most prof-
itable market (Borras et al. 2016). Moreover, initiatives for forest carbon 
offsets – combined with earlier conservation initiatives – are also incen-
tivising a rush for forests. Much of the land that has been targeted is 
governed by customary, traditional and indigenous systems of common 
property upon which millions of the most socio-environmentally vulner-
able people rely on for their livelihoods (Dell’Angelo et al. 2017). The 
phenomenon of land and green grabs is of worldwide significance, but 
those most vulnerable are also those most heavily and adversely impact-
ed. Therefore, in addition to the well-known double injustice of climate 
change, today we must add a third injustice: Environmental and climate 
change hit disproportionally the most vulnerable segments of the popu-
lation; those most vulnerable are also the least responsible for environ-
mental and climate change; and these vulnerable groups are now also 
embattling the worst impacts of certain environmental and climate poli-
cies enacted to mitigate them.  
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Map 1: Location of Land Deals and the Corresponding Intended Production 
Aims4 
 
 Source: Land Matrix  
 
Although environmental change, migration, and land grabs represent 
some of the most pressing and challenging socio-political issues of our 
time, the interlinkages between these issues have tended to be problema-
tised, analysed, and acted upon – at best – in pairs. On the one hand, 
while research on environmental change and migration has greatly ad-
vanced our understanding of the complex relationships between bio-
physical environmental changes and human (im)mobility, much less is 
known about how discourses, narratives and frames around environmental, climate 
change and migration modulate these impacts by modifying access to natural resources.  
On the other hand, while research on global land grabs has advanced our 
understanding of many of its drivers and impacts, and in doing so, has 
illuminated the increasing role of environmental and climate policies, the 
role of migration narratives in legitimising land grabs, as well as the impact of these 
land grabs on migration remains underexplored. In both cases, however, an 
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understanding of how discourses shape realities is crucial, because it is 
through discourses and narratives that specific assemblages of ideas, 
concepts and categorisations are made to give meaning to both physical 
and social realities (Hajer 1995; Lakoff 2008). These specific ideas give 
way to frames that create boundaries around social groups, biophysical 
entities, and/or their interactions, to establish an ordered vision of 
events (Forsyth 2004). Frames influence not only the kinds of questions 
that are asked, but also structure the kind of knowledge that is produced. 
In doing so, they determine what is included on the agenda, and what is 
silenced (O’Brien et al. 2007).  
Although environmental change, resource grabs and migration can be 
framed in many different ways, security and adaptation framings have 
become dominant in both climate change and migration policy circles. 
The power of security and adaptation framings resides in their malleabil-
ity, flexibility, and in the fact that they both refer to something that 
seems intuitively desirable. Security, broadly understood, simply means 
‘the pursuit of freedom from threat’ (Buzan 1991, 18). Adaptation is also 
a seemingly straightforward idea in that it describes ‘a response to a per-
ceived risk or opportunity’ (Pelling 2010, 20). Given their malleability, 
both security and adaptation can mean very different things to different 
people. This creates great divergences in the ways that the relations be-
tween environmental change, land grabs, and migration are both under-
stood and acted upon. Paying attention to these frames does not howev-
er suggest a call to relativism: environmental and migratory concerns are 
amongst the most pressing of our era, and security and adaptation chal-
lenges linked to them clearly exist. However, it is not sufficient to analyse 
their material realities; we must understand how the very enunciation of 
certain frames shapes these realities and with what consequences.  
This research is thus not only concerned with how environmental 
change, land grabs, and migration shape each other in the material sense, 
but also about how discourses around them shape these very realities. It 
means paying explicit attention to how the material and discursive are 
interconnected and (re)shaped through diverse inter-scalar interactions 
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that give way to different types of justifications, interventions, and out-
comes. In order to achieve this understanding, this dissertation explores 
two self-reinforcing mechanisms: Firstly, how different actors use envi-
ronmental and/or migration narratives to, advertently or inadvertently, 
justify land grabs in the name of adaptation and/or security. Secondly, 
how these land grabs shape the security and adaptation of the people 
impacted by them – and beyond.  In so doing the dissertation seeks to 
answer the following key question: Why and how do environmental change, 
migration, and land grabs shape each other – both materially and discursively – and 
with what consequences? By seeking to answer this question, this dissertation 
constitutes a first attempt to draw both theoretical and empirical connec-
tions between these three crucial and intertwining phenomena.   
In order to understand the aforementioned self-reinforcing mecha-
nisms, Chapter 1 starts by analysing the epistemological roots of the 
most common security and adaptation frames around environmental 
change, land grabs, and migration, drawing on both their incongruencies 
as well as on their overlaps. On this basis, the chapter then proposes an 
alternative analytical framework termed variegated geopolitical ecology, which 
forms the analytical apparatus of this work. Variegated geopolitical ecol-
ogy draws on critical political economy and political ecology as well as on 
political geography and critical geopolitics in order to historicise and po-
litically-embed the causes of the phenomenon under scrutiny, whilst also 
seeking to understand their multi-scalar material and discursive relations. 
With this theoretical and analytical framework in place, Chapter 2 adopts 
a global ethnographic and interconnected comparison between Senegal 
and Cambodia as the methodology upon which this work relies. Alt-
hough located geographically at a vast distance, both of these countries 
share a French colonial past that has partly determined the relations be-
tween environmental change, land grabs, and migration to date. Despite 
important similarities, it is in their diverse historical pathways, in their 
current political systems, and in the different positions that they occupy 
within the world economy that we can find some of the key differences 
that are essential to explaining the puzzle at hand. To this aim, Chapter 3 
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offers a historical geopolitical ecological comparison of Senegal and 
Cambodia – a historical analysis that positions both nature and migration 
as central. The chapter analyses not only the colonial roots that brought 
about the current interlinkages between environmental change, land 
grabs, and migration, but also the antecedents of mainstream security 
and adaption frames that are so commonly used today.   
Having embedded the phenomenon under study historically, Chapter 
4 builds upon the empirical material collected in both countries at the 
national scale to show the effects of these diverse historical pathways on 
the current conjuncture. To do so, it concentrates on the variegated 
power of global discourses and how these are, in turn, impacting land 
grabs, environmental change and migration dynamics differently in spe-
cific countries. Although studies have often tended to analyse the im-
pacts of migration policy on migration, or the impacts of environmental 
policies on the environment, the aim here is different. The chapter fo-
cuses on the policies that have facilitated land grabs in each country and 
analyses how, and if, migration and/or environmental arguments have 
been important in contributing to these land grabs. In so doing, it seeks 
to explain why certain environmental and/or migration frames have pre-
vailed over others and with what contradictions and consequences.  
Following this analysis of how global frames interact with national re-
alities, Chapter 5 then zooms down into three landscapes where three 
specific land grabs are taken as the point of entry to understanding more 
complex landscapes where a multitude of overlapping land claims and 
land grabs have occurred. In doing so, the chapter analyses the specifici-
ties and particularities of land grabs as they are situated in complex so-
cio-natural configurations and the impacts these have on both migration 
and the environment in the landscapes where they unfold. Finally, and in 
order to draw connections between these particular landscapes and the 
broader geopolitical whole of which they are part, Chapter 6 focuses on 
‘self-fulfilling risks’5 – or on the (un)intended consequences that land 
grabs are having on security and adaptation well beyond the landscapes 
where these unfold. The argumentative structure of the dissertation thus 
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takes a circular approach in that it moves from the macro and more ab-
stract level to the concrete and particular – and then back again. In so 
doing, this thesis aims to show how and why powerful frames on envi-
ronmental change and/or migration can be used to justify land grabbing, 
advertently or inadvertently, in ways that can increase, rather than allevi-
ate, the very pressures that they purportedly intend to redress.  
Notes
 
1  Co-development refers to the linking of migration and development policy. 
This link can refer to either the allocation of development aid to origin countries 
on the condition that these states will cooperate in controlling migration 
(Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010), or to the enhanced role of mi-
grants in contributing to the development of their origin countries through remit-
tances (Scheffran, Marmer, and Sow 2012). 
2 In this research, migration is broadly understood as ‘the movement of persons 
either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population move-
ment, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, com-
position and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, eco-
nomic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family 
reunification’ (International Organization for Migration 2015) 
3 See for example: Gemenne 2011; Foresight 2011; Black et al. 2011; 2013; Warn-
er 2010; Zickgraf et al. 2016  
4 Estimates on the number of hectares involved have varied greatly, from reports 
stating that 56 million hectares were acquired between 2008 and 2009 (Deininger 
and Byerlee 2012) to others stating that as much as 227 million hectares were 
acquired between 2000 and 2010 (Oxfam 2013). A ‘literature rush’ (Oya 2013) 
has shown how different definitions and methods used to quantify the amount of 
targeted land can provide very different figures and ‘messy hectares’ (Edelman 
2013). The lack of transparency around land deals, and the fact that it is difficult 
to know if these have been confirmed or speculative, makes the task of giving 
precise numbers particularly arduous.   
5 I owe this turn of phrase to an enlightening discussion with Pr. Jesse Ribot at 
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Introduction 
Why and how do environmental change, land grabs, and migration shape each other, 
materially and discursively? And what are the most important feedback 
mechanisms that must be understood and addressed in order to prevent 
a downward spiral occurring between them? These are the nagging ques-
tions that this dissertation seeks to address, both theoretically and empir-
ically. The challenge is to build theoretical and conceptual bridges that 
can allow us to analytically make sense of the complex material and dis-
cursive interrelations that are at the basis of this puzzle. Although differ-
ent lenses and frameworks could be used to analyse these interrelation-
ships, this work has benefited from, and been influenced by, my direct 
involvement in climate change and migration policy processes where 
both security and adaptation framings have become pervasive.1 On the 
one hand, descriptions using these frames with regards to migration of-
ten fluctuate between those that conceptualise migration in the context 
of climate change as a driver and/or consequence of conflict and nation-
al insecurity to those that consider migration to be an essential adapta-
tion measure capable of promoting human security and to contributing 
to triple win solutions for migrants, origin and host societies. On the 
other hand, arguments to legitimise the need for land intensive invest-
ment often use environmental security/adaptation narratives as well as 
narratives around employment creation as key justifications. But what are 
the theoretical antecedents of these powerful ideas, where do they come 
from, and where do they fall short? In order to address this question, this 
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chapter analyses the interconnections between environmental change, 
land grabs, and migration as they relate to diverging security and/or ad-
aptation frames. To do so, this chapter: 1) reviews these interconnec-
tions from the vantage point of neo-Malthusian security frames; 2) re-
views these interconnections from the vantage point of neoclassical 
adaptation frameworks; 3) reviews these interconnections from the van-
tage point of a broadly defined variegated geopolitical ecology perspec-
tive.  
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1.1 Environmental Security and Population Bombs 
The earliest frames of environmental security can be found in Thucydi-
des’ The Peloponnesian War and Plato’s Republic. Both authors compared 
the security of societies that lived within their ‘natural’ limits, like Sparta, 
to those like Athens that relied heavily on imports (Floyd and Matthew 
2013, 3). These ideas survived the passage of time and received a power-
ful translation in the famous Essay on the Principle of Population by the de-
mographer Thomas Malthus. Thomas Malthus’ well-known thesis is that 
the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power of the 
earth to engender subsistence for man (Malthus 1872). Malthusian eco-
nomics departs from two key interconnected assumptions. The first is 
that as population starts to increase, so does the land under cultivation. 
Once all of the high-quality land has been utilised, further cultivation will 
then need to take place on less productive land. This results in lower 
food productivity per worker, which is the ‘law of diminishing returns’. 
The second assumption is known as the ‘principle of population’. Ac-
cording to this, a country’s population is proportionally determined by 
the amount of resources it possesses. For as long as a population has 
access to an unlimited amount of resources for its subsistence, popula-
tion growth would continue to multiply. However, according to Malthus’ 
theory, eventually a point will be reached where the amount of people 
surpasses the capacity of the agricultural land to produce the same quan-
tity of food per worker and the ‘law of diminishing returns’ would once 
again come into effect. Although the falling living standards that would 
result are assumed to bring about a reduction in population growth and 
contribute to stabilising the amount of resources per person, if poor 
peasants continued having too many children, despite their falling wages, 
then a crisis similar to that of the Irish famine, through which millions of 
people were compelled to migrate and a million died, would re-emerge 
(O’Rourke 2015, 93–94).  
Malthus was hesitant on migration as a mechanism to solve the prob-
lem of overpopulation. Although migration could serve as a temporary 
fix to relieve pressure on the labour market, in the long run the ‘principle 
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of population’ would come into effect with higher wages and greater fer-
tility, thereby filling the gap that had been created by the departing emi-
grants (O’Rourke 2015, 96). In terms of scarcity, this means that there is 
an absolute scarcity of natural resources that is ‘physical, real and ines-
capable’ (Scoones et al. 2019, 234). Given that population would theoret-
ically grow at a geometric rate while that same population’s ability to 
produce resources would increase only at an arithmetic rate, the popula-
tion will inevitably surpass the needs of their subsistence leading to cha-
os, insecurity, and collapse. The higher the natality rates, the higher the 
number of people, all of whom would require energy; these people 
would in turn generate more waste, leading to the cyclical destruction of 
the planet (McBrien 2016, 131). Following this thesis, neo-Malthusians 
argue that the finitude of natural resources places strict limits on popula-
tion growth and on consumption. If these limits are exceeded, poverty, 
social breakdown, migration, and conflict become inevitable (Homer-
Dixon 1995). In this reading, environmental degradation and the ensuing 
poverty that this degradation leads to is at the very heart of the causes of 
migration.  
 
National Security and Migration 
Despite Malthusian predictions, colonial administrators were primarily 
concerned about under-population, attributing it as the cause of stagnant 
economic growth (Collins 2002). It was not until the post-war period 
that the Malthusian fear of overpopulation spread and that national secu-
rity concerns became fused with environmental security (McBrien 2016; 
Baldwin 1997; Barnett 2001). These ideas were championed by authors 
such as Paul Ehrlich in his book The Population Bomb (1968) and by Gar-
rett Hardin in his widely influential essay The Tragedy of the Commons 
(1968). Garret Hardin deployed the Malthusian argument of geometric 
population growth to argue that ‘a finite world can only support a finite 
population’  (Hardin 1968, 1243). Under the assumption that human be-
ings act like selfish individual maximising agents, he used the metaphor 
of a selfish herder to underline that people would continue to over-
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exploit natural resources for their own self-interest. The result leads to a 
vicious circle of environmental degradation that Hardin labelled the 
‘tragedy of the commons’. Following this argument, he claimed that that 
the ‘Freedom to breed is intolerable’ and that ‘If we love the truth we 
must openly deny the validity of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’, because it permits decisions over the size of the family to be de-
termined within the family itself (Hardin 1968, 1246). Biologist Paul Ehr-
lich also incited the fear of overpopulation by stating that ‘The battle to 
feed all of humanity is over’, that ‘hundreds of millions of people are go-
ing to starve to death’, and that ‘overpopulation is now the dominant 
problem in all our personal, national, and international planning prob-
lems’ (Ehrlich 1968). 
These arguments around resource scarcity and the dangers of popula-
tion growth gained traction in the midst of the 1970s oil crisis when the 
concept of energy security also entered the stage (Scoones et al. 2018). It 
was also at this moment that ideas about planetary limits emerged in 
ecology and conservation, championed by Richard Falk’s This Endangered 
Planet (1971), as well as within the environmental political scene through 
the Club of Rome’s 1972 Limits to growth report, amongst others 
(Meadows et al. 1972). Richard Falk linked war, resource depletion, and 
environmental overload with population growth. Amongst many diagno-
ses, the Club of Rome showed that ‘even under the optimistic assump-
tion that all possible land is utilised, there will still be a desperate land 
shortage before the year 2000 if per capita land requirements and popu-
lation growth remain the same as they are today’ (Meadows et al. 1972, 
51). The links between national and environmental security were force-
fully argued by Lester Brown in his book Redefining National Security, in 
which he stated that: ‘The new sources of danger arise from oil deple-
tion, soil erosion, land degradation, shrinking forests, deteriorating grass-
lands, and climate alteration. These developments, affecting the natural 
resources and systems on which the economy depends, threaten not only 
national economic and political security, but the stability of the interna-
tional economy itself’ (Brown 1986, 25). These national security and neo-
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Malthusian ideas have deeply influenced conceptions around migration 
in security studies where the concept of ‘environmental refugees’ origi-
nated. The term was first popularised in the 1970s by the founder of the 
Worldwatch Institute, Lester Brown, and became extremely popular 
amongst those who saw population growth, environmental degradation, 
and national security as intimately linked.  For example, in an essay enti-
tled Environment and Security (1989), the famous British ecologist Norman 
Myers argued that in an increasingly economically and environmentally 
interdependent world, the effects of soil erosion on agricultural produc-
tivity, the mass extinction of species, climate change, deforestation and 
desertification are a cause of national security concern for the US. To 
draw the link between environmental destruction and national security, 
both population growth and refugees were made central to his thesis: 
‘These two later problems (tropical deforestation and the spread of de-
serts), like certain others are closely connected to rapid population 
growth in the Third World, a problem related in turn to pervasive pov-
erty and to associated issues of massive unemployment, overburdened 
cities, and refugees from environmental degradation’ (Myers 1989, 23). 
In 1987, the Brundtland Commission report, Our Common Future, also 
pushed the interrelated concepts of environmental security and popula-
tion growth, stating that ‘urgent steps are needed to limit extreme rates 
of population growth’ (Brundtland et al. 1987, 43). While noting that 
‘environmental stress is seldom the only cause of major conflicts’ 
(Brundtland et al. 1987, 5), the report emphasised the need to treat envi-
ronmental security concerns as matters of national security underlining 
that ‘a comprehensive approach to international and national security 
must transcend the traditional emphasis on military power and armed 
competition. The real sources of insecurity also encompass unsustainable 
development, and its effects can become intertwined with traditional 
forms of conflict’ (Brundtland et al. 1987, 4). In an influential article in 
The Atlantic Monthly entitled The Coming Anarchy, Robert Kaplan con-
vincingly linked environmental degradation to national security concerns. 
According to Kaplan, foreign policy would be shaped by: ‘surging popu-
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lations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, 
air pollution, and possibly rising sea levels – developments that will 
prompt mass migrations and in turn incite group conflicts’ (Kaplan 1994, 
58).  
Environmental scholars, such as Homer-Dixon, also drew strong 
links between population growth, energy scarcity, and conflict through 
narratives whose starting points were located in demographic projections 
as a cause of concern: ‘Within the next fifty years, the planet’s human 
population will probably pass nine billion, and global economic output 
may quintuple. Largely as a result, scarcities of renewable resources will 
increase sharply…Environmental scarcities are already contributing to 
violent conflicts in many parts of the developing world. These conflicts 
are probably the early signs of an upsurge of violence in the coming dec-
ades that will be induced or aggravated by scarcity’ (Homer-Dixon 1994, 
5–6). According to the views presented thus far, it is an imbalance be-
tween the supply and demand of natural resources – often driven by es-
calating population growth and migration – that creates scarcity and ex-
acerbates socio-economic problems that can in turn escalate into 
conflicts, and hence, political insecurity (Homer-Dixon 1994, 1991; 
Homer-Dixon 1995; Kaplan 1986; Diamond 2005).   
These discourses that draw the link between population growth, secu-
rity, and migration, have continued to gain prominent political attention 
as concerns over climate change have skyrocketed. One dominant narra-
tive exhibited in international politics and media portrays close connec-
tions between climate change and conflict, especially in the African Sa-
hel, which is often presented as ‘ground zero’ for climate change. The 
Sahel has been globally described as a ‘perfect storm’ case, wherein the 
combination of climate change impacts and population growth is pre-
dicted to lead to land degradation, famine, and terrorism insurgencies if 
urgent action is not taken. In a neo-Malthusian fashion, these narratives 
start by introducing demographic realities and projections, directly fol-
lowed by climate projections: ‘In 1950, the region contained 31 million 
people; today there are more than 100 million, and in 2050, there could 
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be more than 300 million. New projections of climate change … foresee 
a rise of 3 to 5 degrees Celsius above today’s already high temperatures 
by 2050…The projections for 2100 are startling, with a population of 
600 million in the Sahel and temperatures up to 8 degrees above today’s 
norms. It would be totally implausible to sustainably accommodate this 
scale of growth. Without immediate large-scale action, death rates from 
food shortages will rise as crops wither and livestock die and the largest 
involuntary migration in history could occur’ (Potts et al. 2013, 3).  
In this view, global climate change leads to both desertification and 
drought, which result in further resource scarcity. This scarcity over re-
sources then leads to the migration of ethnic groups, which can trigger 
new conflicts or exacerbate pre-existing ones (Benjaminsen 2016, 112). 
Such narratives have permeated high level policy debates at the United 
Nations Security Council where events on the issue occurred in 2007 and 
2011 (Dannreuther 2013). During the 2006 G8 summit, the concept of 
‘climate security’ was emphasised, which was subsequently reiterated in 
2007 by the first United Nations Security Council debate on Climate 
Change Security and again in 2009, by the first United Nations General 
Assembly on this issue (Scott 2012, 221). Furthermore, in 2007, the No-
bel Peace Prize was jointly awarded to the IPCC and to Al Gore for 
‘their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-
made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that 
are needed to counteract such change’. Within his award acceptance 
speech, Al Gore stated that: ‘…Unfortunately we can already establish 
that global warming not only has negative consequences for “human se-
curity”, but can also fuel violence and conflict within and between states 
(…) The consequences are most obvious, however, among the poorest 
of the poor, in Darfur and in large sectors of the Sahel belt, where we 
have already had the first ‘climate war’ (United Nations 2016). In his 
speech, Al Gore also made the link between climate migration and secu-
rity by stating that ‘climate refugees have migrated into areas already in-
habited by people with different cultures, religions, and traditions, in-
creasing potential conflict’ (Baldwin, Methmann, and Rothe 2014, 123).  
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The Pentagon has also increasingly underlined the impacts of climate 
change on national security and the impacts it is expected to have upon 
military infrastructure (Schlanger 2014). In a conference of defence min-
isters in 2014, the United States Secretary of Defense at that time, Chuck 
Hagel, stated that: ‘The most pressing security challenges – from orga-
nized crime to ungoverned spaces – do not respect national bor-
ders.  Nor do their consequences, such as the migration of unaccompa-
nied minors. No nation can address these challenges alone.  We must 
work together to confront them. That is why it is welcome news that 
many nations in the region are becoming exporters of security – working 
with neighbouring countries to provide training, build capacity, and ad-
dress urgent security needs’ (Hagel 2014, own emphasis). More recently, 
defence workers in the Pentagon have been defying the current US Pres-
ident, Donald Trump whose rhetoric spouts climate change denial, to 
protect its military bases from the effects of climate change (Weedon 
2019).  
With regards to potential terrorist threats, although most analyses fo-
cus on the links between ideology and terrorism, the links between cli-
mate change, national security, and terrorism are also being elucidated in 
various ways. Climate change is believed to fuel extremism because peo-
ple who are unable to provide for their families in contexts of extreme 
weather events and environmental degradation become easy targets of 
extremist recruits who may offer them employment and food. An exam-
ple that is often provided is how the drying up of Lake Chad contributed 
to the growth of Boko Haram. As Robert Muggah, a climate and security 
specialist, explained it: ‘Climate shocks and stresses are pushing many 
into extreme poverty. Joining an armed group is sometimes the only op-
tion available’ (Gerretsen 2019). Other scholars have also made the ar-
gument that ‘increased poverty and reduced state capacity, which are a 
foreseeable consequence of climate change, may contribute to the crea-
tion or sustenance of functional space which may allow terrorist groups 
to flourish’ (Smith 2007, 264).  
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In Iraq, for example, climate change is believed to have exacerbated the 
armed conflict due to the interrelated impacts of population growth, in-
creased droughts, and water scarcity upon tensions within the country. 
As Alala Ali, an Iraqi women and peace activist stated: ‘Actually, the cli-
mate change issue started in Iraq intensively in 2006 and 2007, when 
drought and global warming affected a lot especially the West part of 
Iraq, mainly in Neineveh and Al Anbar. Many families, thousands of 
families became jobless after the drought; no agriculture, their animals 
died. Thousands of youth became jobless, and this was the critical point 
that those terrorist groups – including Al-Qaida and, later on, ISIS – re-
cruited those youth really easily, because they had no other options’ 
(Climate Diplomacy 2018). Moreover, the conflict in Syria has been 
showcased as an example of how climate change can indirectly lead to 
civil strife as people are driven out of rural areas, partly as a result of cli-
mate change exacerbated droughts, into urban areas that are incapable of 
absorbing the additional population pressure associated with migration. 
According to a report released by Adelphi, climate change will continue 
to fuel terrorism and strengthen recruitment efforts by terrorist groups 
such as the Islamic State and Boko Haram (Nett and Ruttinger 2016).  
While the authors underline that the interrelations between climate 
change and migration are not a unilinear causal phenomenon, the Sahel 
is noted to be conflict-prone due to the prevalence of pastoralism and 
rainfed agriculture that together with population growth and a greater 
demand for fuelwood lead to environmental degradation (Kisangani 
2012). Although scholars have been nuanced in showing the complex 
multi-causality involved in such interrelations (Kelley et al. 2015), media 
channels have rapidly simplified the relationship through headlines such 
as: ‘The world faces an increased risk of terrorism because of climate 
change’ (Tousignant 2017, own emphasis).  
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The New Scramble for Land: Food and Energy Security 
As evidenced above, the Malthusian links between environmental securi-
ty, national security, and migration have received increased media, policy, 
and scholarly attention. However, from a geopolitical vantage point, how 
do environmental and climate changes contribute to the global land 
rush? From a geopolitical standpoint, international relations have always 
been integral to securing access to natural resources. While the term ‘ge-
opolitics’ can evoke many meanings simultaneously, geopolitics can be 
simply understood as the ‘influence of geographical factors on political 
factors’ (Fettweis 2015, 233). Another commonly-used definition is that 
of ‘the struggle for political dominance’ (Dalby 2013b, 38). Classical geo-
politics perceives geographical conditions – or the physical realities of 
states – as being decisive for international relations (Scholvin 2016). 
From colonialism to imperialism and throughout the world wars, the 
Cold War and the Gulf wars, states have been driven by an expansion to 
access and secure resources abroad. This has, and can, lead to ‘scrambles 
for land’ (Scholvin 2016) and ‘resource wars’, defined as ‘(armed) con-
flicts revolving to a significant degree, over the pursuit or possession of 
critical materials’ (Le Billon 2004, 1). 
The recent food, fuel, and financial crises of the 2006-2008 period re-
centred arguments around population growth, security, and scrambles 
for land back into academic and policy debates. When the prices of basic 
cereals more than doubled, food exporting countries began to restrict 
grain shipments in order to limit food price inflations within their coun-
tries, which subsequently led to a generalised panic within food import-
ing countries. As the founder of the Worldwatch Institute, Lester Brown, 
stated: ‘Seemingly overnight, importing countries realized that one of 
their few options was to find land in other countries on which to pro-
duce food for themselves’ (Brown 2013, 101). Additionally, as a result of 
rising oil prices and fears over energy insecurity, energy policies started 
to promote biofuel expansion (which, importantly, was also at the root 
of the increased food prices). Hence, rising oil prices combined with na-
tional commitments to transition towards green economies, prompted 
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many countries (with the European Union and the United States leading 
the trend) to endorse biofuel targets and support the production of eth-
anol and biodiesel through tax exemptions and other financial incentives 
(Anseeuw 2013; Vigil 2018b).  
While the concept of energy security has been mobilised since the 
1970s, today the concept encompasses more than oil because concerns 
over climate mitigation and adaptation have become deeply intertwined 
with how we relate to energy (Cherp and Jewell 2014). However, if we 
look at resource endowments and security from the perspective of the 
places most affected by scrambles for land, it is their relative resource 
abundance, rather than their own resource scarcity, that makes them at-
tractive for scrambles thereby increasing the likelihood of conflict and 
domestic security concerns. It is in this line of thought that the ‘resource 
trap’ thesis was developed by showing how resource abundance can lead 
to competition between different groups that aim to extract economic 
rents from particularly valuable natural resources, which can then lead to 
competition, conflict, migration and further conflict (Homer-Dixon 1991, 
own emphasis). As resources elsewhere become increasingly scarce, the 
monetary value of the apparently unutilised, available resources rises. 
Hence competition over these remaining resources becomes a very likely 
scenario either incited at the national level and/or internationally. In oth-
er words, it is the ‘resource scarcity’ present within some countries, 
combined with the ‘resource abundance’ of other countries that is the 
main driver of geopolitical scramble for resources. In order to protect 
natural resources from being grabbed and from environmental destruc-
tion, designating land for nature (i.e. non-human purposes) has long 
been touted as the most optimal response. In line with Malthusian no-
tions of population pressure and the destruction of ecosystems that these 
populations engender, ‘land sparing’ consists of the decision to set aside 
land for biodiversity and conservation purposes (Phalan et al. 2011). In 
this view, protecting nature requires its isolation from society. 
While there are numerous linkages between national and environmen-
tal security that could be elaborated upon further here, for our purposes, 
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the broad overview provided here sufficiently highlights the Malthusian 
understanding of the interlinkages that exist between environmental 
change, migration, and resource grabs: resources are finite, but popula-
tions continue to grow. Therefore, and according to this frame, as popu-
lation grows and environmental conditions deteriorate, people will inevi-
table begin to fight with one another over the scarcely available resources 
and/or move towards places where resources are more widely available, 
thereby contributing to heightened tensions in receiving regions. As a 
result of migration and increased competition over scarce resources, 
which create conditions conducive to terrorist groups easier targeting 
vulnerable people, national security is deeply threatened. Moreover, re-
source scarcities induce a geopolitical scramble for land and resources 
that has the potential to ultimately lead to resource wars – and once 
again spark conflicts within and between states. Although this interpreta-
tion of the interrelations between environmental change, land grabs, and 
migration has become widespread, it is often perceived as a ‘doom and 
gloom’ worst-case scenario that can be overcome with certain conditions 
in place. In the next section, we will turn to an analysis of adaptation 
framings whereby it is claimed that these security threats can be sur-
mounted.  
 
1.2 Environmental Adaptation and Ingenuity 
The origins of the term ‘adaptation’ can be traced to the discipline of 
evolutionary biology, in which adaptation is broadly defined as the ‘good 
fit of organisms to their environment’ (Gould and Lewontin 1979, 592). 
The idea of evolutionary adaptation stems from the notion of adaptation 
to the natural environment - the backbone of Lamarck’s theories (1809) 
and of Darwinian explanations of natural selection. According to Darwin 
(1872), it is those individuals with the most favourable adaptations (vari-
ations), who are most likely to survive due to an evolution of tiny, accu-
mulative changes occurring at fairly constant speeds through time. Dar-
win’s important insights were extrapolated and applied by Herbert 
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Spencer to societies which required adaptive responses to re-establish 
‘equilibrium’ after an external shock or challenge (McBrien 2016, 122). If 
adaptation occurs, then population growth and/or environmental degra-
dation do not necessarily need to result in a Malthusian worsening of 
rural livelihoods and to national security concerns.  
In fact, by the middle of the twentieth century it was evident that sig-
nificant population growth had occurred without the apparent diminish-
ing returns that Malthus had predicted. Although part of this growth was 
simply the result of production expanding into previously untouched 
areas, it was also due to technological innovations (Kneese 1988, 283). In 
the book The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian 
Change under Population Pressure, the economist Ester Boserup (1965), chal-
lenged the Malthusian idea that population growth inevitably outstrips 
the capacity of land to produce enough food. Boserup’s main thesis was 
that, contrary to prevailing ideas, primitive communities with sustained 
population growth have a better chance of achieving economic devel-
opment than primitive communities with stagnant or declining popula-
tions. This was attributed to population growth in rural areas being a 
main driver of innovation as well as land intensification stimulating land-
saving practices (Boserup 1965, 4).  
As underlined by Scoones and colleagues (2018), Boserup’s theory 
aligns well with the neoclassical economic understanding of natural re-
source scarcity, which was influenced by earlier works in classical eco-
nomics, and particularly by David Ricardo. Ricardo’s theory of scarcity 
rests on the assumption that land is not absolutely limited, but that it in-
deed declines in quality as it is increasingly exploited. However, Ricardo 
emphasised that agricultural productivity is influenced not only by the 
quality of the remaining available land, but also by the amount of finan-
cial capital, and the ‘skill, ingenuity and instruments in agriculture’ 
(Ricardo 1821, cited in Scoones et al. 2018, 3). For neoclassical econo-
mists, there is no need to stipulate limits on human population, con-
sumption, and growth, because properly functioning markets will pro-
vide the incentives needed for conservation and technological 
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innovations. Implicit within this perspective is the idea that natural re-
sources are not necessarily in limited supply, because the capacity of hu-
mans to adapt is generally capable of compensating for shortages associ-
ated with particular resources (see Chenoweth and Feitelson 2005 for a 
review). In this sense, it is generally assumed that ‘continuous substitu-
tion is always possible’ – at least to some degree (Baumgärtner et al. 
2006, 489). 
The adaptation concept became central to the hazards literature of 
the 1970s, through which adaptation was conceptualised as a ‘purposeful 
adjustment’ to environmental hazards. In the context of climate change, 
the concept of adaptation is central (see Bassett and Fogelman 2013), 
with the IPCC defining adaptation as ‘the process of adjustment to actu-
al or expected climate and its effects’ (IPCC 1990). Moreover, it is im-
portant to note that, although mitigation and adaptation have been treat-
ed separately by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and within IPCC reports, this separation is concep-
tually problematic. In fact, mitigation ought to be understood not as a 
separate domain but as a subset of adaptation: mitigation is an adaptive 
act aimed at ameliorating and reversing the forces behind climate change. 
In this way, lifestyle changes and technological solutions to reduce car-
bon can be regarded as acts of adaptation targeted at supporting mitiga-
tion (Pelling 2010, 22).   
 
Green Growth and Innovative Investment 
According to ecological modernisation theories, technological innova-
tions can break the vicious cycle of growth and degradation – enabling 
economic growth and environmental conservation to work in unison 
(Mol and Spaargaren 2000). This is the fundamental assumption behind 
green growth perspectives. From this perspective, new technologies and 
new farming techniques can contribute to decreasing the ‘yield gap’ 
whilst also equipping farming to be more efficient and productive. The 
assumption that large-scale commercial farms allow for higher produc-
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tivity on smaller plots of land, and are thus a more effective way to man-
age natural resources and increase food production than traditional 
modes of farming, has been present ever since the Green Revolution 
(Eric B. Ross 1998). In the context of the global land rush, a report by 
the World Bank entitled The Rising Interest in Farmland argued that large-
scale land acquisitions can reduce poverty by introducing a more effi-
cient use of underutilised land (Deininger and Byerlee 2011; see Li 2011 
for a critique). Although challenges concerning land grabs are acknowl-
edged, these are attributed to weak governance systems in fragile or 
failed states, which lack the appropriate tenure security or land markets 
supposedly necessary to protect their territories and populations. Implicit 
within this view is the idea that if bureaucratic and legal systems are im-
proved, land titling programs are implemented, and land deals occur fol-
lowing business responsibility models including principles of Free, Prior, 
and Informed Consent (FPIC), then large-scale land acquisitions and es-
pecially those aimed at conservation or the production of biofuels, have 
immense potential to contribute to sustainable development and poverty 
reduction (Wolford et al. 2013, 191).  
In addition to biofuel production, forest carbon projects and climate 
smart agriculture are also presented as ideal ways to solve the environ-
mental crisis, whilst also continuing to enhance adaption and limit food 
and energy security threats. Technical solutions to climate change include 
developing infrastructure, such as irrigation and dams, or responses that 
seek to create biophysical changes, such as carbon sequestration and ge-
oengineering (Nightingale et al. 2019, 2). The view follows that, if natural 
resources are managed efficiently, with adequate price incentives and dis-
incentives, the security problematics of ‘resource wars’ emanating from 
land acquisitions can be avoided, resulting in adaptive options. In these 
framings, although material constraints do exist, and population growth 
stresses the limits, the main problem lies in an underproductive system 
that stems from the suboptimal allocation of resources (Scoones et al. 
2019, 234).  
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Making Migration Work for Adaptation  
Within this broad adaption framing, migration does not need to pose an 
environmental or national security threat. If well managed, migration, 
and the labour pool it creates, has the potential to become as a key in-
gredient of the optimal allocation of production factors, as labour is cen-
tral to this. In fact, in neoclassical economics, migration is viewed as a 
self-regulating process through which spatial differences in labour de-
mand and labour supply adjust themselves – and hence adapt to one an-
other. As shown by Ravenstein’s Laws of Migration (1885), it is primarily 
wage differentials that stimulate migration – especially from rural to ur-
ban areas where ‘the economic rational man’ calculates a cost-benefit 
analysis in order to decide whether to move or not. In his extremely 
popular ‘push-pull’ model, he argued that ‘traditional’ people migrate 
from the countryside to cities and from ‘less developed’ to ‘more devel-
oped countries’ (Kearney 1986, 334).  
From this neoclassical perspective, people affected by environmental 
changes and disasters thus make a rational decision to leave in order to 
sustain themselves and their families. People ‘adapt’ by moving to places 
where natural resources and/or labour are available. Indeed, the notion 
that population movements are an adaptive mechanism to environmental 
change is also well-rooted in the discipline of geography (for a review, 
see  McLeman and Gemenne 2018). Since prehistoric times, people have 
migrated temporally or definitively during periods of droughts, floods, 
and other climatic events that have impinged either directly on their 
lives, such as by driving people into exile, or indirectly by affecting their 
livelihoods and ability to sustain themselves. Consequently, migration 
has always been one of the most important survival strategies adopted by 
people in the face of environmental changes and other economic factors 
(Hugo 1996). 
Migration can serve as a way to reduce population pressures in places 
affected by environmental change (McLeman and Hunter 2010). Moreo-
ver, migration can result in not only a higher degree of human security 
for those who leave, but also for those who stay; migration can provide 
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the potential for improved adaptive capacities and resilience for those 
remaining family members, due to the remittances they receive from 
family members that migrated (Warner and Afifi 2014). This is especially 
important given that many countries rely heavily on economic remittanc-
es of migrants abroad. In fact, in many countries, remittances have sur-
passed other sources of external funding, such as Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  
   Today, the migration as adaptation thesis is widely popular in envi-
ronmental migration research (see Gemenne and Blocher 2017 for a re-
view). It rests on an important nuance that came into popularity through 
The New Economics of Labor Migration thesis developed by Stark and Bloom 
(1985); their analysis shifted the locus of decision-making from the indi-
vidual to the household while underlining that it is relative, rather than 
absolute, deprivation that is a key determining factor in migratory deci-
sion-making. Rather than interpreting individuals as rational income 
maximisers, Stark and Bloom underlined that these decisions are not ac-
tually made individually, but by households. The framing of migration as 
an adaptation strategy to environmental change recognises the agency of 
migrants and assumes that remittances will be invested in the communi-
ties of origin in order to improve resilience to environmental stress 
(Warner and Afifi 2014; see Bettini and Gioli 2016 for a critique). Ac-
cording to this idea, the key lies in well managed migration which can 
serve as an adaptation option to climate change. Not only does enforcing 
state borders to deter migration decrease the human security for those 
that are obliged to flee detrimental environmental conditions, but deter-
ring migration is also counterproductive for development. 
The reading of migration as adaptation to environmental change has 
featured at the international climate change negotiations, and the United 
Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) recog-
nised the growing importance of migration and displacement within the 
2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework (Warner 2012). In this framing, 
bilateral and circular migration programs between areas that are envi-
ronmentally stressed and those that require additional labour resources, 
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are often thought as an ideal ‘win-win’ scenario. Through appropriate 
‘migration management’, these perspectives hold that population pres-
sures at the origin can be relieved, destination areas can receive the extra 
labour force they require, and migrants themselves can contribute to the 
development and adaptation of their communities of origin through so-
cio-economic remittances (see Vigil 2016 for a critique).  
Although security concerns are not alien to adaptation framings, the 
concept of adaptation is more attuned to concepts of human security 
than to those of national security. The Global Environmental Change 
and Human Security program defines human security as: ‘something that 
is achieved when and where individuals and communities have the op-
tions necessary to end, mitigate or adapt to threats to their human, envi-
ronmental and social rights; have the capacity and freedom to exercise 
these options; and actively participate in pursuing these options’ (Brauch 
et al. 2008, 360). In the 1990s, the idea of human security, which sought 
to link the complex interactions between social, political and environ-
mental factors, entered into the UN discourse shifting the discourse on 
security (Baldwin, Methmann, and Rothe 2014, 124). From a human se-
curity perspective, environmental change is considered as a threat to hu-
man security. However, although the ‘migration as a security threat’ dis-
course and the ‘migration as adaptation’ discourse appear to be based 
upon different underlying assumptions, critics have argued that both op-
erate within the contours of the mainstream neoliberal discourses on 
climate change, because they aim to ‘make the unruly governable’ (Betti-
ni 2014). 
While the interrelationships between environmental change, migra-
tion, and land grabs are not coherently articulated within this neoclassical 
and adaptive view, the implicit understanding of how these phenomenon 
interrelate begin to emerge as follows: If correctly managed, large-scale 
land investments in agriculture can enhance adaptive options by improv-
ing technologies and innovations and creating employment (which can 
potentially diminish forced migration). Moreover, migration per se does 
not need to be problematic or raise security concerns. As long as it is 
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well managed, it can compensate for labour shortages in receiving re-
gions, whilst simultaneously contributing to alleviating environmental 
stress and the adaptation of their communities of origin through remit-
tances.  
1.3 Variegated Geopolitical Ecologies 
Both the broadly understood neo-Malthusian and neoclassical frames 
examined above highlight different root causes and chains of explanation 
between environmental change, land grabs, and migration. The way in 
which the problem is identified and understood (i.e. whether the prob-
lem lies within absolute or relative scarcity, population growth, or a sub-
allocation of production factors), has important consequences on how 
proposed solutions are imagined (i.e. population control, or manage-
ment, ingenuity and innovation). From a structuralist perspective, how-
ever, the assumptions on which both frames rely, as well as the solutions 
that stem from these visions of the world are partial at best and can be 
problematic at worst. In both frames, concerns over environmental 
change, resource grabs, and migration have been ‘disembedded’ (a la Po-
lanyi) from the socio-political and structural factors that originally caused 
them. Hence, according to structuralist readings, it is not population 
growth or an absolute or even relative scarcity of resources that is the 
problem (or root cause), but rather a socio-political and economic sys-
tem that relies upon exploitation and the continuous commodification of 
both nature and labour. As Scoones and colleagues have argued (2019), 
whereas environmental security is utmost concerned with absolute scarcity, 
and neoclassical economics with relative scarcity, a political economy and 
political ecology reading forces our attention to political scarcity (Scoones 
et al. 2019, 233- own emphasis).   
 
Re-Embedding and Historicising Destruction and Expulsion  
From a structuralist perspective, migration cannot be understood sepa-
rately from the socio-political and historical context in which it emerges. 
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As the renowned migration scholar, Stephen Castles, argues, ‘A theory of 
global change in which the economy is seen as disembedded from socie-
ty, and the political and social consequences are treated as inevitable ‘ex-
ternalities’ (as economists put it), leads also to a disembedded under-
standing of migration. This means seeking the determinants of migration 
in a range of rational choices based on economic interests. The essential 
link to massive changes in global economic and political power relation-
ships and the resulting social transformation process is absent’ (Castles 
2010, 1578).  
Instead, world systems accounts of migration (Wallerstein 1980), 
which are grounded on the concepts of structural penetration and the 
‘unbalancing’ of peripheral areas, emphasise that it is precisely the inser-
tion of the periphery into the world capitalist system that leads to exploi-
tation (Amin 1974, 1982; Frank 1975, 1980, 2004; Wallerstein 1980) and 
creates the conditions for massive displacement (Portes and Walton 
2013; Sassen 1988). Even if environmental problems existed prior to 
capitalism, these tended to be local and regional. The advent of capital-
ism globalised these environmental problems, by making them depend-
ent upon other changes in the world economy (Moore 2003, 99). Coloni-
alism is seen as inseparable from capitalism since it is the system that 
initiated the hyper-exploitation and plunder of the Global South. The 
world ecology approach, which can be understood as a world systems 
perspective of political ecology, situates the origins of today’s environ-
mental crises in a socio-economic system that began with colonialism, as 
opposed to with the Industrial Revolution and with coal and steam 
(Moore 2015).  
Structuralist readings of migration identify colonialism as the starting 
point of colonizing migrations - defined as migrations that involve ‘the geo-
graphic displacement to areas where natural resources and labour are 
more readily available’ (Portes 1978, 2) - which led not only to the de-
struction of previous forms of community and the exploitation of la-
bour, but also to the exploitation of natural resources for the benefit of 
colonising powers (Castles 2017, 1539). Following this analytical angle, 
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population growth and migration are not problems per se. Rather, it is the 
increase of a certain type of population, in a particular world economy, 
which is responsible for both environmental collapse and forced migra-
tion. Given that only 10% of the global population is responsible for 
over half of all greenhouse gas emissions, and that the richest 1% of the 
population emits more carbon than over half of the world’s poorest 
populations, it is indeed easy to see why it is a ‘certain class’ of popula-
tion that is the cause, and not humanity as a whole. For this reason, 
some authors have suggested that the term ‘Capitalocene’ is a more ap-
propriate concept to use than that of the Anthropocene (literally, the age 
of humans) in order to underline the decisive impacts that a certain type 
of humanity has had upon the world’s ecological system (Moore 2015, 
2011; McBrien 2016). Deploying a world systems and world ecology per-
spective enables us to situate the roots of the problem within the socio-
economic system itself. In doing so, the interrelations between environ-
mental change, land grabs, and migration begin to appear quite different-
ly to those highlighted in the previous two framings.  
With regards to the links between land grabs and migration, Marxist 
concepts are particularly important. The Marxist category of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ is based primarily on the expropriation of the peasantry, 
pointing to both a logic of extraction that can expropriate and 
impoverish and also to a mode of incorporating capitalist economies into 
non-capitalistic ones (Sassen 2010). According to this view, it is precisely 
through this process that ‘great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly 
torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled onto the labour market 
as free, unprotected and rightless proletarians’ 01/11/2019 20:03:00. In 
introducing the concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, David Har-
vey sought to emphasise that primitive accumulation is an ongoing pro-
cess in the post-Keynesian period (from the 1970s onwards), and that 
predatory capital accumulation practices continue to play a major role in 
the current conjuncture (Arrighi, Aschoff, and Scully 2010, 411). Here 
capital accumulation is not seen as previous to capitalism, but instead as 
intimately linked to it (Wolford et al. 2013, 197). The colonizing migrations 
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that Alejandro Portes has analysed share some strong similarities with 
the migration of corporate investors, who migrate to places where cheap na-
ture and cheap labour are available today.  
Through the historical-structuralist analytical lens, migration is not 
generally seen as an adaptive process - as neoclassical economics or ‘mi-
gration as adaptation’ theses would posit - but rather as a process of ex-
ploitation and disempowerment, in which choices to move or stay for 
the most vulnerable are very limited (Veltmeyer and Delgado Wise 
2016). Another useful analytical category for the aims of this research is 
the Marxian concept of ‘relative surplus population’. The use of relative 
here is used to distinguish it from the Malthusian term of ‘surplus popu-
lation’. As Tania Li has explained, the term ‘surplus’ in Marx’s ‘relative 
surplus population’ concept,  does not mean surplus to societal and 
environmental needs – as in Malthus – but rather surplus to capital’s 
demand for labour (Li 2010, 68). In this view, population growth is es-
sential for capitalist expansion because it forms the ‘disposable reserve 
army’, which both prevents wages from rising (and hence cutting profits) 
and forms a mass of human material always ready for exploitation 
(Harvey 1974). Moreover, in many countries of the Global South, the 
anticipated transition from the farm to the factory has not occurred (Li 
2011). The mechanisms of dispossession of our current period have 
been explored by Saskia Sassen through her concept of ‘expulsions.’ Ac-
cording to her analysis, the most vulnerable are ‘expulsed’ through emer-
gent systemic trends of which the creation of new global markets for 
land and the destruction of the environment are amongst the most evi-
dent and far-reaching (Sassen 2014). These casual and unprotected 
labourers then enter into complex patterns of labour circulation through 
‘the barrios and favelas of the world-system’ (Wallerstein 2003, 24). This 
dynamic of continued pauperisation of the population has also been viv-
idly described in Mike Davis’s Planet of Slums (2006). In the context of 
this dissertation, a structuralist reading that combines the aforemen-
tioned elements of the interlinkages between certain types of migration 
(colonising or corporate migrations), environmental destruction, re-
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source appropriations, and expulsions enables us to historicise, re-
politicise, and turn the interlinkages between environmental change, land 
grabs and migration on their head.   
 
Challenging Security and Adaptation Framings 
Linked to structuralist theories, scholars within the political ecology tra-
dition reject the ‘end-point vulnerability approach’, which considers vul-
nerability as the result of certain external events such as environmental 
change. Instead, they assume a ‘starting point’ vulnerability approach  
(O’Brien et al. 2007, 74-75),  whereby vulnerability is socially and envi-
ronmentally constituted to highlight that ‘vulnerability does not (simply) 
fall from the sky’ (Ribot 2014). According to its classic definition, politi-
cal ecology ‘combines the concerns of ecology with a broadly defined 
political economy’ (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987, 17). Political ecology 
departs from the assumption that no environmental issue can be ex-
plained without accounting for structural political factors. Instead of fol-
lowing a deductive approach that links environmental scarcity or abun-
dance to social effects - such as conflict, social segmentation, or forced 
migration - political ecology broadens the scope to a wider array of his-
torically and geographically contingent actors and processes – something 
that Watts (2004) calls the ‘resource complex’. In doing so, political 
ecology shows how economic and political processes, networks, and dis-
courses operating at international, national, and local levels interact to 
produce environmental outcomes in particular places, thereby providing 
a contextualised analysis of how ‘socio-natures’ (Swyngedouw 2004) are 
mutually (re)constituted, both materially and discursively at multiple 
scales (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Bodin and Tengö 2012; Elinor 
Ostrom 2010; Swyngedouw 2004). Political ecology takes material and 
biophysical limits seriously, but it forces our attention to the intercon-
nections between biophysical landscapes and broader political economies 
of development, and how these are (re)shaped through global discourses 
(McCarthy and Prudham 2004; MacDonald 2010). 
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With respect to neo-Malthusian environmental security framings, po-
litical ecologists have long rejected simplistic causal links between envi-
ronmental factors and conflict (Peluso and Watts 2001). By analysing the 
politicisation of the environment through conflict and seeking to explain 
how conflicts develop around environmental issues and not as a result of 
them, political ecology offers a departure from the neo-Malthusian con-
cept of environmental conflict (Le Billon 2015, 598). The relationships 
between security and conservation are considered from a political ecolo-
gy standpoint through examples such as how protected areas become 
intertwined with military practices that seek to protect nature through  
security measures (Peluso 1993; Peluso and Watts 2001). Political ecol-
ogists have deemed neo-Malthusian conceptions of land sparing (as a 
conservation mechanism) to be often encompassing instances of what 
has been defined as ‘fortress conservation’ (Brockington 2002). Fortress 
conservation pursues the preservation of wildlife and habitat through the 
forceful exclusion of the local communities that have traditionally relied 
on the resources for their livelihoods (Brockington 2002; Igoe 2002). 
This is in line with theories of securitisation that view security not only 
for what it is, but importantly for what it does (Buzan and Wæver 2009).  
Securitisation can be understood as act of presenting a particular issue as 
an existential threat, which then justifies the deployment of exceptional 
measures to deal with the identified threat (Buzan et al. 1998). In this 
view, securitising environmental issues can then justify the deployment 
of violence and force (Barnett 2001, 9–10). Critical conservation scholars 
have demonstrated how fortress conservation permits ‘accumulation by 
securitization’. This concept can be understood as encompassing the acts 
through which capital accumulation is ‘enabled by practices and related 
logics of security in ways that often provoke dispossession, with such 
dispossession itself enabling further accumulation’ (Massé and Lunstrum 
2016, 228).  
From a geopolitical perspective, these protected areas can be under-
stood as the expression of localised sites to address global struggles, such 
as those of climate change and biodiversity conservation, which are pre-
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sented as global security risks (Kelly and Ybarra 2016). In this sense, po-
litical ecology stresses the dangers, and the profound political implica-
tions, of the supposed ethically-neutral, scientific discussions concerning 
the relationships between population and resources, especially those of 
neo-Malthusians, which have served to legitimise ‘repression at home 
and neo-colonial policies abroad’ (Harvey 1974, 256). Given that the 
Malthusian ‘population bomb’ is now situated in the underdeveloped 
Global South, its arguments can be used to justify the deployment of 
instruments for the containment of unwanted or unnecessary popula-
tions (Robbins 2011). Environmental justifications and risk management 
strategies have also been used to legitimise massive resettlements and the 
displacement of the most marginalized populations(Nygren and Wayessa 
2018). 
Political ecologists have shown how states have appropriated envi-
ronmental concerns from global institutions not only as a means to at-
tract funding, but also to further their own control over productive natu-
ral resources, even at times employing coercion or violence to do so 
(Peluso 1993). Moreover, although development interventions, such as 
land investments, are often presented as a way to alleviate rural poverty, 
from a critical geopolitical reading, the global containment of irregular 
migration is the backdrop, usually left unspoken, against which the cur-
rent development-security nexus operates (Duffield 2010). Political geog-
raphy has also challenged traditional international relations and geopolit-
ical assumptions by arguing that it is politics (and not geography) that 
determines which resources are valued and who can (or cannot) access 
them (Dalby 1992; Peluso and Watts 2001). Adopting a constructivist 
perspective, critical geopolitics examines the very construction and social 
effects of geopolitical imaginations and geopolitical identities: the imagi-
nary spatial positioning of people, regions, and states and the shifting 
boundaries that accompany their positioning. In doing so, critical geopo-
litical scholars have argued that environmental issues can be used to 
support geopolitical arguments that shape the physical realities of power 
and place (Dalby 2013).  
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Securitisation theory has also been used to examine how dangers, 
threats and risks around climate and migration are constructed, to in turn 
understand how these constructions influence politics (Baldwin, 
Methmann, and Rothe 2014). With respect to reductionist hypotheses 
concerning the links between environmental change, migration, and se-
curity, Hartmann (2010) has argued that the securitisation of environ-
mental migration may end up militarising not just migration and climate 
policy, but also development aid. This is evident in the use of degrada-
tion narratives to criminalise migrants as well as in fortress conservation 
approaches to keep certain people out,  which can be understood as a 
micro level intervention for the containment of population circulation 
(Hartmann 2010). With regards to the idea that valuable resources lead 
to conflict – also known as the ‘resource curse’ thesis – much of this re-
search has tended to pathologize resource-producing regions and to de-
pict its populations as ‘naturally’ inclined to fight over resources, rather 
than to find cooperative solutions (Zalik 2011). Additionally, and in con-
trast to the reputed thesis of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin 
1968), an extensive body of work drawing on Elinor Ostrom has shown 
that community systems of production and subsistence are able to de-
velop effective self-governing institutions. The sustainable governance of 
the commons is not only possible, but often the best alternative because 
local communities are able to develop governing arrangements to fit 
their particular needs (Ostrom 1990; Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003; 
Ostrom 2010; Agrawal 2001). As political philosophers have also under-
lined, the tragedy of our times is that of appropriation (Zarka 2013), and 
not that of the commons.  
Moreover, the literature has demonstrated that there is no simple link 
of causality between climate change, migration and violent conflict 
(Gemenne et al. 2014). However, climate change and migration discours-
es can support measures taken to close borders as well as the securitisa-
tion of control in migration destination areas (Bettini 2013; Boas 2015).  
Political geographers have also provided empirical evidence to debunk 
the myth that massive drought-induced migration exacerbated the socio-
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economic pressures that subsequently led to the Syrian civil war (Fröh-
lich 2016; Selby et al. 2017). Regarding narratives that link climate change 
to terrorism, political ecologists studying pastoralism in Mali, have ar-
gued that the rural peasantry tends to support jihadist groups, because 
people have become increasingly fatigued by a predatory and corrupt 
state and because the developmental model has not responded to pasto-
ral priorities. Instead of focusing on Islamism,  they underline how ques-
tions of access to resources have fed into the anti-state, anti-elite dis-
course, which is shared by jihadist groups (Benjaminsen and Ba 2019).   
As they do with mainstream security framings, political ecologists also 
underline that what counts as adaptive or not, is always political and 
therefore contested. Although adaptation projects can secure resources 
for some groups, they often do so at the expense of excluding others 
(Taylor 2014). As a result, adaptation actions influence social relations 
and the governance and distribution of resources (Eriksen, Nightingale, 
and Eakin 2015). Political ecologists challenge cornucopian (or adaptive) 
approaches that posit that ‘technological fixes’ (Harvey 2001) within the 
established socio-economic system will solve the ‘climate problem’. 
These authors warn of ‘selling nature in order to save it’ (McAfee 2012), 
underlining the contradictory logics of embedded within ‘green capital-
ism’ (Dobson 2000; Falkner 2013; Fletcher 2017; Arsel and Büscher 
2012). From this perspective, market solutions are less concerned with 
preserving ecosystems than they are with ‘making nature work for capi-
tal’ (Igoe 2010; Büscher and Arsel 2012, 130). Consequently, these anal-
yses tend to reject endeavours of carbon trading, offsets, and biofuel 
production as forms of ‘greenwashing’ for private profit that often deep-
en environmental inequities rather than solve them (Bakker 2016, 446). 
This logic is based upon the observation that neoliberal market-based 
solutions tend to suggest that environmental degradation is an externality 
that can be internalised within the very system that produced it. Hence 
market-based solutions treat environmental degradation as if it were a 
‘market failure’, rather than being a failure of the ‘market society’ (Wright 
and Nyberg 2014). These ‘solutions’ can be interpreted as ‘spatial fixes’ 
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that are inherent to capitalism in its pursuit to resolve its crisis tendencies 
through geographical expansion and restructuring (Harvey 2001, 73–74). 
The power of the adaptation narrative lies in its affinity to ‘discourses 
of security, risk management and (neoliberal) resilient social systems’, 
whereby ‘the idea of spontaneous market order has become, ironically, a 
form of sustainable development’ (M. J. Watts 2015, 41). By presenting 
‘nature’ as external to ‘society’ – as adaptation frames tend to do – the 
adaptation framing succeeds in creating a new justification for develop-
ment interventions that fall within existing institutional parameters (Tay-
lor 2014, 7–8). Yet, from a political economy and political ecology per-
spective there is no space for divides between nature and society given 
that ‘all ecological and environmental projects are socio-economic pro-
jects and vice versa’ (Harvey 2014, ch.16). When interventions make 
these distinctions, they can lead to processes of  ‘regeneration by dispos-
session’, which has been defined as ‘the capitalist project of operating 
within and regenerating nature by dispossessing ordinary villagers to fa-
cilitate continuous capital accumulation’ (Borras and Franco 2018, 1319). 
Political ecologists and critical geographers have criticised the ‘neolib-
eralisation of nature’ (McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Buscher and 
Dressler 2007) and the ‘economy of repair’ (Fairhead, Leach, and 
Scoones 2012a, 242) for suggesting that destructive practices in one 
place can be ‘mitigated’ by more sustainable ones in another (Leach, 
Fairhead, and Fraser 2012). Instead, they have highlighted how discur-
sive strategies over nature are used to create mystifications over nature 
and to hide the realities that nature suffers under capitalism (Dalby 
2013a; Parenti 2011). In doing so, technocratic and neoliberal environ-
mental discourses and policies, allow political actions to be presented as 
apolitical, and hence outside the contours of controversies which are es-
sential to politics (Swyngedouw 2011). 
From a critical geopolitical standpoint, these arguments are premised 
on the assumptions that a rich, developed Global North must master 
nature because the poor underdeveloped Global South is unable to do so 
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(Dalby 1992). Scholars within the tradition of environmental justice have 
highlighted the ‘eco-imperialist’ traits of environmental policies that im-
pose Northern environmental views upon the Global South (Martinez-
Alier 2003; Nygren 2013). For example, new carbon markets have been 
described as creating what has been referred to as the ‘new geopolitics of 
climate change’ (Dalby 2013). Although the idea that the environmental 
crisis signifies the end of capitalism has become widespread, Harvey 
does not interpret the looming environmental crisis as necessarily a fatal 
contradiction for capitalism. Instead, he highlights how capital has a long 
history of circulating and accommodating to environmental crises and 
that capital has managed to turn nature into ‘big business’ (Harvey 2014). 
Similarly, but with regards to migration, the adaptation thesis has also 
been rejected from structuralist perspectives for often amounting to little 
more than ‘making migration work for capital’, rather than for migrants 
themselves.  Critical authors have highlighted that the ‘migration as adap-
tation’ theses have strong similarities to neoliberal thinking (Felli 2013; 
Bettini 2014; Baldwin 2012; Baldwin and Fornalé 2017). This is because 
the term ‘adaptation’ implicitly places the burden of change on the af-
fected unit (hence the migrant), rather than on those responsible for cre-
ating vulnerability. By placing the burden of adaptation upon migrants, 
concerns with climate justice, rights and responsibilities are diluted be-
cause the logic of presenting migration as adaptation is mostly concerned 
with accommodating labour migration to the exigencies of capital 
(Bettini, Nash, and Gioli 2016). When migrants are presented as ‘entre-
preneurial subjects’ (Bettini 2014), this can reinforce their vulnerability 
by conditioning population movements to a productive accumulation of 
capital (Felli 2016, ch. 4). By doing so, the migration as adaptation thesis 
also offers a de-politicised reading of both climate change and migration 
to which one must accommodate and/or adapt instead of question and 
resist (Baldwin and Fornalé 2017, 324). From this, it follows that both of 
the terms ‘climate refugees’ and ‘environmental migrants’, when misused 
and manipulated to serve political aims, can provide a means for evading 
culpability to those responsible for population displacement. Evasion is 
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made possible because these terms provide governments and develop-
ment agencies with a convenient excuse, as disasters like hunger, conflict 
or forced displacement can be simply attributed to over-population or 
environmental change (Blaikie et al. 2004).  
 
Inserting a Political Ecology of Access to Migration 
Narratives which support large-scale investment often point to land ti-
tling and land formalisation as the best strategies to protect the vulnera-
ble from land grabs (Deininger and Byerlee 2012). However, it is im-
portant to note that many land deals actually occur legally (meaning that 
they abide by the written legal articles) and therefore occur in spite of 
property rights and tenure reforms. Focusing solely on tenure rights in 
this context is therefore insufficient. In order to understand how land 
grabs affect both migration and environmental change, the theory of ac-
cess developed by Ribot and Peluso (2003) offers important insights. 
Access, as conceptualised by these two scholars, is defined as the ‘the 
ability to derive benefits from things’, rather than the classical property’s 
definition of ‘the right to benefit from things’ (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 
156). As these authors have underlined, law (whether written or oral, 
formal or customary) can never completely delineate all the modes and 
pathways of resource access along complex and overlapping webs of 
power (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 156). Ribot and Peluso explain that even 
the terms ‘property relations’ and ‘tenure’ examine only those relations 
of resource ownership and control that have been sanctioned in some 
way by a social institution. Whereas the notion of ‘property’ can be un-
derstood as a ‘bundle of rights’, ‘access’, on the contrary, is more analo-
gous to a ‘bundle of powers’ and it  includes a wider range of social rela-
tionships that constrain or enable benefits from resource use than the 
notion of property rights does (Ribot and Peluso 2003). By focussing on 
access rather than on property, we can begin to understand not just who 
benefits from resources, but why some people or institutions benefit 
from resources, regardless of whether they have rights to them (Ribot and 
Peluso 2003, 154). Access to livelihood opportunities depends on mech-
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anisms of social inclusion and exclusion, on social relations and differen-
tiations within communities, and – crucially – on power relations (De 
Haan and Zoomers 2005). In the context of globalisation, we must ana-
lyse how this access is shaped by diverse networked spaces and the posi-
tionality within them (Zoomers 2018, 2). By using access as a conceptual 
tool, we are then able to locate property as just one (among many) larger 
socio-political relations and discursive strategies that shape the four basic 
questions of agrarian political economy: who has what? who does what? 
who gets what? what do they do with it? (Bernstein 2004). To these four 
questions, we can add a fifth for the purpose of this thesis: and how does 
all of this impact migration?  
 
Variegation and the Role of the State 
Despite the power of the world system as an analytical category in which 
to embed and understand the interrelationships between environmental 
change, land grabs, and migration, it is important to underline that the 
‘capitalist core’, as theorised by Marx, has not spread evenly nor has it 
maintained the same legitimisers and consequences throughout time and 
space (Henderson, Appelbaum, and Ho 2013). The variegated capitalism 
literature emerged as a reaction to the entrenched opposition between 
structuralist understandings of neoliberalism as an ‘all-encompassing 
hegemonic bloc’ on the one hand, and post-structuralist accounts on the 
other hand, which emphasised a ‘radical contextual particularity’ (Peck 
and Theodore 2007). In searching for a middle ground between the spe-
cific and the general, the variegated capitalism literature conceptualises 
neoliberalisation as ‘historically specific, unevenly developed, hybrid, pat-
terned tendency of market disciplinary regulatory restructuring’ (Brenner, 
Peck, and Theodore 2010a, 330). In doing so, the framework is able to 
recognise multi-scalar complexities without erasing distinctive spatialities. 
Through a ‘geopolitical ecology’ framework, Bigger and Neimarck (2017) 
have underlined the need of  creating synergies between ‘the attention 
given by political ecology to multi-scalar environmental politics and the 
discursive-material co-constitution of global institutional geopolitics’ 
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(Bigger and Neimark 2017, 14). This work builds on this approach by 
paying attention to environmental and/or migration justifications and 
outcomes within variegated contexts.  
The use of variegation, requires us to pay attention to ‘the conflictual 
volatile, and contested interaction of transnational regulatory experiments 
with inherited (national and subnational) landscapes’ (Brenner, Peck, and 
Theodore 2010b, 195). In this sense, ‘globalization, in part, needs to seen 
as an ‘externalization’ of given national capitalisms and aspects of their 
attendant social formations’ (Henderson, Appelbaum, and Ho 2013, 
1222). This means that globalisation should also be understood as the 
‘consequence of the gradual externalization of the socio-political charac-
ter of particular forms of capitalism in particular historical periods’ 
(Henderson, Appelbaum, and Ho 2013, 1221), whereby land grabs con-
stitute a ‘proxy for geopolitical influence’ (Sebastian and Warner 2014). 
In the context of this thesis, ceasing the variegated impacts of the exter-
nalisation of particular forms of capitalism is important to understanding 
how changing geopolitical balances, as well as the particular position that 
certain states occupy within regional political economies, shapes the in-
terrelations under analysis. In other words, in order to understand how 
security and adaptation frames around migration and environmental 
change (re)shape ongoing dynamics around resource politics in particular 
places, we must pay particular attention to how and why broader geopo-
litical (im)balances are infused with other power struggles on the ground 
(not only at the nation level but also at the landscape level).  
Although the concept of territorialisation refers to a state-led process 
of spatial demarcation for the purpose of controlling and regulating peo-
ple and nature (Scott 1998)2, territorial practices are not limited to na-
tional borders or to state actors (Corson 2011); this is especially evident 
through globalisation. Today, not only are territorial practices not limited 
to national borders, but the territorial practices of one actor affect those 
of the other actors (Lee, Wainwright, and Glassman 2018). Hence, the 
production of territory is never simply the outcome of a single state’s 
activity, but rather is an effect of actions by multiple actors, located at 
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multiple scales, (not exclusively states) and is not necessarily intentional. 
Through the global land rush, we see the very visible impacts of what 
has been termed the ‘foreignisation of space’ (Zoomers 2010) or the ‘de-
nationalization of national territory’ (Sassen 2013). This does not mean 
that the state is no longer a key actor, however. In spite of claims to the 
contrary, authors have argued that the power of the state has not been 
erased in today’s globalised context (Sassen 2006, 2013b). Although there 
has been a ‘hybridisation of authority’, through which combinations of 
governments, intergovernmental organisations, corporations, and NGOs 
have merged to govern transnational issues such as climate change 
(Bulkeley 2005; Bulkeley et al. 2014), the transformations that the state 
has suffered are more nuanced than those indicated in narratives of state 
decline (Sassen 2002; 2003). The state remains a key player and different 
political regimes (ranging from democracies to authoritarian regimes) can 
influence outcomes. In fact, as Glassman underlines, it is true that ‘both 
the internationalization of capital is increasingly important and that states 
retain a crucial role in international political economy’ (Glassman 1999, 
673). States thus remain a key unit of analysis in this work, but today we 
must strive to both ‘See like a State’ (Scott 1998) and to also see beyond 
it.   
In order to understand the role of the state in shaping the interrela-
tions between environmental change, land grabs, and migration, we must 
first understand competing explanations of state-society-interactions. For 
Fox (1993), Weberian approaches to public policies tend to be state-
centric by depicting the state as an autonomous and independent entity. 
Marxists approaches, on the other hand, tend to be society-centred in 
that they see the state as an instrument of class rule with no autonomy. 
However, in the structural Marxist view, the constraints to the autonomy 
of the state are not only the result of the influence of class actors, but 
also the result of constraints imposed by the capitalist system itself. In 
this view, a degree of state autonomy is necessary not only to act inde-
pendently of particular interests, but also to defend the dominant social 
order as a whole. It is in this tradition of scholarship that James 
 Variegated Geopolitical Ecologies 35 
O’Connor has stressed that ‘the capitalistic state must try to fulfil two 
basic and often mutually contradictory functions – accumulation and legiti-
mation’ (O’Connor 1979, 6). Given that the capitalist state depends on 
the stable functioning of the economy for its revenues, the state must 
attempt to maintain and/or create the conditions for profitable capital 
accumulation. At the same time, however, it must try to maintain or cre-
ate the conditions for social peace and political stability. Following this, 
Fox developed an interactive state-society framework that considers state 
action as resulting from a ‘reciprocal cause and effect relationship be-
tween changes in balance of power within states and shifts in the balance 
of power within society’ (Fox 1993, 22). 
 The interactive state-society framework developed by Fox is useful in 
the context of this thesis because it allows us to understand not only 
how security and adaptation frameworks have been used to maintain the 
balance between capital accumulation and political legitimation, but also 
how society has reacted to the way these (im)balances shape different 
routes of action. States are not merely passive victims of land deals. 
Many states actually welcome land investments and make the necessary 
changes in legislation to facilitate them. However, there are variations in 
terms of the discourses used by different countries as well as in the ac-
tors, institutions and practices involved in land grabs (Wolford et al. 
2013). While some states have enforced strict regulations limiting foreign 
land ownership, others have embraced foreign large-scale land acquisi-
tions. Why some states might embrace land acquisitions while others re-
ject them is deeply entrenched in the need of the state to create the bal-
ance between capital accumulation and political legitimation, in order to 
minimise the likelihood of social upheaval.  
As Karl Polanyi’s double movement shows, the conversion of land 
(meaning nature at large), labour, and money into commodities, poses 
lethal threats to nature and human beings, which inevitably lead to griev-
ances, resistance, and demands for protection. As these demands for 
protection clash with the principles of economic liberalism and deepened 
commodification, a ‘double movement’ arises (Polanyi 1957; Peluso 
36 CHAPTER 1 
 
2012). The basic objective of the double or countermovement is to limit 
the influence of markets over society and to manage the ‘fictitious com-
modities’; those that have not been produced for the market. Paying at-
tention to double movements is important in understanding how people 
resist the commodification of land and labour, as this commodification 
often forms the very basis of forced and distressed migratory move-
ments today. The particular forms that these double movements can 
take, however, are also dependent upon the particular historical mo-
ments and trajectories in which they develop (Peluso 2012, 83). Despite 
difference manifestations of double movements across political regimes, 
it is important to underline that the commodification of land and labour 
occurs throughout all regime types precisely because capitalism has ele-
vated ‘the market’ (and not states) to the dominant role in economic 
governance (Henderson, Appelbaum, and Ho 2013, 1226). Neoliberalism 
can be defined as ‘a theory of political economic practices which propos-
es that human well-being can be best advanced by the maximization of 
entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized 
by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and 
free trade. (In this context), the role of the state is to create and preserve 
an institutional framework appropriate to such practices’ (Harvey 2007, 
22).  
However, and despite stark critiques of market-based mechanisms for 
the management of natural resources, these are often perpetuated pre-
cisely because they still have wide societal support (Blühdorn 2007). In 
this context, and in order to understand the drivers of resistance (or lack 
of thereof), we must go beyond an analysis of double movements as 
those that arise between a ‘bad’ market and a ‘good’, caring social civil 
society (Carton 2014) to account for mechanisms of inclusion and exclu-
sion. This is particularly the case in the context of climate change where-
by the transboundary and global nature of climate change impacts, might 
create both ‘intra-class tensions and across-class alliances’ that challenge 
traditional class divisions and strategies of resistance (Arsel 2019). 
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In the context of this dissertation, an analysis of these variegated 
double movements – including where and why they succeed and fail – 
will allow us to shed light on why and how ‘political reactions from be-
low’ (Borras Jr and Franco 2013) emerge in different ways in the context 
of land grabbing and how these reactions shape the diverging security 
and adaptation impacts of the land grabs in, and beyond, the landscapes 
where they unfold. These histories of resistance are seen as forms of ‘ge-
opolitics from below’ that emanate from those dominated in an attempt 
to challenge the hegemony of the state (Routledge 2015, 236). This dis-
sertation pays attention to how variegated geopolitical ecologies from 
below unfold across landscapes as a means to connect the more micro-
level with the broader global level.  
 
1.4 Research Questions and Objectives 
The eclectic analytical framework of ‘variegated geopolitical ecology’ al-
lows us to embed, historicise, and problematise the interrelations be-
tween environmental change, land grabs, and migration within the con-
text of diverse types of capitalism that are embedded in shifting 
geopolitical configurations. It compels us to not only pay attention to the 
long trajectories that have shaped expulsion and destruction, but also to 
how these have been materially and discursively co-constituted through 
diverse deployments of security and adaptation framings. Moreover, it 
allows us to attend to the similarities and differences that are key in ex-
plaining variegated outcomes. It is by using the critical analytical and 
conceptual framework of variegated geopolitical ecologies that this dis-
sertation seeks to answer the main research question that underlines this 
work:  
 
Why and how do environmental change, land grabs and migration shape each other, 
both materially and discursively, and with what consequences?  
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The main proposition that guides this research is that the material and 
discursive interrelations between environmental change, land grabs, and 
migration are inherent to the contradictions between capital accumula-
tion and political legitimation that emerge in a world where both envi-
ronmental and migratory issues have become, understandably so, domi-
nant justifiers for policy and development interventions. These 
interrelations are shaped through the deployment of diverse security and 
adaptation frameworks that portray distress migration and environmental 
destruction as externalities that can be internalised within the very system 
that produced them. Despite the different forms that these interrelations 
assume across time and space, security and adaptation frames can serve 
to justify land grabs, advertently or inadvertently, by shaping the very 
conditions under which environmental destruction and migration occur, 
as well as the realities of security and adaptation beyond the landscapes 
where land grabs unfold. How these interrelationships unfold differently 
in specific places, and for what reasons, is an empirical question that this 
research will seek to address. To do so, the main cross-cutting research 
question is addressed through sub-questions that seek responses from 
different temporal, spatial, and geographic scales:  
How have the interrelations between environmental change, land 
grabs, and migration evolved historically in Senegal and Cambo-
dia, and why?  
How are global adaptation and security frames around environ-
mental change and/or migration serving to justify land grabs dif-
ferently in Senegal and Cambodia, and why?  
How have these land grabs unfolded in particular landscapes and 
with what main migratory and environmental impacts? 
What are the key risks that these specific cases pose at both the 
national and global levels in terms of adaptation and security?  




By answering these questions, this research aims to:   
 
1) Contribute to the ‘environmental migration’ literature by illuminating 
how discourses and frames around environmental change and/or migra-
tion (re)shape the socio-environmental conditions under which migra-
tion occurs, by shaping access to resources; 
 
2) Contribute to the ‘global land grab’ literature by giving particular at-
tention to how migration narratives overlap with environmental ones in 
legitimising resource grabs, and by drawing attention to the migratory 
drivers and impacts of such resource grabs;  
 
3) Contribute to both of these broad fields by providing new theoretical 
and methodological ways of linking the historical with the present, the 













1 Throughout the course of this dissertation, I have served as a policy advisor to 
the Hugo Observatory and have been a part of the Advisory Group on Climate 
Change and Human Mobility to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Given the increased policy attention to the inter-
connections between environmental change and migration in recent years, I have 
also served as a consultant for other international organisations on this topic, 
such as the World Bank, the FAO, and the Nansen Initiative. All throughout, I 
have had the opportunity to see first-hand how the topics that are at the centre of 
this work become framed and acted upon. While my involvement in these policy 
processes was not intended to be methodologically linked to this work, it deeply 
informed the way I came to see my own research and understand the power of 
both security and adaptation frameworks.  
2  See also, Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Whitehead, Jones, and Jones 2007; 




2 Global Ethnography and Incorporated Comparison 
 
Introduction 
How do we actually proceed with empirically investigating multi-scalar 
transboundary phenomenon such as environmental change, migration, 
and land grabs – and the discursive and material interrelations between 
them – in a way that does justice to variegation and impacts? This chap-
ter aims to show that the study of such complex socio-ecological phe-
nomenon can greatly benefit from the deployment of multi-case ethnog-
raphies. Multi-case ethnographies are able to capture not only the general 
pathway through which our objects of study have been (re)created and 
(re)shaped, but also their particularities and contingencies. Drawing on 
the literature on variegation, and employing a global ethnography meth-
odology, this dissertation is based on an incorporated comparison be-
tween two very diverse socio-political contexts: Senegal and Cambodia. 
These countries were chosen because they share a common French co-
lonial past which greatly determined the acceleration of environmental 
change, resource grabs, and migration in both places. Moreover, they are 
both countries where the recent global land grab has materialised, as well 
as being countries that are deeply touched by environmental degradation, 
climate change, and shifting migratory dynamics. 
However, the historical pathways of these two countries, and the 
state-society interactions that occur within each, have evolved in distinc-
tively different directions; these variations are key to explaining their di-
verse outcomes – and in thus allowing to cease variegation. Additionally, 
and as a result of their different integration paths within regional political 
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economies and diverse trading and investment networks, the justifica-
tions, as well as impacts, of resource grabs occur differently in these two 
contexts. While research at the national level can allow us to see the in-
teractions between the global and the national, is able to capture these 
complexities, a more locally-based ethnographic approach is necessary in 
order to deal with particular context specificities. In order to gain this 
locally-based nuance, this research draws on extensive ethnographic re-
search conducted in three specific landscapes where land grabs have 
been justified, advertently or inadvertently, by a variety of environmental 
and/or migratory narratives. The chapter is structured as follows: First, it 
explains the methodological apparatus, including the relevant epistemo-
logical and ontological discussions, that underpin this research. It then 
presents in detail the research design, the profile of the countries and 
landscapes under study, as well as the data collection techniques that 
were used. Finally, it explains the methodological challenges and limita-
tions that were encountered throughout the process. 
 
2.1 Global Ethnography and Incorporated Comparison 
Ethnographic fieldwork has long proven to be amongst the most useful 
qualitative research tools for offering novel insights at both the theoreti-
cal and empirical levels. Ethnographic approaches are particularly helpful 
when studying phenomenon where quantitative data sources are scarce, 
unclear, or debated. However, ethnographic research has too often relied 
upon single case study investigations which, while offering rich insights 
and empirical data on particular places and populations, most often lack 
the ability to be extrapolated beyond the specific places and contexts 
where the research has been conducted. Conversely, studies relying on 
broad data sets and multiple case studies often fail for the opposite rea-
son: they make more generalising claims that miss extremely important 
context specificities. As a reaction to these limitations, the sociologist 
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Georges Marcus introduced multi-sited ethnographies in his book, Eth-
nography Through Thick and Thin (1998).  
The purpose of Marcus’ methodology was to expand the traditional 
ethnographic method to incorporate multiple sites with the aim of ex-
plaining what binds them together. This approach does not limit itself to 
‘connecting the dots’ empirically, but rather is equally concerned with the 
broader path on which they are connected – meaning the broader histor-
ical world system relations that they are a part of. Although connections 
often involve direct, immediate contact between people or things, rela-
tions involve indirect, mediated contacts (Feldman 2011, 379), which are 
less discernible to the observers’ eye. As Marcus himself asks: ‘If multi-
sitedness designates a kind of path of movement in fieldwork, (then) 
where does the path come from?’ (Marcus 1995, 110).  Instead of consti-
tuting purely a contextual framework, in a multi-sited ethnography, the 
world system becomes integral to, and embedded in, the various objects 
of study in multiple sites.  
Although multi-sited ethnographies have been extremely useful in the 
study of commodity chains and transnational migration, the sociologist 
Michael Burawoy contended that multi-sited ethnographies depart from 
the assumption of pre-existing sites, and he argued that it is more fruitful 
to turn to cases. This means turning to theoretically constructed objects 
while being aware that it is the process through which we bring theory to 
each site that actually transforms them into cases of something. Epistemo-
logically, instead of pretending to free the researcher from all theoretical 
biases – as the positivist grounded theory approach strives to do (Glaser, 
Strauss, and Strutzel 1968; Glasser and Strauss 2008) – the extended case 
method contends that by its very definition no researcher is free of as-
sumptions and therefore, the assumptions must be overtly dealt with as 
they significantly shape what the researcher sees. It is in fact precisely 
through the theoretical understandings that the researcher brings, that 
the frictions, disconnections, and re-theorisations can be produced. Fol-
lowing this approach, a case is constituted in two ways. First, it is consti-
tuted by the social forces in which it is embedded and the social process-
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es it expresses. Second, it is constituted imaginatively by the position the 
researcher holds in the field as well as by the theoretical angle that is in-
troduced (Burawoy 1998). Instead of aiming to connect sites through 
networks or flows of people, as multi-sited ethnographies tend to do, the 
aim of the multi-case ethnography, and of the extended case method, is 
to compare cases with a view to understanding and explaining their dif-
ferences (Burawoy 2009).  
Taking as a methodological apparatus what Burawoy terms ‘global 
ethnography’ can help us to both distinguish common patterns around 
the world, as well as the particular forces that create them (Burawoy 
2009, 17). Even if the research is still located within particular locations, 
it considers those places to be globalised through multiple connections 
and relations (Gille and Riain 2002, 291). Hence, this methodology is 
capable of investigating ‘glocalisation’ (Swyngedouw 2004) and how par-
ticular localities are different expressions of multi-scalar interrelations 
(Sassen 2013). The extended case method achieves this by applying ‘re-
flexive science to ethnography in order to extract the general from the 
unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro’, and to connect the pre-
sent to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on pre-
existing theory’ (Burawoy 1998, 5).  In so doing, a global ethnography 
allows us to surpass the abstract implications of ‘globalisation’ by study-
ing its particular experiences – experiences that are not homogeneous 
and ubiquitous, but rather specific and concrete (Burawoy 2000) and 
hence variegated (Peck and Theodore 2007; Brenner, Peck, and 
Theodore 2010b).  
Interrelations between environmental change, resource grabs and mi-
gration – while global – are produced differently in various countries and 
particular communities and landscapes at different times. Certain causal 
explanations may prevail at one time and be overshadowed by other ex-
planations at another time. This is why turning to a comparative ap-
proach is especially useful to capture variegation and to show that what 
might seem as counterintuitive at a particular time within one particular 
world economic context, is only the product of complex interactions be-
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tween the broader whole and specific localities (Burawoy 2000, 152). 
However, and in order to avoid falling into the trap of objectifying the 
parts (or cases) as subordinated to the whole (system), McMichael pro-
posed to view the totality as a conceptual procedure, rather than as a con-
ceptual or empirical premise (McMichael 1990, 391). In an ‘incorporated 
comparison’ the parts are always relational categories and all objects are 
historically connected.  
Comparative inquiry tends to be constructed around an ‘external’ rela-
tionship between ‘cases’ and theory, where ‘cases’ or ‘wholes’, such as 
the nation-state, are abstracted from their time/place setting. In an inter-
connected comparison, however, nation-states are not assumed to be 
self-contained systems with common patterns. Rather, they are examples 
of interrelated instances that are integral to, and define, the general his-
torical process (McMichael 1990, 389). Comparison, in this view, is ‘in-
ternal’ to a historical inquiry, where processes are comparable because they 
are historically connected and mutually-conditioning. In order to achieve 
this, two types of non-mutually exclusive interconnected comparisons 
can be conducted. The first adopts a multiple form where instances are 
analysed as the result of continuously evolving process in and across time. 
Here, comparison is a systematic process that consists in the juxtaposi-
tion of instances through time. The second is a singular form, that anal-
yses variation in or across space within a particular world historical con-
juncture (McMichael 1990, 389). In other words, while cross-time 
comparison specifies that an era is composed of temporally differentiat-
ed instances or versions of a world-historical process, cross-space com-
parison specifies that a single conjuncture is the combination of particu-
lar spatially-located parts of a global configuration (McMichael 1990, 
671). These two forms can be combined, however, and it is precisely by 
drawing on both the global ethnographic approach and an interconnect-
ed cross-time and cross-space comparison that the research design for 
this research has developed.  
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2.2 Research Design and Data Collection 
This dissertation is designed by applying a global ethnography approach 
and using a cross-time and cross-space incorporated comparison to ac-
count for variegation. To do so, this work starts by embedding the varie-
gated ‘geopolitical ecological’ histories of Senegal and Cambodia, before 
proceeding to bridge these with the current conjuncture through in-
depth ethnographic research at both the national and local scales. It con-
siders not only how the global is interested in the national and the local, 
but also how these interrelations occur in the opposite direction.  As a 
result, the research design proceeds through a series of juxtapositions 
through which the global is collapsed and made into an integral part of 
related local situations (and vice-versa). 
In order to understand the (dis)connections that emerge between nar-
ratives and material realities, the research not only moves between dif-
ferent geographic locations, but also asks the same questions from dif-
ferent angles. In fact, although interrelations are produced through 
complex historical assemblages and their articulation in particular con-
texts, these can look very differently depending on whether we interro-
gate an international agency, a rural community, a company, or a gov-
ernment representative. Although a global ethnography approach does 
not require us to contrast all of these perspectives simultaneously, the 
research is enhanced by examining one problem through different angles 
and building explanations that can better inform the whole (Burawoy 
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2.2.1 The Construction of an Incorporated Comparison  
Defining a case, as well as the strategic sites for conducting research 
concerned with complex global interrelations, cannot always be done in 
advance of the study. In fact, the need to extend one’s theoretical and 
methodological apparatus often emerges through research itself. This is 
precisely the approach that I have taken when conducting this work, and 
although this was much more time-intensive than adhering to an initial 
and pre-defined plan, I believe this was key in order to both shape and 
answer complex questions. Indeed, and as was explained in the preface 
to this work, the questions that this dissertation poses arose from re-
search that was conducted in Spain.  
On the basis of this preliminary exploration, the research abandoned the 
initial research questions and became centrally concerned with under-
standing how environmental and migration narratives, framed around 
adaptation and security narratives, were used to, advertently or inadvert-
ently, justify land grabs in Senegal. However, although land grabs with 
both environmental and migratory justifications are occurring in Senegal, 
it is not the first country that comes to mind when raising the subject of 
violent resource grabs. In fact, the particular landscape I chose to study 
in Senegal is emblematic in that it is not the norm. In other words, alt-
hough Senegal represents an interesting context in which to pose the 
questions of this dissertation, it cannot be considered as representative 
of the much more violent developments that occur elsewhere. As a re-
sult, it seemed essential that an understanding of how environmental 
change, land grabs, and migration interact would be supplemented by 
also studying these in a socio-political setting where they are more wide-
spread and violent. Moreover, a comparative approach would seek to 
partly address a core dilemma that many ethnographic researchers face: 
how to produce ethnographic work that can handle the critiques that 
might arise from quantitative researchers (i.e. is this representative of the 
larger whole?), while at the same time addressing the need for in-depth 
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studies that also ‘speak’ to the empirical conditions in other cases beyond 
the study at hand (Small 2009, 10). In the context of a comparative ap-
proach to address these dilemmas, the options seemed endless and many 
other countries of the Global South could have also fit this purpose. 
However, various reasons led me to choose Cambodia over another 
country.  
At a first glance, not only is Cambodia one of the world’s most af-
fected countries by land grabs, but it also shares with Senegal important 
traits, such as a French colonial past, as well as the fact that they have 
been both deeply affected (albeit to varying degrees) by environmental 
change and migration. Moreover, and for reasons of practicality and fea-
sibility, while land grabbing in Cambodia is amongst the most alarming 
in the world, it is also one of the few places where foreign researchers (at 
least during the time that I conducted my own fieldwork) were not at 
serious risk of harm nor facing physical threats for conducting such po-
litically-sensitive research. Additionally, the choice of country came at a 
time when I was initiating contact with the project leader of an extremely 
connected project entitled, ‘Climate change mitigation policies, land 
grabbing and conflict in fragile states: understanding intersections, ex-
ploring transformations in Myanmar and Cambodia’ (MOSAIC), 1  the 
project leader of which ended up becoming my PhD co-supervisor; be-
ing part of this team was absolutely essential for my work that subse-
quently followed. Although this research could have potentially extended 
to include other countries, the geographical scope of this dissertation and 
the time and resource constraints of a PhD excluded this possibility. The 
next section introduces in detail the basic information that renders the 
comparative approach between these two settings both theoretically and 
empirically useful for answering the main research question of this work.  
An Incorporated Cross-Time Comparison 
The common historical process that both Senegal and Cambodia share is 
that of relations of dependency, which began with French colonialism. 
From the theoretical perspective that this dissertation takes, it is precisely 
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at this historical moment that an analysis that aims to understand the or-
igins of environmental change, massive resource grabs and disposses-
sions must depart from. Despite this common historical past, which is 
also (and not accidently) what continues to render these countries, and 
many others in the Global South, the most concomitantly hit by these 
three phenomena, both Senegal and Cambodia have followed very dis-
tinct historical pathways. While post-colonialism in Senegal was relatively 
free from stark conflicts, Cambodia suffered a turbulent combination of 
war and genocide.  
The aim of an integrated comparison is to explain not only the com-
monalities between cases, but also their differences. In fact, having mul-
tiple cases is not just about their multiplicity; it is about the spatialised 
(and cultural) differences, which can transform different insights into 
theoretical cases of something. As a result, what matters most when 
building a multi-case study is precisely that they are different. This is in 
fact an essential requisite; without it there would be no point in moving 
from case to case (Falzon 2016, 13). The first step in building a global 
ethnography is precisely to be aware, and to make explicit, these histori-
cal pathways as more than purely contextual elements. These pathways 
are in fact a key to determining and explaining any of the interrelation-
ships that we can see today. As a consequence, this research begins by 
undertaking a historical analysis as if both nature and migration were 
central components of this history. This entails not only a historical and 
socio-political overview of each country, but also an analysis concentrat-
ed on variegated migratory and environmental narratives of territorialisa-
tion, as well as their impacts. To do so, it draws on historical and current 
literature in both French and English while applying to it the variegated 
geopolitical ecological framework that theoretically structures this re-
search. This analysis is carried out in Chapter 3.  
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An Incorporated Cross-Space Comparison  
With the respective historical and socio-political comparison in mind, 
this research then places itself in the current conjuncture. The aim is not 
only to understand how diverse security and adaptation frames around 
environmental change and/or migration shape land grabs, but also the 
key explanatory variables that explain differences in justifications and 
outcomes. To do so, it analyses the key policies that have facilitated land 
grabbing – mostly land and agricultural policies – to then analyse wheth-
er and how migration and/or environmental arguments have been used. 
Before offering an in-depth analysis of these issues, which is provided in 
Chapter 4, it is already useful to advance some basic contextual infor-
mation for each country.  
Despite some progress, both Senegal and Cambodia face considerable 
development challenges. As of 2018, Senegal had a Human Develop-
ment Index of 0.505 (low human development), ranking 164 out of 188 
countries. The same year, Cambodia had a Human Development Index 
of 0.582 (medium human development), with a ranking of 146 (UNDP 
2019).  Nearly half of the total Senegalese population (15 million) lives in 
conditions of poverty. National poverty was last measured in 2011, 
amounting to 46.7% of the country’s population. Most of these popula-
tions are concentrated in rural areas where 66% of residents are consid-
ered poor (World Bank 2019). Unlike many other countries that face ex-
treme poverty, Senegal is generally considered to have a ‘stable 
government’. According to the 2018 Democracy Index, Senegal was cat-
egorised as a ‘flawed democracy’ with a score of 6/10 – a trend that has 
remained stable since 2012 (The Democracy Index 2018). In Cambodia, 
according to official estimates, the poverty rate stood at 13.5% in 2014 as 
compared to 47.8% in 2007. Although Cambodia has achieved the aim 
of reducing poverty by half, most families are only marginally above the 
cut-off limit. Around 4.5 million people remain ‘near-poor’ - vulnerable 
to falling back into poverty when exposed to economic and other exter-
nal shocks. Approximately 90% of Cambodia’s poor live in rural areas 
(World Bank, 2019). In Cambodia, the ruling party has been in power for 
 Global Ethnography and Incorporated Comparison 51 
over 30 years. According to the Democracy Index, Cambodia is classi-
fied as an ‘authoritarian regime’ with a score of 3/10 – a trend that has 
been deteriorating since 2015 (The Democracy Index 2018). 
 
Access to resources – and changes in the quality and quantity of natu-
ral resources available – is of high importance in both countries, where 
the majority of the populations live in rural areas and depend on agricul-
ture as their main livelihood. In fact, although the percentage of the ur-
ban populations in both countries has increased over the last decades, 
the majority of the population in both Senegal and Cambodia continue 
to be rural. As of 2017, the rural population in Senegal represented 
55.6% of the total. In Cambodia, the percentage is much higher, with 
78.8% of the population being rural (FAOSTAT 2017). Regarding Sene-
gal, World Bank estimates suggest that formal employment in agriculture 
consisted of 53.43% of the country’s total employment in 2017. Howev-
er, when informal employment in agriculture and subsistence farming is 
considered, these estimates rise to between 60% and 75% (ILO 2018).  
Despite high economic growth, the labour market has not been able to 
create sufficient opportunities to absorb the labour force and the de-
mand for jobs is growing at a rate that is twice as high as the supply 
(ILO 2018). In Cambodia, the agriculture sector accounted for more 
than 70% of formal employment until 2001; but by 2009, this fell to 
below 60% and by 2013, it stood at just below 50%. As the share of 
agriculture has fallen over time, the shares of services and industry 
have increased. By 2013, industry accounted for 20% of employment 
and the remaining 32% was within the services sector. However, the 
shift away from agricultural employment has tended towards low-
skilled occupations. Despite these shifts, agriculture (both formal and 
informal) still accounts for the majority of Cambodia’s employment 
and for the foreseeable future will continue to provide livelihoods for 
a significant portion of the population (ADB 2015). 
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Figure 2: Urban and Rural Population in Senegal and Cambodia (1990-2017) 
 
 
Source: FAOSTAT 2019 
 
As is the case in many poor countries, rural people engaged in agriculture 
are highly vulnerable to environmental and climate shocks, including 
droughts and flooding. Both Senegal and Cambodia experience the im-
pacts of climate change in the form of increased periods of drought and 
floods – the combination of which affect farmers most drastically. Small-
scale and poor farmers who depend on rain-fed agriculture for their sub-
sistence are particularly at the mercy of fluctuating weather patterns. Spe-
cifically, it is their pre-existing vulnerabilities, which have been socio-
politically shaped, and not just their exposure to risk, which makes them 
prone to hazardous impacts.  The combination of socio-economic and 
political vulnerabilities that the rural poor must navigate has not only 
been compounded by the effects of environmental and climate change, 
but importantly, by agricultural and investment policies that have paved 
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the path for land grabs. While in Cambodia the extent of foreign large-
scale land acquisitions is more prominent than in Senegal, land grabs are 
also an important phenomenon in Senegal.2 Additionally, it is important 
to highlight that a significant amount of land transactions emerge on 
smaller scales and through the hands of domestic investors, despite the 
absence of such figures within databases.  




Source: Land Matrix 2019 
 
Although the global land rush has materialised in both Senegal and 
Cambodia, what we seek to understand is if and why the justifications 
used have been similar or different and whether environmental and/or 
migration justifications have prevailed in one case over the other. In this 
respect, it is not only by looking inwards into Senegal and Cambodia that 
we can obtain an understanding of variegated drivers and impacts, but 
also by looking outwards beyond the national borders and paying atten-
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tion to the different positioning of each country in diverging regional 
political economies. Factors such as who the primary donors are, which 
countries are its main trading partners, as well as to whom their debts 
accrue to, and where their migrants go are assumed to influence not only 
changes in access to resources, but also the justifications employed to 
appropriate land. These factors are analysed in Chapter 4. Both countries 
are heavily reliant upon Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). Although OECD countries have been 
the main lending countries since World War II, and have attached certain 
conditions to their disbursed loans, the last decade has seen an important 
shift. As of 2019, nearly 40% of Cambodia’s external debt is now owed 
to China, and under 10% of Senegalese debt is owed to China. Moreo-
ver, the amount of ‘hidden debt’ is believed to make these figures signifi-
cantly higher (Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch 2019, 14). 
To understand how different geopolitical dynamics play out in specif-
ic contexts, this research draws on both primary and secondary data col-
lected at the national and local scales. Fieldwork in Senegal was conduct-
ed in July and August of 2014 and between May and July 2015. In 
Cambodia, fieldwork occurred in March and April of 2015 and between 
August and October of 2016. In order to cease the variegated impacts of 
diverse environmental and migratory narratives, a number of expert in-
terviews (including with government officials), were conducted. In Sene-
gal, key informant interviews were conducted with government officials 
from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environment, as 
well as with officials from United Nations agencies (IOM), the World 
Bank, NGOs (CICODEV, IRD, Wetlands International, ARD, Institute 
Panos), the national farmer association (CNCR), and researchers and 
journalists.  In Cambodia, key informant interviews took place with gov-
ernment officials from the Climate Change Department at the Ministry 
of Environment, as well as with donors involved in the Cambodian Cli-
mate Change Alliance and Climate negotiators, officials from the Minis-
try of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, the Ministry of Planning, the 
Ministry of Land Management, the Forest Administration, United Na-
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tions agencies (UNDP, IOM, OHCHR), the World Bank, NGO’s 
(LICADHO, ADHOC, Equitable Cambodia), the environmental con-
servation NGOs, researchers and journalists (see a list of key organiza-
tion interviewed in Annex).3 The experts were selected according to their 
expertise on environmental and climate change, migration, agriculture, 
and natural resource management. These key informants were chosen 
according to their wide expertise and through a snowball sampling strat-
egy. The interviews were semi-structured and open-ended with the aim 
of acquiring the most relevant information possible and were tailored to 
each participant, according to their different roles, knowledge, and back-
grounds. In total, approximately 30 expert interviews were conducted in 
each country.   
Most of these key informant interviews took place in the urban areas 
of Dakar and Saint-Louis in Senegal, and in Phnom Penh in Cambodia. 
With respect to language, the interviews were conducted directly in 
French (Senegal) or in English (Cambodia). These interviews were abso-
lutely crucial to understanding the diverse socio-ecological and political 
realities that shape diverse resource grab and migration justifications and 
realities in a specific place. Moreover, interviews with key informants 
often took place on more than one occasion in order to triangulate the 
information that I had gathered from them with the information that I 
had gathered on the field. Data triangulation proved crucial in order to 
identify points of contention.  Moreover, I also participated in seminars 
and conferences relevant to the scope of my research which were very 
useful both for gaining information and networking with diverse stake-
holders who were subsequently interviewed for this work. Two im-
portant events which occurred during my fieldwork were a Roundtable 
on Human Security and Land Rights held on the 9th of March 2015 in 
Phnom Penh and the Global Land Forum held in Dakar from the 12th to 
the 16th of May of 2015. These events provided me with an opportunity 
to meet with key stakeholders and to discuss my research as well as to 
undertake formal and informal interviews.  
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Additionally, at the international level, I followed both Cambodian 
and Senegalese delegations during the conferences of the parties (COP21 
in Paris in 2015; COP22 in Marrakech in 2016; and COP23 in Bonn in 
2017). During these conferences, and as a member of The Hugo Obser-
vatory, I have been part of the Advisory Group on Human Mobility and 
Climate Change with members from several UN agencies and civil socie-
ty. This not only gave me an insider’s view on the negotiations, but also 
allowed me to seize the importance of adaptation and security framings. 
The Importance of Pilot Fieldwork 
Key informant interviews not only allowed me to identify the main fac-
tors that could ultimately explain differences and similarities across cases, 
but they also led me to the locations where in-depth ethnographic re-
search with companies and affected populations could be conducted. 
During the first month in both countries, I conducted pilot fieldwork 
several sites (see maps below), in order to gain a broad understanding of 
how resource grabs were occurring and also to help me discern which 
cases were the most appropriate for more in-depth investigation. Alt-
hough not all of the empirical material gathered during these exploratory 
visits is explicitly mentioned in this dissertation, the information acquired 
at these early stages was important for informing my understanding of 
the macro-dynamics that drive resource appropriations and their im-
pacts. Moreover, this preliminary work was crucial to determining and 
specifying the most interesting and feasible locations in which to carry 
out in-depth research, and where local communities welcomed my pres-
ence. Given the political sensitivity of the topic at hand, this was a very 
important consideration.  
In Senegal, most large-scale land acquisitions are concentrated around 
the Senegal River Delta due to its proximity to water resources. As a re-
sult of the geographical concentration of several European companies 
that have mostly settled in the area since 2006 (see Figure 3), it was pos-
sible for me to visit a variety of communities affected by diverse forms 
of agro-industrial plantations: Les Grands Domains du Senegal (GDS),  
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the Société de Cultures Legumieres (SCL), SOCAS, Compagnie Sucrière 
(CSS), Vittal, Toll John, SenegIndia, and West Africa Farms. While all of 
my preliminary visits in Senegal provided critical insight into the broader 
national context (presented in Chapter 4), Senhuile proved to be the 
most appropriate for further in-depth work.  
Map 2: Visited Sites and Chosen Site in Senegal 
 
Source: Google Earth  
 
In Cambodia, where half of all arable land in the country is being target-
ed by land grabs, the phenomenon is more wide-spread geographically 
than in Senegal. As a result, the information on relevant sites for in-
depth research was more confined to key informant interviews, accessi-
bility, and safety considerations. The choice of my cases in Cambodia 
was influenced by the two main crops grown in the country (particularly 
within Economic Land Concessions), which include rubber and sugar. 
Due to the dominance of rubber and sugar, I found it important to select 
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cases from which I could draw out the different justifications and im-
pacts that these two diverse production aims have. Before making a de-
finitive choice on the cases, I briefly visited a rubber plantation in Preah 
Vihear, home to indigenous communities, where I conducted two days 
of fieldwork with an official from the Ministry of Agriculture at the 
Cambodia/Thai border. While there, I was able to speak to many people 
who had been affected by several land concessions, as well as with many 
others who hoped to flee to Thailand, due to having lost their land in the 
regions from where they originated. At this stage, I also conducted addi-
tional in-depth fieldwork within two adjacent sugar concessions, Phnom 
Penh Sugar and Kampong Speu Sugar, before determining that the most 
relevant and feasible for my own work would be the cases of Koh Kong 
Sugar and Tan Bien Rubber (see map below).  
Map 3:  Visited and Chosen Sites in Cambodia 
 
Source: Google Earth, the Economic Land Concessions boundaries delineating in red, via 
LICADHO 
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2.2.2 Zooming into Three Landscapes  
With an understanding of the historical and socio-economic and political 
trajectories of each country, and insight into how recent land grabs for 
farmland are taking place at each national scale, this research then zooms 
into to three concrete sites, determined through exploratory fieldwork in 
both countries that was explained above. The aim of the case-studies is 
to give a micro-foundation to the more macro processes (Burawoy 
2009). In other words, after analysing how the ‘global inserts itself into 
the national’ (Sassen 2013a), fieldwork in these locations provided me 
with a lens into how the global inserts itself into the local (via the nation-
al) – and with what consequences. This is because complex processes of 
variegation are grounded territorially, and therefore: ‘territories of extrac-
tion can be seen as a kind of rooting’, through which analyses may be 
conducted (Rocheleau and Roth 2007, 435). For this purpose, three cases 
were chosen as entry points into complex landscapes: one in Senegal 
(Senhuile-Senethanol) and two in Cambodia (Koh Kong Sugar and 
Kampong Thom Rubber). The choice to concentrate on just one case in 
Senegal, while focussing on two in Cambodia, stems from practical rea-
sons as well as to the fact that given the much wider spread of land grabs 
in Cambodia, two cases, instead of one, will provide richer insights. 
What draws these seemingly dissimilar cases of land grabs together is 
that they have all been justified by different actors through a diverse set 
of security and adaptation framings linked to environmental and/or mi-
gratory motives. Another point of connection is that they are all – to 
varying degrees –cases of land grabs for ‘flex crops’. Flex crops are crops 
that can be used for multiple purposes (food, fuel, material, etc.), which 
are attractive for investors as they enable them to diversify their income 
opportunities, by, for example, deciding to sell a crop as food and/or 
fuel depending on market prices (Borras, Franco, et al. 2016). In sum, 
the interconnected comparison between the three cases reveals an ap-
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proach of selecting cases based upon theoretical replication, with the aim 
of understanding what is similar and different between them. 
 
1. Senhuile-Senethanol in Senegal is a plantation jointly owned by 
Italian and Senegalese shareholders, conceived as part of the 
country’s most recent biofuel plan for (supposedly) producing 
sunflower oil.      
 
2. Koh Kong Sugar in Cambodia is a sugar plantation jointly 
owned by Thai and Cambodian shareholders; the site is linked to 
the higher global demand for sugar stemming from biofuel pro-
duction incentives and favourable EU trade deals (such as the 
Everything But Arms Initiative).  
 
3. Tan Bien Rubber in Cambodia is a rubber plantation owned by 
the Vietnamese Rubber Group and presented politically and dis-
cursively as a way to increase forest cover, and hence contribute 
to mitigation and ‘greenness’.  
 
Although the research starts with an understanding of each of these cas-
es, these cases are only taken as a point of entry into understanding the 
much more complex landscapes, where several other land grabs have 
taken place. These three cases, serving as anchor points into complex 
landscapes thus constitute the departure, but not end point of this re-
search. This approach follows recent calls by scholars for taking a land-
scape, rather than a single case approach, in order to grasp the complexi-
ty of socio-ecological transformations (Hunsberger et al. 2016; Baird and 
Barney 2017; Scheidel and Work 2016).  
In terms of sampling, I chose the villages that had been the most di-
rectly impacted by the ‘anchor cases’ and from these starting points, ex-
panded the sample to include other villages and contiguous projects, 
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based upon the information gathered during the interviews. My first 
point of contact in all of the villages was the village elder, community 
leader and/or village chief. The populations were then purposively sam-
pled according to how they had been both directly and indirectly impact-
ed by several resource grabs, by their relative economic (or class) posi-
tion (i.e. ‘rich’, ‘middle’, and ‘poor’), by gender, and by age. In order to 
do so, I followed the snow-sampling technique by which interviewees 
were asked to recommend other interviewees (Weiss 1995). Moreover, 
the study was conducted in all three sites coinciding with a national holi-
day (Pchum Ben in Cambodia and Ramadan in Senegal). The rationale 
for this was that these holidays comprise the few dates when most mi-
grants that are able to, return home to see their families. The choice of 
these dates was particularly crucial to understanding first-hand from mi-
grants what in particular drives migration for different people. By inter-
viewing migrants, I came to understand not only their motivations for 
migrating, but also the conditions under which they had done so, and 
whether or not their migratory journey had improved or jeopardised 
their well-being and that of their family members.  
I conducted semi-structured interviews and focus groups with an es-
timated 200 people across these three locations. The interviews included 
base-line questions concerning the environmental and migratory experi-
ences that the participants had encountered before and after land grabs 
took place. These before/after questions were important in understand-
ing which impacts can be attributed directly to land grabs, and which fall 
outside of these specific interventions. When important information that 
was not initially the focus of the interviews or focus groups emerged (for 
example, the existence of other land grabs impacting them), questions 
around these topics were subsequently included in the semi-structured 
interview and focus group guides. These guides remained fluid and flexi-
ble, especially during the first round of fieldwork, and became more 
structured and fixed during the second round of fieldwork. Hence, the 
research was flexibly structured to enable me to investigate crucial fac-
tors that emerged in the process. Interviews were conducted until data 
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saturation was reached. Depending on the site, the amount of time re-
quired for this to happen varied. But across all sites, there became a clear 
point where additional interviews were not providing additional infor-
mation with respects to my questions. 
In Senegal, some interviews at the local level were conducted directly 
in French (as some people in the villages where I was carrying out re-
search spoke French), but the vast majority of the interviews took place 
with the help of a translator (Wolof to French). In Cambodia, at the local 
level, all interviews took place with the help of a research and field assis-
tant, who also served as my translator (Khmer to English), since no in-
terviewees spoke French or English. Regarding the duration of the inter-
viewing process, approximately 20 days were spent in each of the three 
sites, divided across two trips to each of the three sites. Revisiting the 
ethnographic sites enabled me to compare the situation from one year to 
the next, which proved extremely important as it is common for the pro-
jects inducing land grabs to change their aim and scope (and hence their 
impacts) in a short amount of time. In fact, since the last research round 
was conducted, certain projects have been abandoned in all three sites.  
 
2.3 Challenges and Limitations  
Data and Access 
This dissertation covers a broad empirical and geographic scope and 
deals with issues that are extremely politically sensitive in both countries 
and where no robust data on migration exists. Although migration data 
exists at the national and regional levels (to a certain extent), it has not 
been disaggregated at the village level. This means that the available data 
on mobility is unable to explain the impact of particular projects on mi-
gratory dynamics. Internal migration, which constitutes the majority of 
movements, is not recorded in either country and data on international 
migration is often unreliable and is also not disaggregated by village. 
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This, of course, represents a significant challenge which can only be 
overcome with ethnographic fieldwork that includes as many people as is 
logistically possible. Although collecting quantitative figures on the exact 
number of people that have been displaced or have migrated as a result 
of the land grabs examined, would have been useful to an extent, and 
while I did consider distributing a survey for this, the time and resource 
intensity of collecting such numbers was beyond the possibility of this 
work. Such a survey would have required a careful design in order to ac-
curately assess the particular role of the land grabs on all other migration 
drivers. Additionally, it would have had to be translated into various lan-
guages without a clear understanding of the added value that survey re-
sults would reveal. More importantly, a survey was an inadequate format 
for posing the questions required to dig into the complexities and over-
laps, which are the primary aim of this work. For these reasons, the pos-
sibility of collecting quantitative data was abandoned. 
An additional challenge is that although data on particular land grabs 
does exist, the information is unreliable and often does not coincide with 
what we observe on the ground. This stems from the high amount of 
secrecy involved in these transactions, as well as the fact that the majori-
ty of information on land grabs has been collected rapidly by NGOs and 
journalists who often lack the resources to do the type of in-depth re-
search that is needed to answer many of questions. Despite considerable 
hurdles, accessing the company premises to conduct interviews with 
company directors and managers was possible in both Senhuile and 
Kampong Thom Rubber. This information was crucial to triangulate the 
data provided by those interviewed in the village sites with that of the 
companies. Unfortunately, given the highly conflictual status of the Koh 
Kong sugar company, I was unable to access the premises nor to speak 
to the company representatives. 
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Positionality  
Positionality is extremely important in the construction of cases 
(Burawoy 2009, 204). Not only does each case appear different depend-
ing on its vantage point, but also the specific context, as well as the re-
searcher’s race, gender, and age all affect the way others perceive and 
interact with the researcher. Therefore, there is a need to consider how 
the ethnographer relates to the people being interviewed and how these 
relations affect what is being observed and how the data is collected. Be-
ing a white, young, European in Senegal initially played against me at the 
local level because investors in the area are also European. This meant 
that gaining the trust of populations was challenging as many initially 
thought that I may be conducting research on behalf of the company 
itself. My same background, however, facilitated my contact with the 
company managers who shared these characteristics.  
The opposite occurred in Cambodia, however, where being a white 
European tends to be welcomed by the populations, given that there is 
an underlying assumption that most foreigners are NGO workers willing 
to fight for remedy and help them reclaim their land. Conversely, access 
to companies becomes more difficult not just because land grabs are in-
trinsically more politically sensitive in Cambodia, but also because com-
panies associate white people with being journalists and NGO workers 
intending to undermine them. This means that my position, and access 
to data, shifted continuously depending on where I was and on who my 
interlocutors were. To balance the changing perception that participants 
had of me, it was extremely important to understand the context and the 
image that I projected, and to contribute to altering assumptions that 
were incorrect and might bias responses.   
Moreover, and as Burawoy expressed, ‘an intervening social scientist 
cannot avoid domination – both dominating and being dominated. Entry 
is often a prolonged and surreptitious power struggle between the intru-
sive outsider and the resisting inside. Moreover, to penetrate the shields 
of the powerful, the social scientist has to be lucky and/or devious. Us-
ing diverse pretexts’ (Burawoy 2009, 56–57). Indeed, contacting govern-
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ment officials and company representatives often required a different 
strategy. Given the scope of my research, the explanatory angle that I 
used to initially gain access was tailored to the needs and interests of the 
interlocutor. It never implied a lie, or an overt manipulation, but the re-
search object was portrayed in a way that would facilitate opening doors. 
Wearing different hats has its strategic advantages: there is no need to 
show all of your cards to everyone you come into contact with, but ra-
ther you can choose to show the card that has a greater chance of facili-
tating your access across the required doors. For example, to gain access 
to government officials in Cambodia, it was necessary to avoid using the 
politically charged term ‘land grabs’. In cases of doubt, I presented my-
self as a researcher on climate change and migration, which is generally 
welcomed. Whereas had land questions been explicitly raised, the doors 
would not only have been shut, but there is a possibility that I might 
have been prevented from conducting my research altogether. Nonethe-
less, once the interviews began and trust had been established, I was able 
to inquire about most of the difficult and politically charged questions. 
The strategy was thus one of door opening, not of topic avoidance.  
 
Gaining and Maintaining Trust  
Conducting research in sites where the participants are often explicitly or 
implicitly in conflict with one another is particularly challenging. People 
need to be able to trust that the information they disclose will remain 
anonymous and will not be used against them. In order to gain trust, it 
proved essential to first establish bonds with the most vulnerable (the 
people affected by land grabs), before attempting to connect with those 
involved in carrying out land grabbing. This was extremely important so 
that those I sought to interview in the villages would not perceive me as 
a threat. Building this kind of trust with communities where I lacked the 
language skills, and where I had only visited for relatively brief amounts 
of time was challenging, but not impossible. It required a sincere interest 
in their lives beyond the scope of my sole research question, and an in-
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tentional effort to remain in contact throughout the years despite being 
thousands of kilometres away. It required building human connections 
and not viewing people as mere vehicles for my research aims. This type 
of contact and trust was established in all sites, but it was especially built 
in the case of the communities touched by Senhuile (given the lack of 
language barriers). Building this trust was extremely useful for me to ob-
tain the most updated and current information on the evolution of the 
project and its impacts without having to physically revisit the site. 
Moreover, without having built this type of trust, I would not have been 
able to acquire a great deal of extremely important and sensitive infor-
mation, which was critical for this work.  
 
The Crucial Choice of Translators and Gatekeepers   
When one conducts research on politically sensitive topics as a foreign 
outsider, the role of the translator becomes critical. In Senegal, where 
some people in villages spoke perfect French, I was able to rely on local 
translators to conduct my research interviews. This greatly facilitated da-
ta collection, but doing so required carefully selecting the translators with 
respect to how trusted they were within their communities. In the case 
of Senhuile, I was often accompanied by the Village Chief (who, in Sen-
egal, is a respected figure within the village and has no political appoint-
ment) who served as a translator, as well as a development worker who 
had been living in the area for years and was highly appreciated and 
trusted by the communities. In Cambodia, however, given that none of 
the people within the villages spoke English, I was obliged to rely on the 
help of translators from Phnom Penh. This meant that throughout the 
interviews, there was not only one outsider, but two. Finding the appro-
priate people for this task was one of the most challenging fieldwork is-
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Conclusion 
Understanding the material and discursive interrelations between envi-
ronmental change, land grabs, and migration calls for methodological 
tools that can capture the complexity and variegation of the world sys-
tem (and of the world ecology), while also accounting for its specificities. 
The global ethnographic approach used in this research pays explicit at-
tention to changing historical contexts in order to understand the differ-
ent impacts that diverse security and adaptation framings have upon 
shaping access to natural resources and in modifying the socio-economic 
and environmental conditions under which migration takes place. To 
account for variegation, I have chosen to apply an incorporated compar-
ison between two countries that are positioned within different regional 
political economies, which in turn, allows me to account for both do-
mestic and international factors. Both Senegal and Cambodia are theo-
retical cases of variegated geopolitical ecologies in that they share strong 
colonial pasts, but they are also able to show how the ‘core’ of capitalism 
evolves differently according to time and diverse geopolitically con-
structed influences. Moreover, the methodological approach taken aims 
to capture variegation through three specific cases of land grabs that 
serve as ‘anchors’ into understanding much more complex landscapes. 
Instead of limiting the research to a specific site, the method consists of 
following the empirical links that become revealed through the research, 
until connections and interrelations from the global to the local, and 
vice-versa, can be established. Such an approach enables me to identify 
empirical micro-foundations in what may otherwise appear as abstract 
theoretical explanations of world ecological functioning. Although this 
approach does not come without considerable challenges, it allowed me 
to understand how geopolitical ecologies are mutually co-created from 











1 Additional information about the MOSAIC’s project framework, methodology 
and results, is available here: https://www.iss.nl/en/research/research-
projects/climate-change-politics-land-grabbing-and-conflict-fragile-states 
2 Although the Land Matrix is one of the most reliable sources concerning data 
on the number of deals and hectares targeted by land grabs, the veracity of this 
data and its capacity to tell us more must be seriously considered (See Oya 2012 
and Eldelman 2013 for a critique on numbers). This dissertation often uses fig-
ures from the Land Matrix as a simple tactic to give a broad overview of the scale 
of the phenomenon. This does not, however, imply that I am taking these num-
bers as a given nor am I overlooking their contested nature.  
3 Given the high political sensitivity regarding land grabbing in both countries, 
many of my respondents demanded explicit anonymity to participate in this 
work. Citations in text are therefore not attributed to particular individuals in or-
der to respect and protect participants. Most of the key informants interviewed 




3 Historical Geopolitical Ecologies in Senegal and Cambodia 
 
Introduction 
Broader socio-ecological changes can only be understood, and hence re-
shaped, if we address their root causes; where we chose to begin our 
analysis matters. The interrelations between environmental change, land 
grabs, and migration that we see today are a product of fundamental his-
torical changes that can be located, to a very large extent, in colonialism. 
It is precisely through ‘colonizing migrations’ (Portes 1978, 2) that the 
commodification of land and labour took unprecedented dimensions, 
and where environmental destruction extended vertiginously (Moore 
2015). The colonial past that both Senegal and Cambodia share has 
greatly determined and shaped the trajectories through which these three 
phenomena have been shaped both discursively and materially. Howev-
er, colonialism did not take place evenly or homogenously. The framings 
used to legitimise the commodification and extraction of land and labour 
were dependent on both the material realities found in place (the type of 
resources and peoples available for commodification) as well as on the 
diverging geopolitical and economic interests of the colonial power in 
each country. Moreover, the postcolonial paths that took place in each 
country assumed very different routes, which it is essential to understand 
in order to explain these interrelations in the current neoliberal context.  
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The key research question this chapter seeks to address is: How have 
the interrelations between environmental change, land grabs, and migra-
tion evolved historically in Senegal and Cambodia? This is important to 
allow us to capture the roots of, and divergences between, the material 
and discursive interrelations that are present today. This chapter presents 
a historical overview of both Senegal and Cambodia as if both nature 
and migration were central explanatory components. It does so by con-
centrating on three main periods – namely colonialism, postcolonialism, 
and neoliberalism -and by drawing on the similarities and differences be-
tween the two countries with respect to these periods. 
 
3.1 Colonialism: Commodification and Securitisation 
Although humans have transformed the environment from the onset of 
our existence, this transformation became particularly apparent during 
colonialism. It was during this era that land was transformed into 
property, and labour into a commodity, and where massive socio-
ecological transformations began. A world ecology approach views the 
modern world system as an environmental history whereby the rise of 
capitalism radically reshaped world ecology through agro-ecological 
transformations (Moore 2003, 311). Throughout this process, peasants 
were either violently expelled from their land and forced to migrate, or  
remained on the land and forced into agricultural wage labour (Moore 
2015; 2011). During the colonial era, not only was there a desire to ‘se-
cure’ territory, but also to secure the ‘free’ human labour that these terri-
tories contained. The need for food and forest products were some of 
the earliest demands of the early modern world economy (Moore 2003, 
319). Controlling the mobility of local communities was deemed as nec-
essary for capital accumulation. In this context, local communities were 
viewed as not only commodities, but also as a threat to the security of 
the colonisers, who began to view these ‘uncivilised’ populations as sus-
pect and potentially dangerous (Burawoy 1976, 1058). Additionally, even 
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if the concept of adaptation as such was not deployed, rural populations 
already were targets of ‘modernising’ ventures that aimed to intensify 
production and to incorporate producers into national and international 
divisions of labour (Taylor 2014, 98–99). Although local adaptation 
strategies to environmental changes already existed (such as polyculture, 
swidden agriculture, and extensive grazing), colonisers brought with 
them different ideas of what adaptation should look like (namely mono-
crops and large plantations).  
Senegal under French Rule  
For the Senegalese, land is considered to be a ‘divine creation’, like the 
air, the sky and the sea. It belongs to God, to the gods and to the ances-
tors. Before the colonial period, land formally belonged to communities, 
and its chiefs (the Lamane) were the ones that attributed and administered 
plots with the aim of achieving an equal distribution of land and balanc-
ing its usage (Faye 2008). The French colonial enterprise in Africa dates 
back to 1637 in Saint Louis of Senegal, but from 1854 onwards it ex-
panded with an aim to establish Senegal as West Africa’s colonial centre 
(Harris 1911, 353). The colonial administration initiated a territorialisa-
tion process according to the ‘vocation’, or potential economic contribu-
tion that each territory could offer (Magrin, Ninot, and Cesaro 2011). 
Given its availability of land and water, the Senegal River Delta attracted 
the attention of Colonel Schmaltz. In 1816, the Governor of Senegal in-
stigated a ‘Plan of Agricultural Colonisation of the Delta’ stating that: ‘I 
have travelled a lot and I have always observed very closely the countries 
that I have visited. I have never seen anything more beautiful or better 
suited to great businesses than Senegal’ (cited in Niang 2011, 28). 
The introduction of cash crops during the colonial period paved the 
way for capitalist penetration and for the emergence of wage labour rela-
tions in agriculture and trade (Fall 2011, 201). The colonial economy was 
sustained through the expansion of groundnuts. This expansion required 
both the delimitation of large-scale land concessions as well as the mobi-
lisation of large amount of labour (Moitt 1989, 50). The agrarian trans-
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formation that accompanied groundnut expansion modified both envi-
ronmental and migratory dynamics under the premise that traditional 
farming methods were both inefficient and environmentally destructive. 
In other words, there was the implication that traditional methods were 
maladaptive and posed an environmental security threat. In 1904, the 
French colonial administration applied the French Civil Code to Senegal 
in order to provide a legal regime for private, individual ownership of 
land, and attempted to establish a registration system (Golan 1990, 232; 
Ribot 1995, 1590). According to this registration system, all lands that 
were vacant and without a master (owner or lord) belonged to the state. 
The code created the concession system and protected areas, including 
usufructuary rights. It placed forests under the direct control of the co-
lonial state, and it was the General governor who controlled the distribu-
tion of concession rights (Ribot 1997, 263). The French Civil Code de-
termined who was able to access what and who could make the decisions 
over that access, thereby shaping human mobility.  
At the time, it was not population pressure that was problematic, but 
rather the contrary. In fact, a lack of population meant that there was a 
limited capacity to mobilise the labour that was needed for the expansion 
of groundnuts. As a result, the colonial administration developed various 
strategies to regulate labour flows. The main strategy was to force people 
into the cash economy through the imposition of a cash head tax (Colvin 
1981, 63). The introduction of monetary taxes encouraged temporary 
migration to places where migrants could earn wages and pay for these 
taxes (Beauchemin et al. 2014). As occurred also in other African coun-
tries, the imposition of taxes upon those living in rural areas dislocated 
them from their usual subsistence livelihoods and pushed them into 
plantations and/or mines (Burawoy 1976, 1058). The number of migrant 
workers, navetaan (from the Wolof term navet, which refers to the rainy 
farming season), increased enormously during the 1930s (Oya 2015, 40). 
Although they were now ‘free laborers’, the origin and movements of 
migrant workers remained the same as it had been during the previous 
slave period.  
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Moreover, and despite the supposed possibilities that these migrants 
had to become ‘independent’, their actual working conditions and their 
dependence on the Wolofs – or masters – meant that, in effect, their 
conditions remained very similar to what they had been during slavery 
(Moitt 1989, 47–48). In fact, the use of an involuntary labour force was 
utilised on a daily basis as the principal driving force of colonial ‘mise en 
valeur’, which is the profitable and efficient use of land (Tiquet 2018, 
136). Finding strategies to manage people’s movement was thus neces-
sary to resolve a relative scarcity of labour that threatened the possibili-
ties for capital accumulation by the colonisers. The higher-ranking em-
ployment positions within the administration or in commercial posts 
were filled by French and Lebanese migrants. However, when the World 
Wars struck, Senegalese migrants began moving towards Europe due to 
the colonial powers’ needs for army workers (Tall and Tandian 2011).  
During World War II, peanut production needs doubled as a result of 
an increased demand in biofuels, following the rise in prices of fossil 
fuels (Hassan and Kalam 2013). In fact, and although we tend to assume 
that biofuels are a recent development in the context of climate politics, 
peanut was the original bio-diesel, or what we might today call a ‘flex 
crop’ (Borras et al. 2014). In order to double peanut production, the col-
ony relied upon the arrival of unprecedented amounts of migrant work-
ers from different regions in Senegambia, which in turn led to an un-
precedented volume of groundnut exports in the 1950s. However, while 
this increased the overall economic security of the colony, the introduc-
tion of monoculture cash crops systems reduced the number of cereal 
crops grown for domestic consumption and exponentially exacerbated 
the food insecurity of local people, while simultaneously making them 
dependent upon international markets for food. Senegal became the first 
African colony to depend on imported rice from Asia (Venema, Schiller, 
and Bass 1996, 147). The energy security of the colonisers was already 
directly competing with the food security of the Senegalese.  
Although the movement of migrant workers was actively encouraged, 
the movement of pastoralists came into conflict with the desire for 
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greater territorial expansion of peanut. Pastoralists were considered a 
nuisance and threat to the further expansion of groundnuts; conflicts 
between the Islamic brotherhood (who had a key role in the cash crop 
economy) and the Fulbé pastoralists escalated (Fall 2011, 65; Oya 2015). 
Given the that the colonial administration had both political and eco-
nomic interests of maintaining good relations with the Islamic brother-
hood – due to their role in expanding groundnut production – the colo-
nial administration sided with them in orchestrating conflicts over land 
(van den Breemer and Hesseling 1999, 27). In order to control the 
movements of pastoralists and to stop these tensions, the colonial ad-
ministration dug the first boreholes in the savanna region of the Ferlo, 
with the aim of achieving  their semi-sedentarisation (Ba 1986). Hence, 
although the movement of some (wage labourers onto groundnut planta-
tions) was economically useful, the movement of others (mainly pastoral-
ists) was to be managed and kept to a minimum. As James Scott ob-
served, ‘a state mainly concerned with appropriation and control will find 
sedentary agriculture preferable to pastoralism or shifting agriculture’ 
(Scott 1998, 338). 
As groundnuts expanded, their environmental impacts materialised. 
The destruction of natural forests, which had provided a protective cur-
tain against desert winds, marked the beginning of a domino effect of 
ecological degradation in Senegal (Venema, Schiller, and Bass 1996, 147). 
Given the impacts that this could have on the economy, in 1935 the 
Forestry Code for French West Africa recognised the key role of the 
forestry sector and inserted new rules for the use and exploitation of na-
ture (Boutinot 2001). However, these measures were often in contradic-
tion with traditional usages and local people were excluded from using 
forests. Commercial rights over forests were granted nearly exclusively to 
Europeans and other urban elites (Ribot 1997). Whereas people from 
urban areas were considered ‘citizens’, those emanating from rural areas 
were merely ‘subjects’. The former had access to civic rights and received 
authorisations for exploiting and commercialising forests. The latter, 
however, could only use resources for subsistence, and only in the in-
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stances where these resources were not required by the ‘citizens’ for 
commercialisation (Ribot 2001). As a result of these regulations, rural 
populations were only allowed to exploit the areas that had no commer-
cial value to the colony. Moreover, the new protected area system that 
was introduced served as an instrument to further the colonial agenda of 
regulating labour flows, with an aim to move people onto plantations, by 
modifying access. Together, these measures transformed the Senegal 
River Valley into a labour reserve for cheap, mobile and docile workers 
that were needed for agriculture (Clark 1995, 198–99). 
Cambodia under the French Protectorate  
The French colonial authority had interests in Cambodia because it pro-
vided a strategic enclave within Indo-China and a means for subverting 
British expansion in the region. Moreover, The King of Cambodia, No-
rodom, demanded assistance of the French as a result of the Vietnamese 
and Thai squeeze upon their territory (Chandler 1997, 38). Before the 
French established their protectorate in 1863, land ownership in Cam-
bodia had been historically tied to land use; it was acquired by ‘the 
plough’. Whoever farmed the land received usufruct rights to its posses-
sion, but the king remined the owner of land and water. This system al-
lowed farmers to hand over their usufruct rights to their children, but if 
ever the land was unused for more than three years, their rights to that 
land were lost (Chandler 1997). When the French arrived, they found a 
‘worm-eaten’ kingdom (as they called it), shattered by warfare and with 
fewer than half a million people (Chandler 1997, 36). Cambodians were 
cast as people trapped in the past and ‘suspended in motion that the col-
onizers (as liberators) were going to transform’ (Edwards 2007, 422–23). 
High government positions became occupied by French and Vietnamese 
officials. 
The colonial administration focused on agriculture and on processing 
raw materials such as rubber for local use or export (Chandler 1991). To 
facilitate this, the French protectorate introduced private property and a 
‘rationalisation’ of tenure rights. Each parcel of land had to be registered 
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in a cadastral system that fed into a tenure market where people were 
free to buy or sell these rights (Diepart 2007, 133). The French also in-
troduced the concession system for the management and exploitation of 
forest and fisheries resources and the establishment of agricultural plan-
tations (Diepart and Schoenberger 2016, 157). These land laws were also 
used as a means to combat swidden cultivation, which the French 
viewed as an archaic and destructive practice. In 1908, a royal decree 
stipulated that land belonged to those who cultivated it for at least three 
years, and it also introduced property taxes on land, which were also 
partly aimed at combatting swidden agriculture (Guerin 2017, 122).  
The first rubber plantation was established in the Kampot province 
of Cambodia in 1911 and during the following two decades there was a 
massive ‘rubber boom’ in the country, with rubber plantations expanding 
within other provinces, including Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom and 
Kratie (Natividad 2015). Before World War I, rubber plantations had 
generally been small in scale in Cambodia. But following the rising global 
market demand for rubber due to the growing automobile industry, 
these rubber plantations quickly transformed into large-scale ones 
(Murray 1992). In an attempt to avoid conflicts with local people, rubber 
concessions were typically granted in scarcely populated and forested 
areas. However, this meant a condition of labour scarcity and by the 
mid-1920, plantations faced severe labour shortages (Murray 1992). The 
colonial government solved the labour shortage problem by facilitating 
the immigration of indentured labour, bringing migrant workers from 
northern and central Vietnam (Byerlee 2014). Additionally, itinerant la-
bour recruiters patrolled the Cambodian countryside in search of the 
many Cambodian landless and indebted villagers who might offer scarce 
resistance to recruitment. The French Protectorate in Cambodia also es-
tablished the highest tax rates on peasant farmers in all of Indo-China, 
thereby effectively forcing people into wage labour to be able to afford 
their taxes. While the 1920s had been relatively prosperous given the 
high demand for rubber, rice, and corn, the economic crash of 1929 
caused extreme economic hardship, especially among rice farmers who 
 Historical Geopolitical Ecologies in Senegal and Cambodia 77 
were dependent on moneylenders (Ross 1987). To pay off their debts, 
plantation work – regardless of its dire conditions – became the only vi-
able option for many rice farmers. However, non-contractual laborers 
were only hired to meet temporary, seasonal demands for casual labour 
that offered no job security.  
Contracted workers were subjected to many obligations which 
amounted to nothing less than indentured servitude. These included 
binding clauses on the nature, duration, and conditions of work on the 
plantations. Infringement of any of these clauses was viewed as a crimi-
nal offence, and punished accordingly (Murray 1992, 52). The plantation 
compounds resembled ‘gigantic prison-like enclosures’ where workers 
that had already been separated from their means of production, were 
now isolated from the outside world. The frequent use of state power to 
break strikes and settle industrial disputes became an integral part of de-
terring workers’ resistance in Indochina. While for Europeans latex came 
to be known as ‘white gold’, plantation workers referred to it as ‘white 
blood’ (Murray 1992). Although the plantations were actually much less 
efficient than those of smallholders in terms of production, plantations 
were far more convenient units of taxation. Another advantage of this 
production system for the colonial state, was that it typically provided 
centralised forms of residence and labour that were far more amenable 
to central political and administrative control (Scott 1998, 189–90). 
Maintaining people in these locations thus safeguarded continued state 
revenue, both due to the surplus value added by labourers and for the 
improved capacity that the state had to tax them.  
With regards to natural resources, and in a similar way as occurred in 
Senegal, the French instituted a system of forest reserves, wherein 
French companies were granted ‘logging privileges’, but locals were no 
longer permitted to use the forests. This severely limited livelihood op-
portunities as people could no longer access, graze, or collect forest 
products (Diepart and Schoenberger 2016). From 1902 onwards, logging 
activities were regulated within these concessions through licenses be-
tween French companies and the forest administration, in what came to 
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be known as the ‘exclusive logging privilege’. This privilege served to 
limit small-scale use by the large-scale exploitation of forests (Diepart 
and Sem 2015, 18). At the same that these exclusive logging privileges 
expanded, between 1902 and 1920, the area designated as reserve land 
doubled. Colonial forestry rules served to protect French entrepreneurs 
whilst criminalising peasants and local authorities (Thomas 1999 cited in 
Diepart and Sem 2015, 18). These reserves were strategically located in 
areas where the administration was able to collect money by fining ‘envi-
ronmental offenders’. However, as the need for greater capital accumula-
tion expanded in the 1930s, the local governments decided to open the 
reserves to commercial activity. At this time, the French protectorate 
also established a system of ‘collection rights’ in order to exploit wood 
from forests (Diepart 2007, 136). 
3.2 Decolonisation and Postcolonialism 
France emerged from World War II weak and divided. Economic hard-
ships, the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as global super-
powers, combined with the growing power of nationalist elites through-
out Africa and Asia, forced the retrenchment of European colonial states 
from their colonies. Decolonisation, however, did not equate to real in-
dependence from the French state, which continued to maintain a large 
degree of control over its former colonies and protectorates. How this 
control evolved and the political situation it led to in different countries, 
however, was not homogeneous.  
Senegal: Between Socialism and Liberalism 
Following Senegalese independence in 1960, power was assumed by a  
government supported by France under the presidency of Leopold Sedar 
Senghor and his party, the Union Progréssiste Sénégalaise (UPS), which 
would remain in place for the following thirty years (Boone 1992, 11). 
Senghor’s socialism was described by his foreign minister as a ‘middle 
way’ between Social Marxism and American liberalism. Although some 
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classic elements of liberalism were introduced, such as a reduction of the 
role of the state and an enhancement of private sector involvement, the 
political elite also remained closely tied to the Socialist International 
(Schraeder 1997, 487). Senghor opposed deregulation, privatisation and 
trade liberalisation. However, at the same time he nurtured the relation-
ship with France, and continued to base the Senegalese economy on 
groundnut production for export and rice importation (Oya and Ba 
2013, 16). Although he opposed market reforms, he did not oppose a 
heavy French influence or a state controlled by elites - two characteristics 
that would play an important role in the transformation of Senegal to-
wards neoliberalism (Hedin 2007, 35–36). 
Domestically, throughout Senghor’s presidency Islamic leaders re-
ceived land grants from the government to further expand their ground-
nut estates (O’Brien 1975). French firms owned over 85% of Senegal’s 
modest industrial sector (O’Brien 1975, 109) and all of the banks, and 
they easily monopolised the import-export trade. French and Lebanese 
businessmen also controlled retail trade in urban and rural areas (Boone 
1992, 433–34). In return for these privileges granted by the state elites, 
French support assisted the new government in holding onto power in 
the face of challenges from nationalists, trade unions, and student 
movements, who rejected what the state’s ‘pseudo-independence’ and 
demanded real independence instead (Chafer 2003). Caught between the 
need to manage capital accumulation, which was facilitated by the pref-
erential treatment it received from France, together with domestic politi-
cal legitimation at home, Senghor tried to ‘reconcile the socialist rhetoric 
of the party, with an emphasis on co-operation, consensus, and solidari-
ty, with the aims of foreign donors and investors’ (Oya 2006, 206). 
The economy under Senghor was based on a clear modernising mis-
sion of agriculture under the banner of ‘rural socialism’. The rhetoric of 
this vision was that deep involvement of the state in the economy was 
necessary to protect peasants (Oya 2006, 205). A newly formed devel-
opment agency, The Delta Management and Exploitation Company 
(SAED), was mandated with the development and management of water 
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and land, in what became a pioneering zone for development projects 
(Bourgoin et al. 2016). The vision of this development agency, however, 
was not one of industrialised agriculture. Rather, it promoted pump-
based irrigation, which was initially very popular (Koopman 2012, 659). 
Between 1965 and 1975, 30,000 hectares of the Delta were brought un-
der cultivation by the SAED through small irrigation perimeters. Peasant 
farmers were expected to grow rice on land that had been made available 
to the SAED by the state and distributed through cooperatives. This was 
accompanied by large-scale organised and supervised immigration to 
provide the necessary workforce for the exploitation of the irrigated pe-
rimeters (Corniaux et al. 2016).  
However, due to the hardships that farmers on the Senegal River 
were facing at this time due to droughts and economic downturn, the 
government popularised the idea of investment in dams, legitimated by 
the desire to turn the Valley into the ‘California of the Sahel’ (Koopman 
2007). The droughts of the 1960s were capitalised upon by the develop-
ment planners, who used the droughts as an opportunity to suggest that 
traditional farming systems belonged to the past and that large-scale irri-
gated agriculture was the only way forward (Adams 1977). One of the 
key reforms instigated under Senghor, and which continues to be at the 
base of environmental and tenure regulations to date, is the Law of the 
National Domain (Loi sur le Domaine Nationale, 1964). This law national-
ised all lands not registered or occupied prior to the date of its imple-
mentation (Le Roy 1985, 683) and categorised the national territory into 
three domains: the national domain, the state domain, and the private 
domain. Approximately 95% of all land falls under the national domain, 
with the other 5% being shared between the state and private owners 
(van den Breemer and Hesseling 1999, 20). Most of the territory within 
rural areas (excluding protected areas which fall under the state domain) 
are administered by rural communities which have the power to distrib-
ute user rights to the land amongst their communes. The law was meant 
to promote the mise en valeur (meaning ‘to add value’) of lands and to pro-
tect famers against large land holders (Faye 2008). Under this law, the 
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state is also authorised to transfer usufructuary rights to all of its citizens 
on the condition that the receiver uses these rights in an economically 
useful way.  
However, the criteria of what constitutes mise en valeur as never clearly 
defined and thus was left open to interpretation and co-optation by eco-
nomic and political interests at the expense of poorest (Black and Sessay 
1998, 38). A major change that the law entailed was that, de facto, the law 
ended customary rights over land and prevented the transmission, or in-
heritance of land. The implication was that those people who were tradi-
tionally considered to be ‘owners’, no longer had legal rights and hence 
the expropriation of their land was possible. However, in practice and 
despite changes in legislation, those that cultivated the land still consid-
ered it to be their own (Black and Sessay 1998, 38). The two systems of 
legal versus customary land ownership still overlap today. With regards 
to forestry, the state continued to own many forest reserves, inherited 
from colonial times, while the 1935 Forestry Code remained in place 
(van den Breemer and Hesseling 1999, 20).  
The Forestry Services, which had been granted significant power dur-
ing colonial times, continued to consider local people as the main ene-
mies of the environment and so they imposed restrictions of access as 
well as fines on agro-pastoralists (van den Breemer and Hesseling 1999, 
25). These restrictions, however, did not apply to investors, who were 
viewed as inherently capable of properly making an efficient and eco-
nomically profitable use of resources. The tenure changes that had come 
into effect with the 1964 Law on the National Domain had significant 
consequences as the irrigation schemes grew, since they provided a 
mechanism to allocate land for irrigation and hence led the way to land 
speculation (Black and Sessay 1998, 38). 
These regulations on access and tenure over resources also served to 
manage populations, specifically to push people into places of produc-
tion where labour was most needed. The Senegal River Delta became a 
place of in-migration with resettlement schemes for new populations. 
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Claims that SAED’s strategy sought to improve local food production 
and provide an alternative to labour migration which was not needed at 
the time, improved the tone for foreign aid negotiations that were fund-
ing them (Adams 1977, 51). Agricultural projects that were organised on 
the basis of ‘stopping migration’ began to become more popular. How-
ever, the heavy mechanisation and investment required meant that the 
work that could be done by untrained farmers was limited, which legiti-
mised further involvement by the SAED. Moreover, the fertilisers, seed 
and hired machinery that were required as determined by the SAED, 
were provided to the farmers on credit  (Adams 1977, 40) The high cost 
of SAED services, the peasant farmer’s low productivity, and their ten-
dency – in the absence of substitute crops – to consume much of their 
harvest themselves, combined with technical difficulties, drew the peas-
ants deeper into a spiral of debt (Adams 1977, 42).  
The end of preferential price arrangements with France in 1966, and 
the devaluation of the West African CFA franc (CFA), marked a drastic 
fall in groundnut prices and created a very tense political situation 
(Corniaux et al. 2016, 12). At the same time that revenues from the 
groundnut sector were declining, the droughts of the 1970s exacerbated 
the situation (Boone 1992, 169). The socio-political and economic situa-
tion enflamed the popular frustration with the political system. Farmers 
blamed the government for diverting peanut earnings into the bureau-
cracy while the producers were going hungry, labour unions began to 
complain of the declining real value of the minimum wage, Senegalese 
business leaders demanded a better deal in relation to French capital, and 
university students and other intellectuals were outraged by the ongoing 
power given to the French in Senegalese matters (Boone 1992). The dis-
content of the peasantry (known in French as the malaise paysane) trans-
lated into a double movement that defied the political status quo. Student 
groups and labour-unions initiated protests that demanded ‘national con-
trol’ over the economy. The following message from one labour union 
encapsulates the generalised feeling at that time:  
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‘The present economic system of Senegal works like this: Foreign-
ers are rich and getting richer while the Senegalese are poor and get-
ting poorer…Senegalese workers (cannot save) and they consume 
everything they earn (13 billion CFA francs in total). What is worse, 
they are forced to go into debt. The foreigners, who represent only 
5% of the workforce, earn 57 billion CFA francs. Living very com-
fortable lives, they can still save and send their profit outside Senegal 
to invest abroad. They repatriate 43 billion CFA francs each year, ¾ 
of what they earn in Senegal. Every year foreigner repatriate sums that 
exceed the national budget of the country’ (Senegalese Militant of the 
Union des Groupements Economiques Sénégalais (UNIGES) in 1968 – cited 
in Boone 1992, 168). 
Senghor’s initial response to this tense socio-political situation was to 
declare a state of emergency and to silence groups with violence. How-
ever, as protests continued, Senghor moved swiftly to demobilise, divide, 
and co-opt the opposition. Peasant debts to cooperatives were forgiven 
and the government raised groundnut producer prices. He also provided 
student leaders attractive government jobs and increased the minimum 
wage (Boone 1992, 169). In an effort to regain stability and political legit-
imacy, Senghor embarked in efforts to increase public investment in ag-
riculture, increase producer prices, and subsidise fertilisers. However, in 
order to increase public spending, Senghor embarked in acquiring an un-
precedented amount of foreign loans. Senegal’s foreign debt rose from 
15.5% of GDP in 1970 to 99.5% in 1985 (Dembele 2003, 15–18). For-
eign borrowing provided the material basis for expanding the state and 
reconsolidating the Senghor regime during the second decade of inde-
pendence. Loans granted to Senegal by the World Bank Group increased 
dramatically in the early to mid 1970s, tripling between 1970 and 1975, 
and placing the World Bank ahead of the French government as the 
prime financier of Senegalese public investment (Boone 1992, 173). Alt-
hough the government had been very reluctant to completely liberalise 
the agricultural economy and privatise state-owned enterprises (Faye et 
al. 2007: 10), the amount of debt that Senghor had accumulated provided 
84 CHAPTER 3 
 
little leeway to contradict the international financial institutions that de-
manded these changes. The government accepted the intervention of the 
financial institutions mandated with the mission to spread the neoliberal 
paradigm (mainly the World Bank and International Monetary Fund).  
Although Senegal had experienced a negative net migration rate since 
the early 1970s, the above crises led to a spectacular increase in out-
migration (Sidibé 2006). Due to the impacts of the multiple economic 
and structural reforms on weakening farmers’ support systems (particu-
larly of those that needed irrigation in the context of droughts), most 
families had no other choice than to send their sons abroad in search of 
income to support them (Koopman 2012, 656). This became a conven-
ient strategy for the Senegalese state as it ensured a continuous inflow of 
money from the diaspora. At this time, significant domestic policy ef-
forts were devoted to strengthening the potential of emigration for de-
velopment through remittances. However, as the economic crisis in the 
1970s hit, France radically changed its migration policies, introducing the 
requirement for residence permits in 1974, closing the border in 1975, 
and thereafter initiating return policies. Hence, the economic crisis of the 
1970s threatened the possibilities and benefits of migration for develop-
ment. People started to return home and those countries experiencing 
the economic crisis began to delocalise companies, relocating to develop-
ing countries where natural and human resources were cheaper (Daffé 
2008, 113).  
Senghor tried to appease the democratic demands of the various 
populations by adopting a new constitution in 1976 that transformed the 
de facto one-party state into a tripartite political system. However, the 
process incurred strong interventions designed to assure any relinquish-
ing of power. The new constitution designated Senghor’s ruling party, 
the Union Progréssiste Sénégaliase (UPS), as ‘socialist and democratic’ and 
provided a mechanism to crystallise two opposition parties. These in-
cluded the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), led by Abdoulaye Wade, 
and the African Party of Independence, led by Mahmout Diop. While 
according to the constitution the former had to adhere to the ‘liberal and 
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democratic’ creed, the latter had the constitutional obligation of espous-
ing the ‘Marxist-Leninist or communist’ ideology (Cruise O’Brien and 
Coulon 1978). Senghor and his party were convinced that this limited 
pluralism would reconcile the growing popular demands for liberty and 
democracy with the imperatives of political order and stability (Fatton 
1987, 281). As a result of this manipulation, Senghor won the semi-
competitive elections of 1978 by a large majority.  
The macro-economic context deteriorated, however, and Senegal was 
caught in huge external debt and fiscal deficit (Oya 2006, 209–11). This 
set the stage for further structural adjustment and the turn towards ne-
oliberalism, which would later be consolidated under Senghor’s succes-
sor. In 1979, the government announced a new IMF-inspired five-year 
economic plan designed to cut government spending (including in agri-
culture), promote economic growth and reduce Senegal’s trade deficits 
and foreign debt (Gellar 1995, 52). The lack of financial control and per-
vasive corruption resulted in losses that seemed unsustainable. The situa-
tion of socio-economic and political chaos towards the end of Senghor’s 
presidency led him to resign, passing on his power to a very close ally, 
Abdoulaye Diouf, in 1981.   
 
Cambodia: Between (In)dependence and Genocide  
Post-colonialism in Cambodia assumed a very different path, as it was 
caught in the midst of various international conflicts and wars being 
fought over its territory. While in 1941, the Japanese army proclaimed 
the end of European powers, the French administration continued to 
remain in the country. In 1945, understanding that their defeat by the 
United States was eminent, Japan entered with force into Indochina, 
seizing power and removing the French administration. However, later 
that year, the allied forces (Great Britain, India, and France) arrived to 
Cambodia with the help of the Cambodian King, and thereafter, Cam-
bodia became an autonomous state within the French Union. The focus 
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of this newly ‘independent’ state was to establish an industrial base. Dur-
ing the Sihanouk regime (1953-1970), Cambodia agreed to coexist with 
foreign interests and hired foreign personnel to fill the posts that had 
been left vacant by the French administration, while also accepting for-
eign capital investments in infrastructure. The geographical location of 
Cambodia was strategically important for military interests especially giv-
en the neutral foreign policy adopted by Cambodia during the Cold War 
years (Chhair and Ung 2013). Nonetheless, despite foreign investments 
in infrastructure, agriculture continued to be an extremely important sec-
tor providing approximately 41% of the country’s GDP. Cambodia’s ex-
ports continued to depend on primary goods with rubber and rice re-
maining the most important (comprising over half of the total exports) 
(Chhair and Ung 2013). 
The tenure system that the French had introduced in Cambodia was 
preserved and land transactions increased. This consequently led to an 
important tenure concentration and the formation of a landless farmer 
class (Hou Youn 1955 cited in Diepart 2007, 133). This placed a signifi-
cant number of peasants into a vicious cycle of debt and impoverish-
ment. Although Sihanouk wanted to maintain the ideals of France, by 
the end of the 1960s a strong anti-colonial sentiment rose, echoing what 
was occurring in many parts of the world. Sihanouk’s authoritarian rule, 
which aimed to silence opposition, provided movements of national lib-
eration and Khmer nationalism with a strong impetus to present them-
selves as an alternative to foreign domination (Osborne 1993). However, 
Khmer nationalism did not assume power immediately. In 1970, Sihan-
ouk was overthrown by the right-wing General Lol Nol with the backing 
of the United States. Lol Nol embraced a policy of liberalisation which 
involved devaluing its currency, removing state controls on foreign trade 
and banking, and reducing state involvement. The policies of liberalisa-
tion were short lived however, because Cambodia became trapped in a 
civil war fought between regime supporters - backed by the United 
States - and Khmer nationalists – backed by China (Chhair and Ung 
2013).  
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Between 1969 and 1973, during the Vietnam War, the United States 
dropped an estimated 550 000 tons of bombs over the neutral country to 
supposedly flush the Viet Cong forces thought to be operating in Cam-
bodia (Boyden and Gibbs 1997). This intervention killed thousands of 
people and more than a million people were internally displaced in Cam-
bodia. This provided ammunition to the nationalist sentiment and na-
tionalistic factions, which became more powerful as a result, held togeth-
er through their anti-Americanism. For many, it was the prospect of 
freedom that mobilised them for a revolution that promised radical 
transformation (Chandler 1997, 42). Throughout the country, the per-
petually powerless segment of the population was drawn towards the 
revolution under the hope that they would finally be empowered through 
it. In 1975, the Khmer Rouge overthrew General Lol Nol (Chandler 
1976).  
The Khmer Rouge (KR) sought to dismantle the French colonial idea 
of Cambodge and replace it with that of ‘Kampuchea’. The flaws that 
needed to be rectified in what the Khmer Rouge called the ‘old society’, 
included social ranks, personal possessions, wealth, consumerism, indi-
vidualism, ‘family-ism’, book learning, foreign ideas and ‘urban’ society. 
Many of these characteristics, the Khmer Rouge argued, had been im-
ported thoughtlessly from the ‘depraved’ United States. The regime pro-
posed to wage a class war and to transform the economy by abolishing 
class distinction, destroying pre-revolutionary institutions, and trans-
forming the population into unpaid agricultural workers (Chandler 1991, 
1). Supported by an extremely impoverished population, the Khmer 
Rouge initiated the radical collectivisation of farming. Under the leader-
ship of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge regime abolished money, evacuated 
all cities and towns, prohibited religious practices, suspended formal ed-
ucation along with newspapers and postal services, imposed communal 
eating after 1977, and forced everyone to wear peasant attire.  
The main priority of the Khmer Rouge was the production of rice.  
The Khmer Rouge paid scarce attention to the forestry sector as their 
prime focus was the expansion of agriculture. Almost overnight, Cam-
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bodia became as rural as it had been at the time of the French’s arrival in 
1863 (Chandler 1997, 45). Approximately 30-40% of the population 
were uprooted from their origins and all urban areas were emptied (IOM 
2009). New ways of life instituted by the regime included a culture of 
obedience to authority figures, but no longer to one’s parents and elders. 
However, anti-Vietnamese prejudices and Sihanouk’s obsession of being 
surrounded by enemies remained, contributed to the fact that by 1978, 
Cambodian hatred towards its neighbours had become the driving force 
of Cambodia’s foreign relations (Chandler 1997, 45). At this time, all as-
sets were owned by the state and all international involvement in the 
state was removed. The Cambodian ‘balance sheet’ throughout this time 
of radical change includes the death of approximately 1.7 million people 
– or one fifth of the population – who perished as a result of forced 
overwork, starvation, mistreated diseases or executions (Chandler 1991). 
Whereas the internal migration of populations was forced by the regime, 
people were not allowed to leave the country. However, both during the 
Khmer Rouge period and immediately after, a large number of people 
fled to refugee camps in Thailand or sought asylum overseas. 
In 1979, a Vietnamese invasion overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime 
and established the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. Members of the 
Khmer Rouge fled to the north-eastern provinces of Cambodia – along 
the Thai border – and guerrilla activity ensued (Marschke 1999, 16).  
With the Khmer Rouge no longer in power, people started migrating 
throughout Cambodia in an attempt to acquire their former land back. 
The People’s Republic of Kampuchea initiated a distribution of land 
among peasants and people were able to return their villages (when these 
had not been completely destroyed); the land continued to remain classi-
fied as state property (Vickery, Haysom, and Sutton 1986, 137–38). The 
new government attempted to set measures for the collectivisation of 
agricultural land and established a policy of ‘solidarity groups’ (krom sa-
makki), but the collectivisation policy did not extend into other means of 
production. The ‘solidarity groups’ were groups of 15 to 25 families who 
farmed the land collectively and shared the fruits of their labour equita-
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bly amongst themselves (Vickery, Haysom, and Sutton 1986, 138–39). 
Under this system, land user rights were granted to each family in rela-
tion to the number of active members. Land was given in usufruct and 
abandoned land was cultivated by those who had the labour capacity to 
do so. However, as the system developed, it not only led to conflict over 
land access, but it also reminded people of the damage experiences they 
suffered under the Khmer Rouge, and so the people rejected collectivisa-
tion (Feldt 2016). 
From an environmental standpoint, the lack of access to international 
markets and the absence of external investment stalled deforestation in 
Cambodia from 1975 until the start of the 1990s (Dudley et al. 2002, 
324). However, by end of the 1980s, the rhythm of deforestation in-
creased as a result of the exploitation of luxury wood by military factions 
that used the revenues to maintain themselves. The last chapter of the 
Cambodian civil war was characterised by both the establishment of 
timber as a ‘conflict commodity’ and a rise in wildlife trade, which served 
to sustain the power of both the army and political elites (Le Billon 
2000). For both cultural and circumstantial reasons, land collectivisation 
failed, and land privatisation was introduced (Ovesen, Trankell, and 
Öjendal 1996). The negotiations for the transition from war to peace be-
gan in 1989. With the end of the Vietnamese domination, Cambodia 
moved towards a market economy and from a system of state ownership 
of land to a private property system (Feldt 2016). 
This transition to private property took place in the middle of the civ-
il war with the presence of Vietnamese troops, after Western countries 
halted aid flows; it also occurred in the context of a country struggling to 
rebuild itself from one of the darkest chapters in history (Hughes 2003, 
1). Under the supervision of the World Bank and the International Mon-
etary Fund, Cambodia engaged once again in fundamental changes to its 
land tenure institutions. In 1989, new legal provisions were inserted as 
amendments to the Constitution and three categories of land were de-
fined: settlements, agricultural land and concessions. These provisions 
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would be letter integrated into the 1992 Land Law (Diepart and Sem 
2015, 27).  
3.2 Variegated Neoliberalism 
 
Despite striking similarities during their colonial periods, postcolonialism 
took drastically different directions within Senegal and Cambodia. It was 
on the basis of such diverse historical pathways that neoliberalism also 
assumed variegated pathways that maintained salient similarities with the 
colonial period. As stated by Moore: ‘neoliberal capitalism was built by 
returning to the ‘scenes of the crime’, ruthlessly appropriating wealth 
from the long-plundered zones of the Global South’ (Moore 2011, 17, 
133). The end of the Cold War and the subsequent breakdown of the 
Soviet Union was facilitated by a massive upheaval of global economies 
during the 1970s. Between 1973 and 1979, global oil prices rose dramati-
cally, generating a severe economic crisis in industrialised nations as well 
as a massive debt crisis in the developing world. The disillusionment 
with state involvement based on Keynesian economic principles led to a 
paradigm shift that consisted in leaving the ‘regulation to the market’ 
through neoliberal principles (Springer 2010, 2). However, how neoliber-
alism plays out in practice is conditioned by the political situation in 
place and by how state-society interactions unfold. As a result, each 
country adapts to neoliberalism in very different ways and with distinc-
tively different legitimisers and outcomes with respect to environmental 
change, land grabs, and migration.  
Senegal: Balancing (In)dependence  
In order to appease social tensions, the new President Abdoulaye Diouf 
increased the democratisation process initiated by Senghor and the Na-
tional Assembly legalised and recognised all political parties. Similarly to 
what Senghor had done before him, Diouf portrayed himself as both a 
‘moderniser and a protector of traditional values and institutions’. 
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(Fatton 1987, 285). However, although one party rule was replaced by an 
apparent multi-party democracy, the structures of power remained un-
changed (Barker 1988). Democratisation in Senegal was granted by a rul-
ing class that sought to maintain political legitimacy in the face of social 
unrest. Thus, the process of democratisation in Senegal has been inter-
preted as a ruling class project bent on reorganising the state in an effort 
to diffuse an ‘organic crisis’ and neutralise the threat from the left 
(Fatton 1987; Barker 1988).  
In the 1980s, economic downturn coupled with new droughts had 
once again a disastrous impact on Senegal’s agricultural economy. As a 
way to remedy the situation, the government embarked on a series of 
policy reform packages associated with the structural adjustment loans of 
the World Bank (WB) and the assistance of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (Oya 2006, 211). International development institutions at-
tributed the sharp fall in production to droughts, inappropriate infra-
structure, excessive administrative costs, inadequate incentives, and high 
production costs, which reduced the self-financing capacity of farmers. 
The solution was presented as lying within greater liberalisation of the 
conditions of production and with increased privatisation. The structural 
adjustment plans demanded that the state retreat from agriculture, that 
SAED assignments be reduced, and that private sector activity be en-
hanced (Adams 1977). This created inequalities between the poorest 
farmers, who were strongly affected by the loss of subsidies, and farmers 
who were better placed to take advantage of the new circumstances. On-
ly those that were relatively better off financially could now afford irriga-
tion, which has since then created additional problems of land access and 
social cohesion (Adams 1977).  
A major endeavour of these loans was to finally transform the Senegal 
River Delta into a zone of capitalist production for the world economy 
and one of rice production for the national economy. The government 
wished to transform the delta into a granary (Scheer 1996, 36) and the 
Senegal River Basin Development authority (OMVS, Organisation pour la 
Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal, in French), established in 1972, was 
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charged with the task of doing so. Following the advice of a technical 
feasibility study conducted by French authorities, the basin states pro-
ceeded with dam development (Venema, Schiller, and Bass 1996). The 
riparian States of Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania joined forces within the 
OMVS, and approved the construction of two dams: the Diama dam in 
Senegal (which was completed in 1986) and the Manantali dam in Mali 
(completed in 1988) (Ubink, Rahmato, and Amanor 2009). 
Many critics had warned that the basin plans would not benefit local 
residents and would rather place additional pressure on them, because 
they would translate into increased land prices and an inability to secure 
access to resources. Moreover, studies showed that for an equal invest-
ment of labour and money, flood-recession farming would actually yield 
much better results. However, these criticisms went unheard and the idea 
of a modernised and forward-looking agricultural system was favoured 
over traditional smallholder farming (Adams and So 1996). The govern-
ments of these three countries believed that the dams had the potential 
to end the o economic recession, whilst also providing the conditions for 
stable agricultural production at a time of great climate fluctuations, and 
relieving the costs of cereal imports that had contributed to great nation-
al debt (LeMarquand 1991, 268). The dams were supposed to allow for a 
control of water flow from the river, thereby facilitating annual double-
cropping and reducing Senegal’s cereal deficit (Bass, Venema, and 
Schiller 1996, 494). France’s interests in financing the dams were partly 
due to the presence in France of African migrant workers from the Sen-
egalese River Valley as well as to the growing belief that migration could 
be regulated through investment and development in the country of 
origin and that traditional framing systems were not sufficient to adapt to 
the droughts (Kamara 2010). However, although originally the costs of 
the Diama dam had been planned to be financed by user fees, the pro-
ject’s financial results were negative in an area where local farmers could 
simply not afford irrigation costs (Venema, Schiller, and Bass 1996, 143).  
In the face of mounting difficulties, in 1984 the World Bank initiated 
an increasingly invasive program of structural adjustment compelling the 
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state to further dismantle agricultural support agencies (Dembele 2003). 
The government implemented a ‘New Agricultural Policy’ (NAP), which 
followed the prescriptions of international financial institutions. Farmers 
were now responsible for their own economic activity without help from 
the state, and the private sector was mandated to sell fertiliser and seeds 
to farmers who would pay in cash for the needed inputs. The New Agri-
cultural Policy stood on two principles: market liberalisation and the 
withdrawal of the state’s direct support to producers (Oya 2006, 213). A 
new financial institution, the Caisse National de Crédit Agricole (CNCAS), 
was now charged for issuing agricultural credit, while producers were 
responsible for major public perimeters and water management tasks 
(Corniaux et al. 2016, 11). The consequences of these reforms were of-
ten disastrous, especially within the Senegal River Valley where the gov-
ernment’s ability to continue constructing irrigation schemes crippled 
and between 1980 and 1987, the agricultural GDP fell by 41% 
(Koopman 2012, 656). Given the impossibility for farmers to compete 
with those that had access to the expensive irrigation system, their only 
option – other than migration – was to work as agricultural wage labour-
ers (Adams and So 1996). The development projects in the Senegal River 
Valley failed both with respect to their economic and social objectives, 
and protests against the government began to proliferate across the 
country. In 1992 the government accepted a new round of Agricultural 
Sector Loans that paved the way for a new agricultural policy framework, 
which included the Structural Adjustment Program for Agriculture 
(PASA), the Program of Investment for the Agricultural Sector (PISA), 
and the Political Declaration for the Agricultural Sector (DPA) (Oya 
2006, 217). 
Despite pushback from segments of civil society, in January 1994, the 
neoliberal paradigm was further consolidated when the state acquiesced 
to IMF and WB demands to devalue the CFA franc currency by 50%.  
With the currency halved in value, many Senegalese perceived this as an 
indication that they were being abandoned by France. The public reac-
tion was immediate and Senegalese newspapers screamed at their betray-
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al by both France and the regime, through violent riots in Dakar (Chafer 
2003, 163). Despite attempts to float the economy, the Diouf Admin-
istration could not foster the type of economic growth its lenders de-
manded. The price of basic items spiked significantly while wages re-
mained stagnant (Hedin 2007, 39–40). In 1995, the World Bank 
approved a new Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) for agriculture, 
which once again stated that its aim was to increase food security, im-
prove rural income, and advance natural resource management, while 
contributing at an average growth rate of 4% (Adams 1977). This pro-
gram stipulated further liberalisation and improved incentives for the 
private sector investment. Following a further push from creditors, the 
Diouf administration adopted a Plan of Action on Tenure in 1996 des-
tined to benefit foreign investors over ‘non-productive’ Senegalese farm-
ers. Although the 1996 decentralisation laws confirmed the transfer of 
power over land allocation to rural councils over the national domain, 
the new reform allowed the state to expropriate land considered to be of 
public use for development, which could then allow to facilitate land ac-
cess for private investors (Chafer 2003, 163). These reforms in agricul-
tural and tenure policies have not gone unchallenged in Senegal, howev-
er. In 1993, the Conseil National de Concertation des Ruraux (CNCR), a 
federation of 28 small-scale producer associations, was established. Since 
its creation, it has become the prime civil society organisation to interact 
with the government on matters of agricultural policy (Resnick 2004).  It 
is also the country’s main peasant movement and a key actor in defend-
ing small-scale agriculture whose role is of continued importance (Pesche 
2009). 
 
Cambodia’s Triple Transition   
Following 30 years of brutal conflict, and with the fall of the Soviet Un-
ion in 1989, Cambodia began a process of economic and political re-
form. The 1991 UN-negotiated civil war settlement marked the begin-
ning of what has become to known as Cambodia’s triple transition from 
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authoritarianism to democracy, from a command economy to a free 
market, and from war to peace, which would be overseen by the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNCTAT) (Hughes 2003). 
The UNCTAT was mandated with the task of disarming the warring fac-
tions and of creating an (economic) liberal order to connect Cambodia to 
the world economy (Ojendal 1996, 194). In order to achieve this, the In-
ternational Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia provided 
loans and grants for development, on the condition that structural re-
forms were made (Slocomb 2010, 289). Cambodia started normalising 
relations with the west and accepting large amounts of aid in the form of 
grants and loans from bilateral and multilateral sources (Ear 1997, 73). 
Market liberalisation reforms consisted of new land tenure policies and 
land privatisation, tax and market reform policies, a new investment law 
designed to attract foreign capital, and a separation of the state from 
production through the reduction of subsidies and the privatisation of 
state-owned businesses (Hughes 2003, 31-33). 
During the 1990s, the government announced a reform agenda to 
promote development. Agricultural development was prioritised within 
the reform agenda in order to ensure food security and economic 
growth; this was to be done by providing raw materials for the pro-
cessing industry, increasing exports, and creating employment. To facili-
tate this, the government introduced a series of investment incentives 
(Hughes 2003). In the 1990s, land concessions were officially reintro-
duced as the main system for natural resource management. The conces-
sion system benefited from the strong support of international organisa-
tions and it became the main system to manage natural resource in 
Cambodia throughout the 1990s. The objectives of the concessions were 
to generate revenue for post-war reconstruction efforts, enable the sus-
tainable management of forests, and generate revenues from exports 
(Diepart and Sem 2015). In contrast to the previous concession system 
however, this model was intended to make a rational use of resources 
through centralised management that would impose rules on the conces-
sionaires. These rules included the various obligation such as the need to 
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invest in transformative industries and to increase the finance available 
for rural infrastructure such as roads and schools (Hibou 2004, 4 cited in 
Diepart and Sem 2015). The elections held in 1993 gave power to a coa-
lition formed by the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), which opposed 
the Khmer Rouge, and the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independ-
ent, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopertaif (FUNCINPEC), led by Norodom Ranna-
ridh, who tried to integrate the Khmer Rouge into the government as a 
means to weaken the CPP. The need that both of these parties had in 
order to accumulate capital for accumulation led to a sharp rise in the 
allocation of forest concessions (Diepart and Sem 2015, 32).  
The Constitution, adopted by the new Royal Kingdom of Cambodia 
(RCG) in 1993, reinstated a constitutional monarchy and a pluralist polit-
ical system (Siphana et al. 1998 cited in Diepart 2007, 135). The 1993 
Constitution marked the shift to a market economy and legalised both 
private ownership and state property. This fundamental change implied 
important tenure changes to private property. For example, due the 
Constitution’s inconsistencies vis-a-vis the 1992 Land Law - which had 
stipulated that only residential land could be granted legal ownership - 
the Constitution hence implied a necessary modification of the 1992 
Land Law (Diepart 2007, 136). These new land measures generated a 
new speculative drive over land permitting those with greatest means to 
amass natural resources (Hughes 2003, 41).  
Access to agricultural land in the 1990s was characterised by great in-
equalities with respect to agricultural land size, leading to increased land-
lessness and land concentration (Diepart and Sem 2015). Many people 
who had earlier returned to settle on land following the peace agree-
ments would be considered – under the new tenure reforms – to be ille-
gally using that land. These people had in fact begun to resettle on va-
cant plots previously occupied by victims of the genocide, and to re-
adopt pre-Khmer Rouge organising principles of land access, through 
which ‘actual use’ and not ‘proprietorship’ prevailed. However, under the 
new tenure reforms, these people no longer had rights to these plots. 
The 1992 Land Law stipulated that local authorities held the authority to 
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grant land ownership rights, but in effect, land rights were granted to 
those who bribed the local authorities to issue receipts, rather than to 
those who actually occupied the land. Those that suffered expropriations 
had scarce recourse options (Springer 2010). 
In a country that was devastated by years of war, natural resources 
were considered to be a catalyst for economic post-conflict reconstruc-
tion (Le Billon and Springer 2007; Le Billon 2000; Milne 2015). Howev-
er, as global awareness of environmental issues and funding opportuni-
ties to address these spread, the exploitation of natural resources became 
an increasingly contested solution (Le Billon 2002). Illicit logging in 
Cambodia became a key point of contention between the government 
and the international donors, who at the time, were providing more than 
half of the national budget (Le Billon 2002, 574) and funding opportuni-
ties became increasingly linked to reforms in the forest sector (De Lopez 
2001). In order to appease the international donors and diffuse the 
mounting tensions, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) passed a 
number of environmental laws in the 1990s. The 1993 Royal Decree on 
the Designation and Creation of Protected Areas was subsequently fol-
lowed by the passing of the Environmental Protection and Natural Re-
source Management Law in 1996, while the socio-economic develop-
ment plan of Cambodia (1996-2000) also contained provisions for 
natural resource management.  
All of these regulations can be interpreted as the result of effective 
technocratic work and pressure put forth by donors, however, these reg-
ulations were hardly effective within the political context of Cambodia 
(Mehmet 1997). Instead, what these laws did de facto, was to place more 
land in the hands of the state. Between 1994 and 2001, 39% of Cambo-
dia was allocated to forest concessions while agricultural concessions had 
expanded to an area of 809,296 hectares by 2001. In fact, while deforest-
ed areas between 1973 and 1993 averaged approximately 70,000 hectares 
per year, according to estimates from the World Bank, between 1993 and 
1997 this more than doubled to rate of 180,000 hectares per year 
(COHCHR 2004, 13). In 1996, Global Witness – Cambodia’s former 
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forest-crime monitor – cautioned that: ‘there is not another instance in 
the world where such vast proportion of a country’s forests, situated in 
areas with no effective government control, had been sold in such a 
short time, and in such great secrecy, to foreign companies’ (quoted in 
Springer 2010b, 67). In the process, those most vulnerable saw their pos-
sibilities to access the resources they relied on for their livelihoods in-
creasingly restricted.   
 
Conclusion 
The land rush that we see today was set in motion long before the recent 
global crisis. Legitimations around environmental security and adapta-
tion, with regards to migration and environmental change, underlined 
many of the justifications for such land acquisitions. Despite the differ-
ing geopolitical interests of the French colonial administration within the 
two countries, the similarities in terms territorialisation outcomes that 
the colony imposed in both countries are striking. In both cases, colonial 
migrations were about controlling people through labour and extracting 
natural resources. They were also designed to enable access to territories 
that were vital to further consolidate control of populations and re-
sources. The French colonial administration attempted to ‘modernise’ 
agriculture in both countries, in a way that is similar to what is being 
done today in the name of adaptation. At the time, it was low population 
rather than high population that concerned the colonial administration. 
Tenure, taxation, and environment reforms all contributed to demarcat-
ing resource access for the most powerful while excluding the most vul-
nerable. The exclusion of peasants from resources combined with their 
inability to compete in new land markets, facilitated the mobilisation of 
labour into large-scale plantations that fed the increasing needs of the 
colonial power. Both countries became dependant on cash crops and 
export crops (peanut in Senegal and rubber in Cambodia) which had dire 
environmental consequences. However, the forced migration and mo-
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bility of some (wage labourers) came at the price of the sedentarisation 
and involuntary immobility of others (mostly pastoralists and swidden 
cultivators).  
Despite this shared colonial past, both countries pursued distinctively 
different pathways following independence, which are key to under-
standing the current period. As in other parts of the world, anti-colonial 
and nationalistic sentiments emerged with force. Touched by broader 
economic crises, two double movements took place. In Senegal, this 
double movement led to a socialist government that remained in power 
for 30 years and that tried to find a balance between independence and 
its ongoing links to its former colonial power. In Senegal, droughts cou-
pled with the continued dependence on the colonial power and on struc-
tural reforms loans, propelled the state’s retreat from agriculture. As land 
markets rose, poor farmers were incapable of competing and the agricul-
tural sector suffered severe hardships. In Cambodia, on the contrary, the 
civil war that took place between supporters of a right-wing general sup-
ported by the US and a communist faction supported by China, gave 
way to one of the darkest chapters in history. The Pol Pot regime perpe-
trated one of the deadliest genocides in human history with the forced 
uprooting of urban populations, which were pushed into rural areas (and 
with the impossibility to migrate abroad), and the death of one-fifth of 
the population from overwork, starvation, and executions. All assets 
were owned by the Cambodian state and all international involvement 
was removed. Trials to impose collectivisation failed under the Vietnam-
ese invasion and Cambodia moved towards a market economy. 
The transition towards neoliberalism occurred progressively in Sene-
gal where the aim of striking a balance between independence and de-
pendence from the west gave way to the latter. Structural reforms altered 
tenure regimes in drastic ways, while irrigation schemes - presented as a 
form of environmental adaptation - could only be accessed by those who 
had most means to begin with. As a result of the application of mise en 
valeur principles, poor peasants were unable to compete with wealthy in-
vestors. The economic situation of Senegal deteriorated, and out-
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migration became an escape valve from poverty for many small-scale 
farmers who were unable to compete in the domestic market. In the 
process, the new agricultural policies which intended to build resilience 
from environmental change and economic efficiency, inadvertently 
placed natural resources in the hands of political and economic elites, as 
they held the political power and economic means to make such ven-
tures ‘profitable’. In Cambodia, the transition towards neoliberalism oc-
curred at the end of the conflict, during which time private property was 
reintroduced along with new legislation. The new legislation was de-
signed by donors in an effort to protect the country’s natural assets 
(which had been relatively untouched by deforestation during the coloni-
al period), by regulating the granting of land concessions. However, nat-
ural resources become key in the acquisition and maintenance of power 
by the ruling party. It is within this context, that the legislation and ten-
ure reforms further served to place natural assets in the hands of those in 
power who depended these resources as a means to support their legiti-
macy. Despite important differences, in both countries the path from 
colonialism to neoliberalism has been marked by the will to control pop-
ulation and nature to the benefit of the most privileged and at the ex-











4 Green and Migration Grabs  
 
Introduction     
At the turn of the century, a number of major events on the international 
stage altered not only the material realities of migration and environmen-
tal change, but concomitantly, how these realities have been framed and 
acted upon. With regards to environmental change, the increased severity 
and number of casualties linked to natural hazards, as well as the decline 
of endangered species, has propelled climate and environmental change 
to the top of international political discussions. In an effort to halt cli-
mate change, new institutions and negotiations have been created1 and a 
wide variety of measures have been designed with the intent of mitigat-
ing and adapting to a rapidly changing environment and climate. 
Amongst the wide variety of measures proposed, Bioenergy with Carbon 
Capture and Storage (BECCS), together with market mechanisms to 
control emissions, have become particularly salient. Moreover, funding 
for adaptation has been made available for developing countries to adapt 
to the worst impacts of climate change.  
With regards to migration, while many developing countries depend 
upon migration as an escape valve from poverty and a means to fulfil 
increasing aspirations to migrate, the global financial crash severely re-
duced the labour needs of many migrant-receiving countries. Measures 
to control migration include a stronger securitisation of border controls, 
whilst development aid and assistance are increasingly designed to halt 
migration at the place of origin. In this context, it is important to not 
only examine green grabs – understood as the ‘appropriation of nature for 
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environmental ends’ (Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012) - but also mi-
gration grabs, which, following the previous definition, can be defined as 
‘the appropriation of natural resources for migration ends’. Given that 
both environmental change and distress migration often impact rural 
populations the hardest, interventions in agriculture for both environ-
mental mitigation and employment creation have been regarded as a 
suitable response. However, in a global context of increasing food and 
energy prices through which corporate investors have been propelled to 
invest in farmland, many rural areas have become the target of land 
grabs. In this context, the question this chapter seeks to address is: How 
are global adaptation and security framings around environmental change and/or 
migration serving to legitimise land grabs differently in Senegal and Cambodia, and 
why?  
In order to answer this question, the chapter analyses how the materi-
al realities of environmental change and/or migration have been framed 
differently in the very diverse contexts of Senegal and Cambodia and 
how these frames have been used to legitimise land grabs. To do so, it 
analyses the main policies that have reshaped access to land since the 
turn of the century and underlines the specific migration and environ-
mental intentions of each. This chapter draws on both an analysis of key 
policy documents, and on primary data collected in interviews with key 
stakeholders, government representatives, donors, NGOs, and research-
ers in both countries.  
4.1 Senegal 
The consequences of removing agricultural subsidies for producers in 
the 1990s were devastating for many small-scale farmers. This was exac-
erbated by the fact that at this time Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) to the agricultural sector also decreased. The assumption that 
that private investors would fill the gaps left by agricultural subsidies did 
not materialise and with the arrival of cheap subsidised imports from 
developed countries, the livelihoods of many farmers deteriorated drasti-
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cally (De Schutter 2015, 6–7; Dembele 2003). After 40 years of socialist 
rule, in 2000, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal’s liberal party won the Presi-
dential elections based upon his promises to diversify foreign relations in 
a way that would diminish reliance upon France (Chafer 2003) and to 
improve living conditions, which had seriously deteriorated during the 
1980s and 1990s (Patel and McMichael 2009). Due to his ambitious pro-
grams to modernise the agricultural sector, he was also nicknamed ‘the 
agronomist’ (Benegiamo and Cirillo 2018).  
Given that structural adjustments had become increasingly conten-
tious during the 1990s, African political leaders – including Wade – start-
ed to criticise the West openly for their mismanagement of African 
economies. However, instead of criticising neoliberalism per se, elites fo-
cused their critiques on its misapplication (Hedin 2007, 50). African 
leaders thus tried to strike the balance between capital accumulation and 
political legitimation by seeking to redefine neoliberalism in a manner 
that would be appropriate to the social demands of independence com-
bined with greater sovereignty over their own national economies, which 
populations demanded. In 2001, Senegal – under President Wade - 
joined the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) and Presi-
dent Wade became one of the key architects of the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), signed by many African Heads of 
State. This development framework aimed to address the challenge of 
agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa by underlining the key 
role that the private sector and foreign investment should play in revital-
ising agriculture – namely through agribusiness led development (Bour-
goin et al. 2019, 42–43). To do so, NEPAD proposed a new policy of 
privatisation and free trade designed to attract Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI) (Cherry 2002). In this view, and in line with the World 
Bank’s prescription, the assumption was that increased privatisation of 
land would resolve the many tenure conflicts occurring in rural areas, 
whilst also increasing the efficiency of the sector (World Bank 2003 in 
Ndiaye 2011). Instead of calling for more loans however, the NEPAD 
called for foreign investment. The NEPAD embodied the paradoxical 
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relationship between embracing the Western economic principles of free 
trade and investment, whilst simultaneously depicting Africa as a ‘self-
reliant’ entity (Hedin 2007, 50). The document stated that unlike previ-
ous IMF and WB policies, this was a project of African nationalism: ‘It 
will be African-led and managed’  (Cherry 2002, 19). 
 In line with these objectives, Senegal pursued investor-friendly poli-
cies by allowing a full expatriation of economic benefits and securing the 
tenure interests of investors. Senegal’s Code for Investment stated that 
‘Physical or moral persons who have invested, have the right to transfer 
freely to the State where they are residents, the dividends and products 
of all nature of the capital invested, and of the product of liquidation of 
their company’ (art. 6). Hence, the new Constitution of 2001 divided 
land ownership between state-owned and privately-owned land, and 
permitted the allocation of land rights to private investors (Crabtee-
Condor and Cassey 2012, 55). This prioritisation of privatisation is in line 
with neoliberal principles that postulate that facilitating private owner-
ship over land would increase efficiency and economic security. Accord-
ing to the World Bank, new politics on tenure were needed to incentivise 
growth and to reduce inequality. Property rights are believed to reduce 
poverty by incentivising investment and facilitating access to credit. 
Property rights are also presumed to incentivise land redistribution 
through sales or leases (Banque Mondiale 2003). 
In 2002, as a result of a crisis in the peanut sector and of the great 
tensions emerging in rural areas, the new President and his advisors 
started to outline a new agricultural vision for the country (Pesche 2009, 
143). In 2003, a draft vision was published stating the aim of increasing 
the efficiency of Senegalese agriculture so that it would be able to com-
pete in international markets. The draft document proposed to support 
both small-scale farms arms and commercial/industrial farms for greater 
efficiency. The draft contained a chapter on tenure that made a distinc-
tion between two types of land: one regulated by rural communities and 
another regulated by an agency overseen by the President. The National 
Council of Rural Concertation and Cooperation (CNCR) and the oppo-
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sition party suspected that the vision was a tenure reform in disguise. 
After a series of civil society protests over what the presumed conse-
quences of such a law, the chapter on tenure was finally removed from 
the draft law (Pesche 2009, 144-145).  
However, unclarity and uncertainty over tenure and access to land 
remained. Even if the 1964 Land Law had in fact abolished customary 
rights to land, the population had continued to function in accordance to 
customary modes of tenure. Today, Senegal has overlapping land regula-
tions that includes both legal rights aligned with and sourced from the 
official land policy as well as the informal, yet socially-legitimate, cus-
tomary rights to land. Although the 1964 Land Law clearly stated that 
the land is not the property of the state, de facto many people view the 
state as having appropriated land and consider the law to have facilitated 
a great land grab by the state (Ndiaye 2011). Given that the conditions of 
mise en valuer were never clearly defined, in a context where productivity 
became the central objective of agricultural interventions, small-scale 
farmers were unable to compete with those who had more endowed 
means to use the land. Additionally, the modalities through which rural 
communities could grant or un-grant land were never clearly defined, 
leaving ample room for corruption (Ndiaye 2011). In a context of in-
creased liberalisation in which the state seeks to attract investors, the 
loopholes in the 1964 Land Law combined with domestic political prob-
lems, provided ample space for conflict over the distribution of land, and 
those with the greatest economic power had clear advantages to this over 
vulnerable populations. The quest for increased FDI and for making re-
sources available to investors conflicted directly with access to land by 
farmers. As explained by the executive director of the Initiative Prospective 
Agricole et Rurale (IPAR): 
‘The vast majority of land in Senegal is land under the national 
domain that does not belong to those who exploit it, since the law of 
1964 suppressed customary rights. However, in practice those who 
use the land regularly do consider that the land belongs to them, it is 
the land of their parents. Yet, from a legal perspective, those land do 
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not belong to them: this is why there is tenure insecurity because at 
any moment the State for reasons of public utility can take back the 
land. Local collectivises can also do the same thing, so this creates 
problems of tenure insecurity’ (Dr. Ba, executive Director of IPAR – 
quoted in Niang et al. 2015) 
In response to the increasing liberalisation of tenure, the CNCR re-
quested a number of measures to protect family farming including: the 
formalisation of all user rights; the creation of a right of transmission; 
the regularisation of all land that had been seized illegally; the creation of 
specific legislation for the tenure of pastoralists; the creation of village 
committees on tenure issues;  the use of a cadastral system and the cor-
rect implementation of land use planning (CNCR 2012). As one farmer 
expressed, ‘Before the SAED helped us, they even gave machinery and 
seeds…But in the last years we have been left to deal with our own des-
tiny…’ (Interview with farmer, Senegal River Valley, 2015).  
As a result of consultative processes with the CNCR, the law on Ag-
riculture, Forestry, and Livestock Act (LOASP) was passed in 2004. It 
sought to strike a balance between modernising small-scale farms whilst 
also promoting investment, with the ultimate aim to achieve a level of 
food security that would enable Senegal to become self-sufficient. The 
law promoted the creation of land markets which are deemed to be more 
effective and efficient in the reallocation of resources. Despite efforts to 
balance these two visions, in reality the LOASP was foremost concerned 
with increasing the amount of agricultural exports and generating incen-
tives for private investment in rural areas (Resnick 2014). As a repre-
sentative from the CNCR explained in 2014: ‘There are two very differ-
ent visions for the future of agriculture. Civil society here wants to 
support family farming and the state wants to support food security. 
They say that the only way for food security is more agrobusiness; we 
know this is not true…The policies say that we can do both at the same 
time, but in reality, this is not what is happening’ (Interview, CNCR, Da-
kar, 2014). While agrobusiness, under certain conditions, is seen as nec-
essary, what the peasant movement underlines is that it is family farming 
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which should be the priority (Pesche 2009). Even if not explicitly stated 
within the approved law, the creation of land markets by the LOASP did 
de facto introduce a new tenure regime, thereby breaking with the socialist 
principles of the 1964 Land Law, and placing itself in line with a clear 
liberal tradition (Ndiaye 2011).  
 
4.1.1 From Migration as Adaptation to its Securitisation  
At the turn of the century, the cumulated economic difficulties that re-
sulted from decades of structural adjustment in the primary employment 
sectors of Senegal were visible not only through an increased rural exo-
dus towards urban areas, but also by the growing number of migrants 
traveling towards the European Union (Feldman 2011, 383). Given that 
France had introduced increasingly restrictive migration policies, the de-
sired destinations tilted towards Italy and Spain, whose populations were 
already growing at rates generally below those of other European coun-
tries (Arango 2013, 3). Not only were jobs easily available to migrants 
but, in Spain, there was also a limited detention period, opportunities for 
regularisation, as well as few obstacles to readmission (Carling 2007, 7).  
Before the turn of the century, irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Afri-
ca reached Europe through journeys across the desert to the Maghreb 
and thereafter crossing to Europe. After 2000 however, the intensifica-
tion of border controls at the strait of Gibraltar drove migrants to use 
boats to reach European islands, such as that of Lampedusa, Sicily or the 
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Figure 4: Senegal: International Migrant Stock (%) and Number of Interna-
tional Migrants 
 
Source: IOM Migration Data Portal. Primary data UNDESA 
 
Many of these migrants left home inspired by the motto, Barsa wala Bar-
shak, which in Wolof means ‘Barcelona or Die’, as Barcelona represents 
the European Eldorado (Mbaye 2014, 3). Besides the constraints on their 
livelihoods, there are also strong cultural reasons that incentivise the mi-
gration of Senegalese youth. In fact, the popular culture is full of prov-
erbs that highlight the importance of migration: ‘If you have a son, let 
him go. One day he will come back, either with money or with 
knowledge or with both’ … ‘He who does not travel will never know 
where it is better to live’ (Tandian 2018).  For the Senegalese govern-
ment, the out-migration of its population was viewed as beneficial given 
the importance of remittances for domestic development (see Figure 5).   
Despite the loss of lives throughout the journeys and the deteriorating 
conditions within the host countries, migration was seen not only as an 
adaptation strategy for the migrants themselves, but also for the associat-
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ed communities of origin that rely to a large extent on migrant remit-
tances. As was the case with most developing countries during the 1990s, 
the amount of remittances received nearly doubled; this happened to 
correspond with the time that Official Development Aid began to shrink 
(De Haas 2005). In absolute terms, Senegal received one of the highest 
amounts of remittances from Sub-Saharan African countries (Gupta, 
Pattillo, and Wagh 2009). In 2003 a Ministry of Senegalese Living Over-
seas and several structures to protect migrants and promote remittances 
were established (Ndiaye and Araar 2017). Migrant remittances have 
drastically improved the living conditions of many households in devel-
oping countries. Migrant remittances are also considered to be less cycli-
cal than other forms of financial flows such as ODA and FDI. As a re-
sult, remittances have become a type of ‘development mantra’ among 
institutions, such as the World Bank, NGOs, governments, and civil so-
ciety organisations (De Haas 2005). 
Figure 5: Senegal: Personal Remittances, Official Development Assistance 
and Official Aid, and Foreign Direct Investment Received (current USD) 
 
 Source: World Bank Data 
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Despite Spain’s need for cheap labour, and Senegal’s ongoing need for 
remittances, images of migrants arriving to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta 
and Melilla began to instil fears of an ‘invasion’ within the general Euro-
pean public (Beauchemin et al. 2014, 2). In 2005, Spanish authorities 
reached a cooperation agreement concerning repatriation and border 
controls with the governments of Morocco and Mauritania. Although 
this decreased the number of people crossing to Europe from these 
countries, other migration routes substantially increased in popularity, 
especially those from Senegal (Carballo de la Riva 2009). The year 2006 
marked a turning point with respect to security fears of migration, after 
around 30,000 people left West Africa – half of whom were Senegalese - 
and arrived to the Canary Islands; this amounted to 25,000 more people 
than that of the previous year. This episode came to be known as the 
‘Cayuco crisis’ (Arango 2013, 3). The cayucos are vessels (usually traditional 
fishing boats) of around 30 metres in length, capable of transporting up 
to 180 people. Even if the numbers of those arriving by cayuco was mini-
mal when compared to other means of entry represented (de Haas 2008), 
media headlines depicted the arrival of the cayucos as ‘avalanches’, ‘tides’, 
and ‘plagues’, reinforcing the image of migration as a security threat 
(Pinyol-Jimenez 2012, 37).  
In European imaginaries, these arrivals were depicted as those of 
‘wild men’, a somewhat ‘inexplicable armada arriving at the southern-
most margins of the European Union and the very heart of western lei-
sure migration, the playas of Tenerife and Gran Canaria’ (Andersson 
2010, 31). Between 2006 and 2013, Spanish media headlines recurrently 
used messages such as ‘Nearly 5000 immigrants are collapsing the reten-
tion centres in the Canary Islands’, ‘200 more people without papers ar-
rive’, and ‘The Canary Islands has received more than 1400 undocu-
mented migrants over the weekend’ (Villaseñor 2017). A British 
journalist described the power of the images circulated in the media as a 
surreal encounter ‘between the Stone Age man and the 21st century biki-
ni-clad girl’ (Andersson 2010, 32). Despite irregular entries by sea consti-
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tuting only 8% of the total irregular entries into Spanish territory (Velez 
Alcalde 2008), the mediatic attention on boat arrivals propelled migration 
to be among the top concerns of the Spanish public opinion (Villaseñor 
2019). 
Although the factors driving Senegalese migration to Spain are 
acknowledged to derive from a complex combination of economic and 
social factors, the environmental drivers of these movements have been 
increasingly underlined. The first international symposium on desertifica-
tion and migration, organised by the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and with support from the Spanish 
government, was held at the University of Almeria (Spain) in 1994. The 
Almeria Declaration that resulted from the symposium noted that: ‘The 
number of migrants in the world, already at very high levels, nonethe-
less continues to increase by about 3 million each year. Approximately 
half of these originate in Africa. These increases are largely of rural 
origin and related to land degradation. It is estimated that over 135 
million people may be at risk of being displaced as a consequence of se-
vere desertification’ (Almeria Declaration 1994 – own emphasis). Na-
tional and environmental security issues with regards to migration and 
desertification were also underlined in Valencia (Spain) in the context of 
a special North Atlantic Treaty Organization workshop held in in 2003. 
In 2006, and coinciding with the cayuco crisis, a second Almeria confer-
ence on desertification and migration took place. The opening presenta-
tion underlined the increased levels of migration that Spain had experi-
enced in recent decades underlining that: ‘While this immigration was no 
direct outcome of environmental or desertification factors, the inflow 
has increased from those countries in North and Sub-Saharan Africa that 
are victims to desertification’ (Brauch 2006). In addition to discourses on 
environmental security and migration, irregular migration from Sub-
Saharan Africa to the European Union began to be regarded as a security 
threat associated with international crime, particularly following the ter-
rorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 (de Haas 2008, 
1305–6).  
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4.1.2 Security Aid and Investment in Agriculture  
The ‘myth of invasion’, which has been empirically debunked by Hein de 
Haas, gave way to a new European security system was concerned with 
fighting smugglers and intensifying border controls (de Haas 2008, 
1305–6). As a result, fences were erected in Ceuta and Melilla and the 
European Union decided to intensify patrols in West African waters 
(Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010, 45). In 2006, the Europe-
an Union and Senegal implemented two short-term cooperation projects, 
which consisted of a European Union contribution towards surveillance 
operations, repatriation and rehabilitation (of around 1.8 million EUR) as 
well as the provision of local support for migration related activities of 
non-state actors (1 million EUR). In the medium-term, the plan for these 
funds was to invest in public projects (19.8 million to 27,4 million EUR) 
and to create 4000 jobs in a year (EUbusiness 2006 cited in Adepoju et 
al. 2010, 61). The European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union, (FRONTEX), began to patrol Senegalese and Mauritanian 
waters to prevent potential migrants from crossing into Europe via the 
Mediterranean Sea, and provided funds to Senegal so that Senegal would 
patrol its own borders more intensely. The Spanish government, in an 
effort to externalise its border controls, requested to collaborate with 
FRONTEX to halt migration from West Africa to the Canary Islands 
through the Hera Operation and later through the implementation of 
SEAHORSE (which is a cooperation project between Spain and Moroc-
co, Mauritania, Cape Verde, and Senegal designed for controlling immi-
gration) (Lemberg-Pedersen 2017, 39).  
Aside from enhancing border controls and repatriations, other policy 
measures to control migration sought to address migration by increasing 
development aid in return for migration control (de Haas 2008, 1305–6). 
Along the lines of this logic, policy cooperation designed to curb migra-
tion would be enhanced by an increase in development spending and, in 
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return, President Wade would agree to sign repatriation agreements. 
However, repatriations spiked strong social opposition; President Wade’s 
response was to emphasise the development plans that he would enact in 
order to facilitate the reintegration of migrants (Pian 2014). It was within 
this context, and with funding from the EU, that President Wade 
launched the Plan REVA in 2006 (Retour Vers l’Agriculture, or Return to 
Agriculture) (Panizzon 2008). This ‘co-development and capacity build-
ing’ program aimed to ‘reintegrate’ returned migrants into farming jobs 
within Senegal, in order to combat unemployment and irregular migra-
tion. According to the policy document, ‘The aim is to fight against emi-
gration and rural exodus by creating durable conditions for people to 
voluntary return to the land and allow those interested to regain their 
dignity’ (Senghor 2006). Additional objectives of the Plan REVA were to 
promote private investment, facilitate foreign investment, and create an 
export-oriented agriculture. To facilitate this, the Plan REVA mandated 
the creation of the National REVA Agency whose logo was: ‘Agricul-
ture, the new business’. 
To tackle the migration challenge, the Plan REVA proposed to create 
agricultural development poles for those migrants that were repatriated 
and for youth considered at risk of migrating. The National REVA 
Agency managed to create around 15 farms and employ around 2,000 
people. The underlying assumption of this initiative was that by external-
ising Europe’s borders controls and ‘fixing the youth’, the would-be-
migrants would instead stay in their communities of origin (Andersson 
2010, 45). However, the employment numbers under the National 
REVA Agency remained significantly below the agreed-upon aim of em-
ploying 7,000 people, as had been written into the Plan (Oya and Ba 
2013, 18). Furthermore, it was also far from being able to tackle unem-
ployment or the underlying desires to migrate.2 According to critics, the 
Plan REVA continues to oscillate between the impossible balance of 
promoting the development of export-oriented industrial agriculture and 
local food security (Kaag, Gaye, and Kruis 2011). Additionally, returned 
migrants have stated that these measures have done little to reintegrate 
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them: ‘…The government of Senegal has not made any efforts since we 
have returned. Sometimes it speaks about plans such as REVA …But all 
of that, it is not the reality…’ (Member of the Association for Returned 
Migrants, quoted in Pian 2014, 185). Moreover, as one farmer in the 
Senegal River Valley explained, the Plan REVA served as a mechanism 
for businessmen to acquire land: ‘This Plan REVA story...they said they 
were going to do a lot. Then they started irrigating a perimeter here and 
there and just stopped doing anything. All stopped, nothing was 
done…The land belongs to some Senegalese businessman that has a lot 
of investment in the area…what they will do with this land? We do not 
know…’ (Interview, farmer, Saint Louis, 2015). According to several 
sources the Plan Reva never achieved more than 10% of its aims (see 
Antil 2010).  
In addition to agricultural interventions, measures to address climate 
change in Senegal have also been linked to migration. The most promi-
nent example is The Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Ini-
tiative that was launched by African leaders in 2007 and which President 
Wade championed (Bascombe 2012). Implemented under the United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the aim of 
the initiative is to restore the productivity and vitality of the Sahel region. 
According to President Wade, ‘The desert is spreading like cancer. We 
must fight it and that is why we have decided to join this titanic battle’ 
(Morrison 2016). Similarly, the Director of the National Agency for the 
Great Green Wall, which was created in Senegal in 2011, underlined that 
the Great Green Wall must ‘valorise the desert and transform it in order 
to fix populations and thus combat emigration…It is a program to fight 
climate change, drought, and poverty’ (AFP 2011). However, 2008 and 
2014, only 13,000 out of the 80,0000 hectares that formed the national 
objective had benefitted from reforestation and soil rehabilitation initia-
tives (Guenard 2016).   
At the same time that securitisation and investment were increasing, 
emigration from Senegal to the European Union did decline between 
2008 and 2010. Although this was interpreted as a success of the new 
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security measures and cooperation agreements between the European 
Union and Senegal (Domínguez-Mujica, Díaz-Hernández, and Parreno-
Castellano 2014, 27),  the decline in the number of migrants is largely 
attributable to the lack of employment opportunities that the economic 
crisis brought within Europe, and not simply a result of security 
measures or the development aid given to the migrant countries of origin 
(Tilly 2011). However, what the crisis did achieve was to alter the per-
ception within Senegal that migrating to Europe would be a pathway out 
of poverty. In Spain, for example, many of the migrants that had previ-
ously used the agricultural sector as a springboard to access higher paid 
jobs in construction or industry – and with whom I met at the very be-
ginning of this journey – found themselves unemployed and with scarce 
possibilities to regularise their status within Spain. As a result, the notion 
that Europe was an El Dorado dissipated within origin communities; the 
risks involved in the perilous journey to Europe were seemingly not as 
worthwhile as previously. However, this did not in itself halt migration. 
It simply changed the destinations that migrants sought to reach. Echo-
ing stories from many households with whom I spoke to in the Senegal 
River Delta, one farmer explained: ‘People from our village left to Italy 
and Spain in the past. To work in construction and farming…But there 
are no more jobs there… now more people just go to Mauritania. This 
year around 50 of our children went there. They go to work in construc-
tion, agriculture, house cleaning…The women get paid around 5000 
CFA per month and their food is also paid…Much better than here!’ 
(Interview, farmer, Senegal River Delta, 2015). 
At the same time that international migration towards Europe was 
becoming a less viable option for escaping poverty, the domestic situa-
tion within Senegal was also worsening due to the global financial, food, 
and energy crises. The historic and ongoing dependence of Senegal on 
external food markets created a particular situation of vulnerability vis-à-
vis the global food price crisis (Resnick 2014). In fact, even though 60% 
of the population at the time of the global crises was employed in agri-
culture, more than 50% of the rice consumed in Senegal was imported 
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(Antil 2010). Consumers experienced a 100% increase in the price of rice 
between January 2007 and September 2008 (Resnick 2013, 629). Com-
bined, increasing unemployment and poverty along with spikes in food 
prices and the rising costs of transport, electricity and other basic items, 
led to a growing dissatisfaction with the government, which culminated 
in food riots that spread across Dakar (Tatersall and Ba 2007; Patel and 
McMichael 2009). The protests were organised by opposition parties, 
unions and civil society groups that demanded an end to Wade’s presi-
dency (Fortier 2011). In an effort to appease the rising tensions, Presi-
dent Wade proposed two major agricultural policies. The National Bio-
fuel Program (in the context of the Plan Reva) was intended to address 
energy security, while The Great Push Forward for Agriculture, Food, 
and Abundance (Plan GOANA) was intended to address food insecurity. 
Both of these proposed measures were integral parts of the ‘Green 
Revolution’ agenda for Africa, that had been launched in 2006.3  
The specific aim of National Biofuel Program (2007-2012) was to 
achieve energy independence and particularly biodiesel self-sufficiency by 
2012. The rise in the interest of biofuel production at this time reflected 
a global interest in the production of biomass-based energy. Many devel-
oped countries (with the European and the United States initiating the 
trend) endorsed biofuel targets and supported the production of ethanol 
and biodiesel through tax exemptions and other financial incentives 
(Cotula, Dyer, and Vermeulen 2008; Vigil 2018b). In the midst of the 
food crisis, President Wade thus embraced the idea of a ‘Green Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ through the wide-scale plant-
ing of crops, not for food but for fuel,  which had been one of the initial 
catalysts for  the global food crisis to begin with (Ma’anit 2007). And yet, 
to achieve the biofuel targets, the largest company in Senegal (La Com-
pagnie Sucriere Senegalaise) was growing sugar for ethanol production; in the 
National Biofuel Plan the production of jatropha curcas – a tropical plant 
for biofuel production – was encouraged to reach 1,190,000 litres by 
2012. According to the National Biofuel Program, not only would grow-
ing food for fuel contribute to making Senegal less dependent on oil 
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prices, and achieving its pledges under the Kyoto Protocol, but it would 
also contribute to reducing migration:  
‘The price of oil continues to rise…Not only are the prices high, 
but oil reserves will be exhausted in the near horizon. On top of oil 
prices, environmental challenges (climate change, environmental pro-
tection) and the respect of international conventions (Kyoto Protocol 
ratified by Senegal) are major challenges (…). Biofuels have become a 
reality. Their use reduces CO2 emissions…Biofuels are an opportuni-
ty for the future of countries that do not produce petrol. The produc-
tion of this type of energy in Africa is even more pertinent given the 
vast availability of land, which constitutes a sure competitive ad-
vantage. Africa could become the first world producer of biofuels. 
Nonetheless, the most immediate advantage is that it can reduce the 
bills of petrol for States and households…Its appearance in countries 
like Senegal will contribute to stopping rural exodus and clandestine 
migration’ (Sall 2007, 2–3).  
 
As the figure below illustrates, the impacts of the global demand for 
flex crops have manifested strongly in Senegal where the production of 
cash crops such as cassava and sugar rose spectacularly, even surpassing 


















The Great Push Forward for Agriculture, Food, and Abundance (Plan 
GOANA) aimed to end food dependence, whilst increasing agricultural 
production, employment, and achieving rice self-sufficiency by 2015. It 
was also presented as a land reform process that required each munici-
pality to designate land to interested and ‘capable’ farmers (Boccanfuso 
and Savard 2008, 8). By using the legal provision of mise en valeur, the 
Wade government instructed rural councils to alienate land from farmers 
and pastoralists, who they believed lacked the resources to ‘develop’ it , 
and instead grant this land to wealthy foreign or national investors 
(Koopman 2012, 656–57). According to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
‘GOANA is a great idea because there are many farmers, but they just do 
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means to exploit it so that we can feed Senegal’ (Interview, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Dakar, 2015). Similarly, other officials underlined: ‘We have 
a lot of hope in the agribusinesses…And family farming can develop in 
parallel. People want to be producers, not famers…! Our main worry is 
to create employment for the youth…Land is not elastic, you know! 
Families grow, but the land does not, and they need more work. The 
SOCAS (La Societe de conserves alimentaires au Senegal), which started operat-
ing in the Senegal River Delta in 1965 for example creates 1,150 seasonal 
employment and 1,000 permanent and the CSS (Compagnie Sucriere Sene-
galaise) is the biggest employer in Senegal with around 100,000 people 
working there…Not all agrobusinesses are the same! And they do con-
tribute to development! In terms of salary they are meant to pay the min-
imum salary established by law which is 45,000CFA’ (Interview, SAED, 
Saint Louis, 2014).  
Both of the agribusiness companies cited above however, are exam-
ples of Senegalese companies that have been operating for decades. 
Moreover, the quantity of employment created by the SOCAS amounts 
to 300 permanent employees and 1,000 temporary employees during 
harvesting (according to their website) and not 1,000 permanent jobs as 
stated by the SAED. GOANA has been criticised for relying on poorly-
targeted consumer and producer subsidies, and for putting forth food 
production goals that were deemed unrealistic (Resnick 2013, 630). 
Moreover, it has been unable to balance the state’s double aim of sup-
porting both agrobusiness and family farming. As explained by one 
agronomist, ‘It’s like (GOANA) just want to clearly indicate that this 
program is for those who want to invest in agro-industries, and has noth-
ing to do with small farmers…This GOANA is a bargain for opportun-
ists and the corrupt, but not for peasants…In the same way that the Plan 
REVA before it, GOANA is inevitably going to fail’ (Jacques Faye, cited 
in Gueye 2008, 19). The dominance of corporate interests over those of 
small scale farmers has incentivised those with the highest economic and 
political positions to maximise their power. As stated by one investiga-
tive journalist working on land issues in Senegal, ‘GOANA has just been 
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one great excuse for the richest people in Senegal and for foreigners to 
get a hold on land’ (Interview, journalist, Dakar, 2014)  
One of the underlying assumption informing the Plan REVA, the Na-
tional Biofuel program, and the Plan GOANA were that by granting 
land to those who can use it the most efficiently, there will be a trickle-
down effect that translates into higher economic growth and employ-
ment creation, thereby preventing irregular migration. Although in theo-
ry the agricultural reforms were in effect supposed to balance their sup-
port for agribusiness with their support for small scale farming, in 
practice, these two visions have been largely incompatible with one an-
other. As the Wade administration required that land be given to those 
that have the ‘means’ to adequately develop it, a large portion of land 
was granted to private foreign and national enterprises; in fact, by 2015, 
17% of the country’s arable land had been allocated to large-scale inves-
tors (Faye, Mbow, and Thiam 2016, 9–10). Due to the ongoing search 
for FDI, combined with new policies and regulations that defined what 
constitutes valuable and ‘effective’, large-scale land acquisitions reached a 
peak in 2010 and 2011. Although specific data concerning land transac-
tions remains unreliable, the Land Matrix asserts that within Senegal, 33 
large-scale land deals have been finalised since the year 2000, which 
amount to a total area of 375,733 hectares. Most of land transactions for 
agricultural development have occurred in the Senegal River Delta where 
there is not only land, but importantly, water. Whether or not directly 
linked to the National Biofuel Program, a large portion of crop produc-
tion has been for flex crops.4  
Of the total number of the recorded large-scale land deals, 26% have 
been abandoned due to reasons involving the respective project’s lack of 
viability, the bankruptcy of investors, and/or to community-led protests. 
Of the 33 land deals recorded, four of the deals concern production for 
domestic markets only, two concern production for export only, and six 
concern production for both domestic and international markets with 
the largest share of the produce designated for export (Land Matrix 
2016). However, land in Senegal has not only been acquired by foreign 
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investors. In fact, much of the land granted under the Plan REVA, the 
National Biofuel Program, and Plan GOANA was allocated to political, 
military and religious elites. According to estimations, land acquisitions 
by Senegalese persons amounts to approximately 61% of the total land 
deals (Faye et al. 2011). In less than ten years, nearly 30% of all arable 
land within Senegal was affected by land acquisition processes (IPAR 
2012). 




Source: Land Matrix 
 
Choices made within agricultural policies are extremely important with 
respect to their impacts upon migration. This is because the agricultural 
sector absorbs the majority of the Senegalese labour force, particularly 
for youth aged 15-24 years. Moreover, education in and of  itself is not a 
solution to unemployment as within Senegal the rate of unemployment 
increases with education level, peaking amongst those with higher educa-
tion (Guarcello 2007). Given the lower rates of formal employment in 
rural areas, the fact that urban areas are unable to meet the employment 
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demands of the youth, and the decreased possibilities of international 
migration, it is within the slums of Dakar that the Senegalese youth in-
creasingly concentrate (Antil 2010). These slums are also home to re-
turned migrants who have been unable to reintegrate into Senegalese so-
ciety, despite the promises made by authorities (Janin 2009, 257).  
In addition to enabling large-scale land acquisitions at the expense of 
small-scale farmers and failing to provide employment and reintegration 
opportunities for those returned, President Wade undermined democrat-
ic institutions. During his presidency, crucial state institutions remained 
highly politicised and key posts were filled by regime loyalists. President 
Wade utilised patronage networks to concentrate power within his party, 
as well as engaged in electoral manipulation, and violated civil liberties by 
cracking down on opposition leaders (for a review, see Kelly 2012). The 
final straw came in 2011, when President Wade attempted to change the 
Constitution to permit him to run for a third round of Presidential elec-
tions. At this point, hundreds of people protested in the streets under 
slogans of ‘Y’en a marre!’, which referred to a social movement initiated 
by two rappers, and which in French translates to ‘enough is enough!’, or 
quite literally ‘fed up!’ (Fortier 2011). In 2012, Macky Sall, Wade’s former 
Prime Minister, won the elections. Macky Sall had engaged in deep con-
flict with Wade following his demand that President Wade’s activities be 
audited. In retaliation, Wade had renounced Sall’s tenure as president of 
the National Assembly, pushing Sall to abandon the Senegalese Demo-
cratic Party (PDS) and to create a new political party, called the Alliance 
for the Republic (APR) (Kelly 2012, 125). Since 2009, Macky Sall had 
been travelling throughout the country, including to remote rural areas, 
which gave him a large advantage in the run up to the Presidential elec-
tions.  
Sall’s campaign centred around the country’s high food prices; he 
proposed to protect consumers with subsidies and invest heavily in agri-
culture if elected (Resnick 2013, 634). Following his election, Macky Sall 
created a National Commission for Tenure Reform in 2013. The pro-
posal for a tenure reform body aimed to appease a number of civil socie-
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ty movements that had emerged in response to the increased number 
and intensity of land grabs under the CRAFS (Cadre de Reflexion et action 
sur le Foncier au Senegal). In addition to protecting small-scale farmers, the 
various NGOs and civil society organisations of which this group is 
composed, advocated for improved transparency and reliability of land 
tenure information (Bourgoin et al. 2019, 3).  
However, despite the initial promises put forth by Macky Sall, agricul-
ture has continued to be developed through the same model of large-
scale land exploitations driven by foreign capital and agribusiness that 
was put forth by Wade (Bourgoin et al. 2019, 3). As his former Prime 
Minister, Abdoul Mbaye expressed, ‘A country like ours is made up of 
fallow lands, of water that throws itself into the sea, and of unused 
hands. In front of this there is market of households that has to feed it-
self. No other activity than agriculture and agrobusiness can allow for a 
rapid absorption of the massive unemployment and under-employment 
that characterizes economies like ours’ (Mbaye 2014). It is under Sall’s 
Presidential tenure that Senegal has become one of the target countries 
of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN), which 
was launched in May 2012 at the Camp David Summit of the G8 as one 
of the responses to the global food price crisis of 2008-2010. At the 
heart of this alliance is a recognition that African governments alone will 
not be able to compensate for the huge underinvestment in agriculture 
since the 1980s. Hence, the NAFSN evolved as an effort to mobilise the 
private sector and facilitate investment within agriculture (De Schutter 
2015, 9).  
In 2014 Macky Sall launched the ambitious Emergent Senegal Plan – 
a plan that seeks to undertake a major infrastructure and economic over-
haul by 2035, and which encompasses all sectors from transport and in-
dustry to education, urbanisation, agriculture, healthcare and employ-
ment (Sala 2018). At the heart of the agricultural segment of the 
Emergent Senegal Plan (called PRACAS) is the idea that the private sec-
tor will facilitate both food security and support small scale farmers. The 
plan involves a series of measures designed to facilitate access of private 
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investors to land and new regulations for exporting companies. The aim 
of this policy is to support food security and to create employment 
through the transformation of agriculture: ‘Food security, the fight 
against rural poverty and sustainable agriculture constitute major press-
ing challenges for Senegal. These three complex and interrelated prob-
lems are today affected by climate change…Senegal has great potential, 
however (land, human resources), and a democratic and stable political 
context, which shows peace and security, and are able to give hope to 
answers capable of responding to the problems of youth employment 
and of food security of the Senegalese…For the President of the Repub-
lic, agriculture must be the main economic engine of Senegal…There is a 
need to accelerate the transformation of agriculture to increase produc-
tivity and competitivity of the sector…’ (PRACAS Introduction, 14).  
Although large-scale land acquisitions hit a quiet period between 2012 
and 2014, largely due to civil society uprisings that preceded Sall’s elec-
tion, after 2014 they raised again (Land Matrix Senegal). Given the de-
clining opportunities to migrate and the exacerbated economic crisis, the 
fact that so much land has been granted to investors continues to deeply 
concern civil society, not only for its immediate effects, but also im-
portantly for its longer-term effects: ‘They have already given around 
17% of the land in 10 years… On top of that there are other risks like 
coastal erosion and desertification, and population growth is of around 
3%... if this trend continues; what will be left?’ (Interview, CICODEV, 
Dakar, 2014). Other civil society groups highlight the incongruences be-
tween domestic and international food security as a result of policies that 
prioritise large-scale investment: ‘All these companies, they say it is for 
food security you know…But then they export everything to Europe, 
how is that food security for us?’ (Interview, CNCR, Dakar, 2014.  With 
international migration increasingly perceived as an existential threat for 
Senegalese migrants, the incoherencies become even more striking. As 
one representative from the CNCR explained: ‘People go to Italy and 
Spain for the harvest, but here we can produce it! When we know today 
the level of food and financial crisis in the world, we need to sensibilise 
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people that risk factors are far worst in other places… Three million 
CFA (around 5,000 USD) is an important capital for a farmer. Its much 
better to invest that in our lands than spending it in a clandistine journey! 
But if they give all the land to Europeans…! Then what can we do?!’ (In-
terview, Aliou Gueye, CNCR, 2014, Saint Louis).  
While population growth is perceived as a problem, the problem is 
not understood to be rooted in the environmental destruction that popu-
lation growth will engender, but rather the increasing resource demands 
that the domestic population will have, particularly given the limited ac-
cess that local people have to their own resources. As a representative 
from the CNCR highlighted, ‘Every 25 years, our population doubles. 
How are we going to feed the Senegalese when our lands are in the 
hands of foreign investors? It’s a production that is aimed at foreign 
markets with foreign capitals that will return (to their) home. The 
economic potential of our lands is enormous, but we have no confidence 
in ourselves, and we just keep giving them away….We are not assuring 
our food security, instead what we are doing is assuring the security of 
international markets….If this continues our lands will not serve to feed 
us, but rather to feed others’ (Interview, CNCR, Dakar, 2015). This sen-
timent is widely accepted and observed throughout society: ‘I do not un-
derstand why hundreds of hectares are given to foreigners, when the pri-
ority should be to make these lands accessible to our producers’ (Mariam 
Sow, ENDA Pronat, Global Land Forum Dakar, 2015). Despite the 
promises that many Senegalese people hoped would result from Macky 
Sall’s changed approach toward agricultural development, the proposals 
presented by the CRAFS to the National Committee on Tenure Reform 
in 2016 have to date remain unheard (Bourgoin et al. 2019, 3). 
 
Land Investments: Keeping them in their Place?  
As demonstrated above, since the turn of the 21st century Senegal has 
sought to attract FDI as a means to gain independence and free itself 
from debt. However, the structural reforms and the withdrawal of the 
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state from Senegal’s agricultural sector heavily impacted farmers. Alt-
hough migration had served as an escape valve at of poverty, with the 
economic crisis in 2008 migration became increasingly securitised with 
ODA being tied to migration controls a within migrant-sending coun-
tries. At the same time, in the midst of the crisis, foreign investors 
rushed to acquire land in Senegal where they were met by an accommo-
dating Senegalese state. This pursuit of FDI was often justified under the 
assumption these investors would generate considerable employment 
that would contribute to slowing migration. However, the contradiction 
between aiming to maintain people in their place, while simultaneously 
granting the best land resources to foreign investors who are unable to 
meet the employment needs of a growing population, has become strik-
ingly evident. The ways through which migration and environmental jus-
tifications have served to justify land grabs in Senegal has been heavily 
influenced by the position that Senegal holds within a particular migra-
tion system as well as by the interests of its main donors and corporate 
investors. This chapter now travels to a completely different national 
context, within a different region, in order to explore how the linkages 
between material realities and political legitimations have translated into 
different circumstances, that are nonetheless part of the broader picture 
of variegated interrelations between environmental change, land grabs, 
and migration.  
4.2 Cambodia 
Since the 1998 elections, Hun Sen has served as the sole Prime Minister 
of Cambodia. Despite the Environmental Protection Laws passed in the 
1990s at the request of donors, by the early 2000s, 70% of Cambodia’s 
forests were enclosed within forestry concessions (Oldenburg and Neef 
2014). By the turn of the 21st century, the environmental destruction and 
human rights abuses that had resulted from the concession system gen-
erated international attention. Following reports by Global Witness and 
increasing international pressure, the Royal Government of Cambodia 
(RGC) issued a logging ban in 2001, incorporated mechanisms for regu-
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lating the concession system in its new 2001 Land Law, and in 2002, is-
sued a new Forestry Law as well as an Environmental Protection Law.  
The 2001 Land Law established a cornerstone for private property 
rights and was drafted with the assistance of numerous international do-
nors during a time when neoliberal interpretations of property were not 
only the norm, but also a precondition for receiving the Official Devel-
opment Aid that Cambodia was so reliant upon (Thiel 2010). Given the 
massive shortcomings of the 1992 Land Law and the widespread abuses 
it inadvertently led to, expectations concerning the 2001 Land Law were 
extremely high. The main objectives of the law were to improve tenure 
security and access to land through a market-based reform (based on 
land titles, cadastral administration, and land markets) to facilitate in-
vestment and productivity and to redistribute land through Social land 
Concessions (Diepart and Sem 2015, 44).  
The 2001 Land Law transformed large areas of land - previously 
managed by communities - into state land. Today, the government holds 
approximately 75-80% of the country’s territory under the status of ‘state 
land’ (USAID 2011), which it can reclassify into ‘state private land’ in 
order to grant concessions (Touch and Neef 2015). With regards to land 
concessions, the Land Law distinguishes between two forms of land 
concessions - those for economic purposes and those for social purposes 
(RGC 2001, Art. 49). Economic Land Concessions (ELCs), regulated by 
the Sub-Decree n° 146, defines them as: ‘a mechanism to grant private 
state land through a specific economic land concession contract to a 
concessionaire to use for agricultural and industrial-agricultural exploita-
tion’. According to Article 3 of the Sub-Decree, ELCs are meant to: ‘in-
crease employment in rural areas within a framework of intensification 
and diversification of livelihood opportunities and within a framework of 
natural resource management based on appropriate ecological system’.  
ELCs are assessed in terms of their capacity to: increase agricultural 
production in order to stimulate employment, promote living standards 
for the people, reinforce environmental protection and resource man-
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agement, and create linkages and mutual support with SLCs, all whilst 
avoiding negative social impacts (Art. 5 of the sub-decree on ELCs). The 
law grants concessionaries exclusive rights over the respective land for a 
period of 99 years, in exchange for fees and investments. Following pro-
tests by civil society organisations, the government introduced a cap on 
the size of ELCs, meaning that land concessions granted shall not exceed 
10,000 hectares. Moreover, (and purportedly to avoid speculation) all 
granted concession lands must be exploited within 12 months or risk 
cancelation of the grant (Art. 62 of the Land Law). Although the sub-
decree on Economic Land Concessions of 2005 stipulated that ELCs 
must include Environmental Impact Assessments, it provided conces-
sionaries with the right to clear concession land (including any forested 
area within the concessions) (Art. 49 of the sub-decree on ELCs). More-
over, within ELCs, social impact assessments are not required.  
By 2003, the bottom 40% of the economic strata owned only 5.4% of 
the arable land, while the top 20% owned 70% of the land; the richest 
10% owned 64.4% of the land (Un and So 2009, 129). Social Land Con-
cessions (SLCs) were established to remedy this situation. SLCs were 
regulated in 2003 through the sub-decree n° 19, which defined them as: 
‘a legal mechanism to transfer private state land for social purposes to 
the poor who lack land for residential and/or family farming purposes’ 
(RGC 2003, sub-decree on Social land Concessions, Art. 2). According 
to the 2001 Land Law and the Sub-decree n° 146 on ELCs their duration 
was restricted to 99 years, their size to 10,000 hectares and these could 
not be transformed into private property. SLCs, on the other hand, do 
not have any time restrictions placed, residential land granted can be up 
to 1,250 square meters in size, and SLC’s for agricultural use can extend 
to a maximum of 2 hectares. Contrary to ELCs, SLC’s can be trans-
formed into private property. This pro-poor policy was expected to pay a 
key role in resolving land disputes, many of which had been triggered by 
ELCs and the policy was depicted by governments and international do-
nors as a measure to reduce landlessness and poverty, and to assure equi-
table land distribution (Neef, Touch, and Chiengthong 2013). 
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4.2.1 Criminalising Internal Migration  
Among the various streams of internal migration, rural to rural migration 
has been the predominant stream (accounting for over half), followed by 
rural to urban (28%) and urban to urban (15%), while urban to rural mi-
gration remains negligible (CRUMP and Ministry of Planning 2012). Ac-
cording to the demographic census of 2008, 61% of migrant household 
heads stated that the main reason for rural to rural migration was the 
search of employment  or of agricultural land (frequently related to a lack 
of land in origin) (Diepart and Sem 2015, 62). However, new regulations 
had a considerable impact on this mobility.  The 2001 Land Law estab-
lished that ‘no further encroachment can take place….and new occu-
pants without title are considered as illegal occupants…’ (Land Law 
2001, Art. 38 – emphasis added). While state expropriation of property 
can only be exercised ‘in the public interest and with prior provision of 
just and fair compensation’ (Art. 44 of the Constitution and Art. 5 of the 
2001 Land Law), the definition of what constitutes ‘public interest’ has 
remained unclear and the interpretation of the Land Law with respect to 
pre-existing notions of possession, actual use, and common resources 
(and not proprietorship) has created significant confusion amongst au-
thorities and populations (Springer 2013).  
The introduction of the Land Law in 2001, was shortly followed by 
the cancellation of forest concessions and the adoption of the Forestry 
Law in 2002, which defines the framework for management, harvesting, 
use, development and conservation of the forests. It states that ‘forests 
shall be protected against damaging activities caused by excessive exploi-
tation, abusive forest clearing…and shifting cultivation…’ (Law on For-
estry 2002, Art. 32). In this context, internal movements have been in-
creasingly criminalised because they are presumed to play a considerable 
role in environmental degradation and deforestation. As the Forest Ad-
ministration, the government body under the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) charged with forest management, ex-
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plained, ‘After the Khmer Rouge the Government encouraged people to 
open agricultural plots inside the forest. People needed land to grow ag-
riculture and it was in the interest of all that they did this…But then we 
had the idea of conservation…All these rules and laws do not allow for 
any more smallholder clearance and they are there to protect the forests’ 
(Interview with the Forest Administration, Phnom Penh, 2016).  
The vilification of (internal and poor) migrants is combined with the 
alleged compromise of protecting forests in policy narratives as follows: 
‘Illegal logging and forest destruction happens because of the migrants. 
It is illegal. But they still want to cut the forest and move there? We can’t 
let them…We must protect the environment’ (Interview with the Minis-
try of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Phnom Penh, 2016). As a con-
servation NGO expressed: ‘The problem is not so much emigration as 
immigration…People come from other rural areas they want to clear 
land.’ (Interview, Wildlife Conservation Society, Phnom Penh, 2016). In 
such a context, what qualifies as ‘land grabbing’ remains very unclear. As 
the Director of an influential Cambodian think tank explained: ‘There is 
a huge patronage system… Can we call it land grabbing? It depends… If 
its friends (of the powerful) then it’s ok, but if its normal people or land-
less migrants then it’s not ok…They use the laws to their advantage and 
implement what suits them’ (Interview, Phnom Penh, 2016).   
In these narratives, migrants are somehow generalised and labelled as 
‘poor and destructive’ with no clear explanation of who is moving, why 
they are moving, and what power status they possessed to acquire the 
forests that they are supposedly destroying. Nonetheless, despite their 
common characterisation as ‘illegal evictions’ by NGOs and the media, 
most dispossessions in Cambodia actually occur in line with the written 
article of laws; in other words, they are legal (Springer 2013). In effect, 
the country’s land and forestry laws have turned many small landholders 
into illegal trespassers by ‘the stroke of a pen’ (Peluso and Lund 2011a, 
674). As one official at Cambodia’s Ministry of Land Management ex-
plained, ‘They need to go by the regulation that they have...They think 
the law is a tool against them. They never abide the law. Here we do law 
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enforcement and then the opposition says we violate human rights.’ (In-
terview, Ministry of Land Management, Phnom Penh, 2016). Although 
migration can have effects on deforestation, in the context of massive 
land concentration, landlessness and an expanding number of ELCs, it is 
important to pay attention to and identify where the root causes of de-
forestation lie, especially in a context of flowing investment: 
‘The land in Cambodia is needed by a lot of people…During the 
war time people did not occupy the whole country because it was not 
secure. And with 30 years of war we didn't have time or budget to de-
velop infrastructure. Much land was forest. Cambodia’s population 
since 1950 when French independence was only 3 million. From 1954 
to 1970 not much money. We had small population, so much land 
was under the forest cover. The forest grows very quickly in tropical 
climates. From 1998 until now the investors and the people know 
that they need to get the land…They (the investors) want to come to 
Cambodia because we have easy natural climate and resources make 
people live very peacefully and they have food and peace…’  (Inter-
view, Ministry of Planning, Phnom Penh, 2016).  
Although SLCs were designed to secure land access for the hundreds 
of Cambodians who lack secure tenure, the implementation of SLC’s has 
been slow and has often ignited conflicts. When comparing ELCs and 
SLCs, the differences are striking. In terms of area, ELC’s were granted 
an estimated 2 million hectares as of 2012, while SLC’s were granted on-
ly 113,167 hectares as of 20145. In other words, SLC land comprised on-
ly 4% of the area granted to ELCs (Diepart 2016). Additionally, conflicts 
have emerged when SLCs are granted on land that is already occupied, 
thereby leading to the forced eviction of its previous occupants (Open 
Development Cambodia 2015), as well as on lands claimed for ELCs. 
Moreover, the quality of the land granted for SLCs is often of low quality 
and inadequate for farming (LICADHO 2015).  At one interview with 
the Ministry of Planning concerning the possible benefits of SLCs, when 
I inquired as to how many people have received land through SLCs, it 
appears that the numbers are ‘off record’ and that no official figures are 
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released: ‘People ask for absolute figures. Journalists come and attack 
us... These poor people got land and are still poor. There is a law, a pro-
cess to follow… If you want to get land then apply, we tell them. They 
don’t want to apply. The ones that occupy the land are not poor. Those 
land disputes on the land is not with poor. The poor people become the 
tool of the rich… The political movement opposition is there to say 
things against the Government. Cambodia is a democratic country. We 
do things very well, some of them just don’t want to go in order.’ (Inter-
view, Ministry of Land Management, Phnom Penh, 2016).  
Not only have SLCs failed to materialise as planned, but the System-
atic Land Registration system, which has benefitted 625,000 families as 
of 2012, has been only very partially implemented and primarily limited 
to the area around the central lowlands (Diepart and Sem 2015, 54). Any 
areas that are deemed to be under conflict cannot benefit from Systemat-
ic Land Registration. In the current context, this is vastly problematic as 
it is difficult to find locations where there is no conflict over land.  As 
early as 2003, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for 
Human Rights in Cambodia released a report on human rights and land 
concessions stating that: ‘The situation I met shocked me. The compa-
nies have been given rights over land that are very similar to ownership. 
Yet they have little or no regard for welfare; and they contribute little, if 
anything, to overall state revenue. I have concluded that the policies are 
wrong. They are not reducing poverty in Cambodia, and they are allow-
ing the continued plundering of its natural resources. To use a Khmer 
phrase, they are ‘Eating the Kingdom’…The concerns are urgent. Cam-
bodia’s rural poor are the most vulnerable to arbitrary acts by public au-
thorities and the powerful’ (COHCHR 2004, 2). 
As previously stated, an important argument used to justify ELCs has 
been their potential to create labour opportunities. As one government 
official stated: ‘We don’t want our people to leave. I’m in very pain… So 
painful to see the Thai soldiers kill people. That’s why we bring the 
companies to Cambodia… We know our people need money and this is 
all of us think about.’ (Interview, Ministry of Planning, 2016, Phnom 
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Penh). It is also through the justification of employment creation that 
any resulting environmental harm caused by plantations is seen as justi-
fied: ‘We are promoting rubber to create jobs…Nobody wants to defor-
est or cause environmental damage, but there is always a balance.’ (Min-
ister of Agriculture Undersecretary of state, cited in Harfenist 2015). 
Although people may lose land, the expectation is that they would be 
incorporated into plantations as labourers, and that these people would 
fill the gap of much needed labour: ‘On one side they lose all their way 
of life their identity, everything: they have no more land no more forest.  
But if there is opportunity to be a daily worker, then they would accept 
that’ (Interview, ILO, Phnom Penh 2016). This ‘acceptance’, however, is 
often not as voluntary as it might appear at first glance as it  is often 
times linked to other factors, such as rising land prices and economic 
constraints: ‘With the arrival of companies, the land price goes up, so 
people decide to sell their little land and to work for the company in-
stead’ (Interview, CDRI Migration, Phnom Penh, 2016). Such sales 
should be understood as distress sales that leave them with no assets.  
Moreover, despite the provision by the land law that all ELCs should 
start operating within 12 months of their inception or risk cancellation, 
this has not been enforced. In addition to this leading to speculative 
practice, this also means that land is taken but that no labour is actually 
created inside the concessions. When plantations do provide employ-
ment, the actual labour created depends on the actual labour needs vis-a-
vis particular crops, the level of mechanisation involved in the planta-
tions, and on whether the plantation managers chose to hire local labour, 
labour from other provinces, or to import foreign labour with them. 
Moreover, the nature of the employment opportunities that emerge 
should be analysed in terms not only of quantity, but also with respect to 
the quality of employment. Although there is no national record of the 
precise number of jobs created through ELCs, observers question the 
actual number of employments created: ‘The expectation is that these 
will create labour and increase internal movement but be a substitute for 
international migration…However, the employment created has not 
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been that significant and people still make more money by going to Thai-
land or Malaysia…’ (Interview, CDRI Migration, Phnom Penh, 2016). 
According to local NGOs, companies often prefer migrant labour: ‘We 
have to destroy the myth of ELC as job producers…The companies 
bring lots of workers with them! The companies prefer migrant labour 
rather than locals…’  (Interview, Oxfam, Phnom Penh, 2016).  
In addition to quantity, the quality of the jobs leaves much to be de-
sired. As one representative from the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) remarked: ‘So far the government has not taken any action on a 
minimum salary in agriculture. Labour law does not cover domestic work 
or seasonal worker…There is no initiative for minimum wage, no pro-
tection of employment… (We see) slavery conditions especially in plan-
tation areas which have just started. They are not allowed to go home, 
not communicate with outsiders, located deep in the forest… They take 
their ID card from each worker so that they cannot run away…In the 
garment factories is much better conditions (and this does not mean they 
are good).  But for the workers inside the ELC it is really terrible.’ (In-
terview with ILO, Phnom Penh, 2016). Moreover, in the event that local 
labour is hired, it can serve as a means for patronage – a situation in 
which, those with the strongest political connections get access to the 




‘They should go, they should go! They have nothing to do here…We 
need people that can invest here, not just some poor farmers that do 
nothing…They should go!’ (Interview, Ministry of Planning, Phnom 
Penh, 2016). 
 
In multiple developing nations across Asia, governments have devoted 
increased attention to the economic and social implications of labour 
 Green and Migration Grabs 135 
export, and to the possibility that international migration can be har-
nessed to improve economic development mainly through remittances 
(Hugo and Stahl 2004, 174). Cambodia has been promoting overseas mi-
gration as one of the measures to alleviate poverty and unemploy-
ment/underemployment, especially among its young citizens. The first 
policy that considered international migration in Cambodia was sub-
decree 57 on Sending Khmer Workers abroad, signed in 1995. The sub-
decree underlined the lack of employment opportunities in the domestic 
market and highlighted the opportunities that migration could generate 
with respect to improving national standards of living through economic 
remittances (Sophal 2009, 6). This is evident within Art. 1 of the sub-
decree, which states that: ‘In order to access the higher standards of liv-
ing and to upgrade vocational skills, and generate the national revenue, 
the Royal Government allows the sending of Khmer workers to work 
abroad while the domestic labour market is unable to absorb totally the 
unemployed and under employed persons’ (sub-decree 57, 1). Given 
Cambodia’s socio-political and economic situation, and the needs of 
neighbouring countries with respect to cheap and compliant sources of 
labour, Cambodia is rapidly becoming a labour-exporting country, and 
many households now rely on remittances from relatives working in 
Thailand and also Malaysia (Bylander 2015). Since 2000, remittances sent 
to Cambodia have been rising sharply, and since 2012, they surpassed the 
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Figure 8: Cambodia: Personal Remittances, Official Development Assis-
tance and Official Aid, and Foreign Direct Investment Received (current 
USD)  
 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
As stated within the National Poverty Reduction Strategy, ‘Labour ex-
port has been an important option for reducing poverty in several of 
Cambodia’s Asian neighbours, such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thai-
land and Vietnam. The Royal Government policy is to encourage official 
labour exports to increase welfare, enhance skills, reduce unemployment 
and increase state revenues….’ (RGC National Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy 2003-2005). In fact, although many Cambodians would prefer to stay 
within their own country and be closer to their families, the opportuni-
ties in Cambodia’s urban areas do not match the amount of labour need-
ed by Cambodians: ‘Young people want freedom. They want to be city 
people. But in most cases, they don’t have anything to do in the cit-
ies…So going to countries like Thailand and Malaysia becomes the only 
real option’ (Interview, CDRI, Phnom Penh, 2016).  
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Figure 9: Cambodia: International Migrant Stock (%) and Number of Inter-
national Migrants 
 
Source: IOM Migration Data Portal. Primary data UNDESA 
 
Thailand, followed by Malaysia, are the most popular destinations for 
Cambodians (Kaur 2010, 7–12). Both countries are heavily dependent on 
foreign workers and have initiated guest worker programs as a solution 
to fill their domestic labour needs. Given the strong need for cheap la-
bour within Cambodia’s neighbouring countries, the view that migration 
should serve as an adaptation strategy is widespread: ‘I don’t worry if 
people can get a job in here or not. The other countries don’t restrict 
movement so it will be easy to move. The high skilled will be able to 
move so they can move around because of the ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) community agreement. The middle and low 
skill movement. So not a problem, if they don't find a job, they can go… 
Magnitude of migration to Thailand is very strong. There is no sign that 
Thai economy will demand less low skill labour in the near future, so 
people leaving is no problem…But 90% of those going to Thailand are 
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migrants. Makes sense from a policy point of view…’ (Interview, CDRI, 
Phnom Penh, 2016).  
In 2011, a new sub-decree (n°190) on ‘the Management of Sending 
Cambodian Workers Abroad through Private Recruitment Agencies’ was 
enacted. However, when compared to the law it replaced, which was 
sub-decree 57 of 1997, it provides diluted and weaker protections for 
workers in many key areas (LICADHO 2011; Drolet 2013). According 
to the Cambodian League for the Promotions and Defence for Human 
Rights (LICADHO), the sub-decree fails to address core issues that have 
been well documented, such as: 1) debt bondage through the provision 
of enticement loans to workers; 2) recruitment of underage girls; 3) ille-
gal detention and mistreatment of workers in pre-departure training cen-
tres; 4) the facilitation and use of forged legal documents; 5) failure to 
provide contracts to workers; 6) failure to pay workers their full salaries 
and/or not to pay any salary until the end of the contract; and 7) pre-
venting and obstructing contact between workers and their relatives 
(LICADHO 2011, 1). These guest worker programs include fixed-term 
employment contracts with a range of restrictions, including workers’ 
repatriation upon completion of the work contract.  
Although high skilled professionals are permitted to bring their fami-
lies with them when migrating, less-skilled guest workers are not granted 
this right. Given that the majority of Cambodian migrants are low 
skilled, they are usually employed in what have come to be known as ‘3D 
jobs’ – dirty, dangerous and demeaning – and they are very often victims 
of human trafficking and labour exploitation. This is partially due to the 
fact that, despite growing bilateral agreements and guest worker pro-
grams, the costs of migrating regularly are very high. On average, the 
cost is around 700 USD to migrate to Thailand, whereas human smug-
glers provide the same service, much faster, for 100 USD. The Human 
Trafficking snapshot disseminated by the International Organization for 
Migration has identified the following key trends in human trafficking: 1) 
the trafficking of men and boys for forced fishing and fishing related in-
dustries; 2) the trafficking of women and children for forced sexual ex-
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ploitation; 3) trafficking of children for forced domestic work; 4) traf-
ficking for forced begging; and 5) trafficking for forced marriage. These 
trends occur both internally and across borders (IOM 2018).  
International migration has not also come to be regarded as an escape 
out of poverty, but also as an escape valve for possible political conten-
tion: ‘For the government this (migration) represents an escape valve out 
of poverty. Good for the government that they go…A majority of those 
who go would vote against the ruling party. So now they are gone it’s 
better for the government…It’s like a time bomb waiting to explode’ 
(Interview, UN Agency, Phnom Penh, 2016). The lack of land contrib-
utes both directly and indirectly to these movements. As one official 
from the Ministry of Environment explained: ‘If you look back, the 
farmers had land size: they had a lot of natural resources. 1950-1960 be-
fore the war, the families had 12 children and had no problem. The land 
is smaller and smaller, and the population is increasing. The children 
don’t work in the farm. When we have a peaceful country, people have 
been looking for natural resources. When there was a lot of forest land 
people were moving. This was when there was a lot of forests. Now 
there is no more land and people have to go’ (Interview, Ministry of En-
vironment, Phnom Penh, 2016).  
 
4.2.2 Adapting to Environmental Discourse 
The significance of environmental justifications in Cambodia is not only 
due to the natural capital the country holds, and the importance of its 
forests for global temperatures, but also to an unwillingness of donors to 
engage in what they term as ‘politically sensitive’ topics. When asked why 
the analysis of the drivers of migration often overlooks questions of land 
access and land rights, many answers where along these lines: ‘Yes, we 
know how important this (land grabbing) is. It is really a huge factor 
driving people out…but you know, here, we need to be very care-
ful…We are trying to make progress on other things like education and 
drug trafficking. If we touched the land question, we would get kicked 
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out of Cambodia…And then, well… then there is no contribution that 
we could make at all…When we keep it in environmental terms, it just 
makes life much easier…’(Interview, UN Agency, Phnom Penh 2016). 
Indeed, although human rights and corruption issues have always been 
high on the donor’s agenda, very few NGOs are able to successfully nav-
igate the near impossible constraints of working in partnership with an 
increasingly authoritarian government, while also having the space to 
criticise and challenge state actors. Others have sought to explain this 
phenomenon by attributing it to the fact that Western donors feel lim-
ited in what they demand of Cambodia, following their embarrassing in-
action during the Khmer Rouge genocide; instead, they grant Cambodian 
officials allowances for the burden of the country’s history (Ear 2007, 
82). 
However, even if environmental issues are perceived as less politically 
contentious, and as potentially offering more leverage for action, donor 
reforms have been insufficient in inducing the change necessary for envi-
ronmental protection. Although certain reforms, such as the logging ban 
and the new forestry law are important, these have failed because they 
have taken a technical approach, neglecting to challenge the fact that for-
est management continues to be oriented towards the interests of the 
political elite, rather than towards those of ordinary Cambodians (Davis 
2005, 163). For example, the Protected Area Law, enacted in 2008 to 
protect forests and vital eco-systems, reinforced the control and power 
of the state over natural resources. By the end of 2017, protected areas in 
Cambodia covered the equivalent of 41% of the country’s total land 
(Open Development Cambodia 2017). However, if protected areas are 
considered to have lost their ‘public interest’ these can be declassified 
and allocated to ELCs. Despite the assertion to protect the environment, 
and despite strict prohibitions under the Forest and Environmental Pro-
tection laws, ELC licenses have very often served de facto as logging con-
cessions at the edges of protected areas, or even within them (Tucker 
2015; Forest Trends 2015). 
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Market-based approaches have become increasingly appealing be-
cause they appear to be more effective than project-based, state-led or 
regulatory conservation (Ferraro 2001; Kiss 2004). However, in Cambo-
dia, there has been a steady rise of state ‘ownership’ or control over 
payment schemes, especially regarding new mechanisms such as the 
United Nations Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) program. Even if NGOs play a significant role 
in the technical and advisory parts of carbon schemes, the government 
retains the ultimate control over how to implement these schemes (Milne 
and Chervier 2014).  The Cambodian government’s prevailing view is 
that Payments for Ecosystem Services and REDD+ are potential mech-
anisms for generating state revenue. For example, the 2010 National 
Forest Program document states: ‘Conservation of healthy forests will 
attract state revenue through payments for environmental services’ 
(RGC 2010, 11). As one member of the Ministry of Environment ex-
plained, ‘Adaptation is about receiving funding, and mitigation we still do 
not know how to calculate emissions. They cannot apply that has forest 
before 1990. All the ones that exist already cannot apply for the Clean 
Development Mechanism6 project… REDD+ works easier because we 
can lie. Forest protected areas they can convert to REDD+.’ (Interview, 
Ministry of Environment, 2016).  
In fact, even after Cambodia started to receive money in 2011 for 
agreeing to follow sustainability standards under REDD+, deforestation 
activities in the country flourished. The Cambodian REDD+ initiative 
has been criticised by the Forest Carbon Partnership for its lack of atten-
tion to the impacts of ELCs and for overlooking the need to integrate 
ELCs into land use planning (Forest Trends 2015). As other observers 
noted, ‘Illegal logging will always bring more money than REDD’ (Inter-
view, Oxfam, 2016).  For example, in just one year – that of 2017 – Vi-
etnam imported 179 million USD worth of timber from Cambodia 
(Forest Trends 2015). The amount received from timber exports to Vi-
etnam alone is more than the combined amount of mitigation and adap-
tation climate-related finance that Cambodia has received on any given 
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year since 2007, except for in 2014 when it received 186 million USD 
(OECD 2017). Although climate-related finance is considerably lower 
than what Cambodia receives from logging, politicians have been trying 
to capitalise on rubber trees, which – similar to the concept of flex crops 
– have the potential to contribute towards both logging revenues and 
climate revenues. As one official from the Ministry of Agriculture stated, 
‘Rubber trees should not only be for latex but for carbon trading too!’ 
(Interview with the Ministry of Agriculture, Phnom Penh, 2016). While 
Cambodia has long been host to rubber plantations, following an in-
creased market demand and an increase in commodity markets in 2005, 
rubber became the most important commodity driving ELCs and it now 
represents the second largest agricultural export after rice (Natividad 
2015).7 The rubber from Cambodia is mainly exported to China, Vi-
etnam and Malaysia (Chhair and Ung 2013). Despite wide ranging evi-
dence on the environmental impacts of this crop and its substantial re-
sponsibility in driving deforestation (Ziegler, Fox, and Xu 2009; Ahrends 
et al. 2015), rubber has been presented not only as crop capable of at-
taining economic development, but also environmental protection.  
Cambodian Prime Minister, Hun Sen, stated that ‘Rubber, once big-
ger, is considered as forest coverage too… Promoting rubber plantation 
on economic land concession we will then have more land under forest 
coverage and people will generate economic benefit from their rubber 
too…In Malaysia, their forest coverage is palm oil tree and rubber too. 
They make their country green. They are replacing former natural forest. 
They cleared them and grew in their place trees with more economic 
values. I think we will need to encourage more cultivation of rubber.’ 
(Hun Sen quoted in Vannarin 2013). In fact, the Forest Law does not 
differentiate between tree plantations and natural forests.  Art. 2 of the 
Forest law defines ‘forest’ as including both natural and artificial forest 
systems; this definition enables companies (such as rubber companies) to 
claim that they have ‘reforested’ an area, when in fact they have cleared 
natural forests to cultivate tree plantations of economic value 
(COHCHR 2004, 21).  
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Some have attempted to utilise this green narrative, which is also fa-
cilitated by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization’s 
(FAO) definition of forest, to advocate for the insertion of rubber con-
cessions within REDD+.8 The FAO defines ‘forests’ as: ‘Land spanning 
more than 0.5 hectares of trees equipped with a minimum height of 5m 
at maturity in situ and a crown cover (or equivalent stocking level) of 
more than 10 percent.’ (FAO Term Portal). Hence, industrial tree mono-
cultures can be considered forest under this definition: ‘They don’t have 
a definition of forest cover. They are still discussing what trees to include 
in forest.’ (Interview CDRI Environment, 2016, Phnom Penh). Unclear 
definitions that can be exploited for multiple aims have multiple social 
and environmental ramifications. As one member from the Cambodian 
delegation to the climate negotiations explained, ‘This has been a big dis-
cussion. Politically there are many interests that have been lobbying for 
its inclusion within REDD+…Although it is not possible technically,9 
political interests try to find loopholes…the idea has spread so widely 
that they use the idea to grab the land from the people by spreading the 
wrong information... There is so much confusion with REDD+… The 
local people think that this is possible and even at the central level here, 
people who are not involved in the technical discussions, continue to 
believe so.’ (Interview, Ministry of Environment, 2016, Phnom Penh).  
This is useful for elites, since many oknhas10 have rubber investments 
and are losing their profits from rubber, as its market price has dropped: 
‘Now with these new mitigation policies, the oknhas see rubber planta-
tions as an opportunity’ (Interview with CCAFS, 2016, Phnom Penh). 
However, although the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
counts the increasing number of private plantations in ELCs – often 
filled with rubber and acacia trees – as ‘forest cover’, the UNFCCC (un-
der which REDD+ is organised) does not. It is hence also important to 
underline that the implications of flexing may occur not only when these 
are material or anticipated (Borras et al. 2016), but also when flexing is 
just hypothetical or imagined.  
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Within ELCs, sugar is second largest crop grown after rubber. Global 
sugar demand has spiked considerably as a consequence of the rising 
global biofuel demand. It is part of the ‘global flex sugarcane complex’ 
(Bordonal et al. 2018; McKay et al. 2016). The rise in sugarcane conces-
sions in Cambodia is also linked to the EU’s Everything But Arms Initia-
tive (EBA). The initiative was adopted in 2001 with the stated intention 
of promoting development in the world’s least developed countries 
(LDCs) by granting duty free and quota free access to the European 
market. Market access for sugar was fully liberalised in October 2009, 
which is especially relevant as the EU guarantees a minimum sugar price 
higher than that of the world market (Equitable Cambodia and Inclusive 
Development International 2013, 20). The EBA has been one of the key 
drivers for sugar cane plantations in Cambodia. In fact, while sugar cane 
was negligible before EBA was enacted, today more than 100 hectares of 
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land are designated toward sugar concessions whose product was ex-
ported to the EU (Borras, Seufert, et al. 2016, 33).  
Since Hun Sen’s rise to power, there have been a number of interna-
tional outcries concerning the regime’s use of violence and its human 
rights records, and to attention being given to the human rights impacts 
of ELCs (Human Rights Watch 2015; Global Witness 2009; COHCHR 
2004). Despite the relatively strong legal provisions of the Land Law and 
subsequent sub-decrees, concerns over the human and environmental 
impacts of ELCs continued to be raised by local communities, civil soci-
ety organisations, UN agencies and development partners. As a result of 
the domestic and international outcry, in 2012 the Prime Minister issued 
a moratorium on the granting of new ELCs through an Order on Measures 
for Strengthening and Increasing the Effectiveness of the Management of Economic 
Land Concessions (Order 01), coupled with a new nation-wide land titling 
campaign. The aim was to target people who were ‘illegally’ occupying 
state land so that they could obtain legal claims to those lands. This co-
incided with the run up to 2013 national elections, during which time 
there was an overwhelming sentiment of ELCs being viewed as potential 
threats for social stability and the cause of a Cambodia’s tinted image 
internationally. Rural discontent over land grabs was a major cause of 
support for the opposition party (Naren and Willemyns 2013). There-
fore, the moratorium can be seen as an appeasing policy by the govern-
ment to address the demands of affected communities that can be un-
derstood as an action taken to maintain political legitimation in the face 
of increased social revolt (Young 2019).  
The Order 01 not only called for the suspension of granting new li-
censes to ELCs, but also for the revision of existing ones, in order to 
cancel those which had failed to comply with regulations. This included 
concessions that cut down trees and subsequently failed to cultivate the 
land, as well as those that have encroached on areas beyond their con-
cession boundaries, those that have left parts of the concessions empty 
in order to sell them to third parties, those that have undertaken activi-
ties that were not initially included within the ELC contract, and those 
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that have dispossessed local people and/or indigenous communities by 
removing their land access. It also called on relevant stakeholders to fol-
low the ‘leopard skin strategy’, which seeks to demarcate concession 
boundaries in ways that avoid existing residential and agricultural land. 
However, while the Order prohibited the granting of new concessions, 
in principle, this did not affect those that had already received approval 
prior to the Order. As a result, 32 new concession licenses were issued 
following the Order (Grimsditch and Schoenberger 2015, 5–6). Howev-
er, between June 2012 and December 2014, 1.2 million hectares of land 
granted to ELCs were reclassified as state public land. One official from 
the Ministry of Environment stated the following three reasons for can-
celling ELCs: ‘First, the company was not following legal procedures. 
For example, before the development they need to do an (environmental 
impact assessment) and a master plan…Second, there was non-
resolution with affected villagers. And third, the company did not have 
the capacity to develop the land’ (cited in Grimsditch and Schoenberger 
2015, 10).  
By December 2014, 610,000 land titles were issued to small-scale 
farmers. However, the Order had mixed results. Although the stated 
purpose of registering and titling lands was supposedly to clarify owner-
ship within conflicted areas, a study conducted by NGO forum revealed 
that many people nation-wide reported that their land was not surveyed 
precisely because there were conflicts regarding differing claims to it or 
that it overlapped with land enclosed within ELCs. In fact, ‘outsiders’, or 
people that were not from the conflicted areas, had benefitted from the 
Order – counter to its initial purpose. Lack of clarity remains around 
whether the Order had in fact targeted people with legal claims to the 
land, and thereby failed to provide any additional security for those that 
lacked legal claims (Grimsditch and Schoenberger 2015). Moreover, the 
politicised nature of the campaign raised numerous concerns as to how it 
might have inadvertently facilitated further corruption and land grabs. In 
2013, the Asia Director of Human Rights Watch stated that, ‘While some 
have benefitted from the campaign, in other cases the scheme has 
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amounted to a land grab by powerful interests with no legal protections 
or recourse for those who lose out in the process. The campaign is being 
conducted in a secretive and bullying manner in which independent or-
ganizations are prevented from monitoring what is happening and local 
residents are threatened if they complain’ (Human Rights Watch 2013). 
The next chapter directs its attention to two landscapes where, despite 
legal provisions and promises made by the government, the land disputes 
remain far from being resolved. 
 
Greening Territorialisation and Criminalising Internal Migration 
Complex combinations of environmental and migration drivers and jus-
tifications overlap with one another to justify land grabs in a country 
whose economic growth has generated heavy social and environmental 
costs. While emigrating from Cambodia was not a major trend at the 
turn of the century (and hence neither were remittances) in Cambodia, 
internal migration – particularly undertaken by those in search of availa-
ble land for livelihoods – was the prime form of mobility. As a country 
that was heavily reliant on ODA for its transition, Cambodia adopted 
donor reforms concerning land tenure (i.e. the regulation of ELCs and 
SLCs, as directed by the Land Law) with the hope that attracting inves-
tors would lift the country out of poverty. As FDI grew, so did the de-
mand for agricultural land; however, this was most often allocated to in-
vestors at the expense of national populations that sought land access – 
many of whom have been criminalised. The destruction of environmen-
tal resources, especially in terms of deforestation, has continued to cap-
ture prominent international attention. In response, Cambodia has be-
come a prototypical example of a state that is ‘willing to comply with 
international conservation agreements or with western conservation 
principles, as such agreements and principles are often used to justify the 
state’s resource management practices’ (Peluso 1993, 200). With the hy-
pothetical greening of rubber, and the rise in flex crop production for 
green energy, the dependence of small-scale farmers on cash crops has 
been pushing them further into debt; in such a context, international mi-
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gration has become an important strategy to escape poverty and land-
lessness.  
Conclusion 
Despite their diverging historical pathways, in both Senegal and Cambo-
dia, tenure and agricultural reforms have been structured around diverse 
environmental and/or migration narratives. Both countries have used 
environmental and migration arguments to justify the contentious grant-
ing of massive land concessions in an attempt to maintain the thorny 
balance between capital accumulation and political legitimation. Alt-
hough environmental and migration narratives are used in both contexts, 
migration arguments have greater prevalence in Senegal, and environ-
mental ones in Cambodia. This is due to the different positionings of the 
two countries within the world economy, as well as the differing interests 
of its main donors and corporate investors. For example, while Cambo-
dia can provide a ‘carbon sink’ due to its remaining forests, Senegal can 
provide a ‘migration sink’ at the same time as generating increased biofu-
el outputs.  
In Senegal, international migration was, and still is to a large extent, 
seen as a way to escape poverty that simultaneously generates large eco-
nomic returns through remittances. Yet EU policies have increasingly 
criminalised international migration and development aid has aimed to 
reduce migration through measures that assume foreign investment can 
address underdevelopment or the root causes of Senegalese forced mi-
gration. The resulting large-scale agricultural investments are justified not 
only as means to ensure employment creation at home, but to also in-
crease food and energy security domestically and internationally. In 
Cambodia, on the other hand, it is internal migration that has been pre-
sented as a security threat, while international migration is perceived as 
an adaptation opportunity. This is because neighbouring countries, such 
as Thailand and Malaysia, still rely upon and need cheap labour. Moreo-
ver, out-migration leaves more land space open for profitable invest-
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ments all while creating an escape valve to release the pressures of rising 
unemployment and possible political contention. At the same time, pro-
tected areas have facilitated the criminalisation of internal migration. In 
order to understand how different land grabs materialise on the ground, 
the next chapter zooms into three very different landscapes where land 
grabs have occurred in order to understand their specific environmental 




1 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was created in 1988, 
and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
in 1992. 
2 The number of young people entering the labour market every year is currently 
estimated at 269,000. According to demographic projections this number will 
reach 376,000 in 2025 and 411,000 in 2030. However, the formal sector creates 
fewer than 30,000 jobs per year in Senegal (Hathie 2014). 
3 See more on the Alliance for a Green Revolution for Africa (AGRA), here:  
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/how-we-work/resources/grantee-
profiles/grantee-profile-alliance-for-a-green-revolution-in-africa-agra  
4 According to the Land Matrix, the top investor countries in Senegal in terms of 
hectares under contract are Romania (100,000), Italy (68,250), Norway (30,000), 
Saudi Arabia (20,000), France (16,498), Cameroon (11,000), Nigeria (8,000), India 
(5,700), Belgium (5,000), Libya (3,150), the Netherlands (3,000), and the United 
Kingdom (310). Combined, French and Italian investors are involved in most 
land deals (9 out of 19). More than half of the land deals have an area under con-
tract of less than 5,000 hectares, which illustrates that Senegal has only marginally 
been affected by mega deals (of 10,000 hectares or more). Of the acquired land, 
the vast majority are leases (between 10 and 99 years). 
5 This figure includes those SLC’s managed and granted by the government and 
those co-managed between the government and donor organizations such as 
World Bank, GIZ, Life with Dignity and Habitat for Humanity (Diepart 2016). 
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6 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was created through the Kyoto 
Protocol in order to fund projects in developing countries that contribute to 
greenhouse gas emission reductions.  
7 Data shows that the area of rubber plantations increased from around 129,000 
hectares in 2009 to around 326,000 hectares in 2013. The Ministry of Agriculture 
has predicted that the area of rubber plantations would reach 450,000 hectares by 
2020 (Forest trends Cambodia 2014). 
8  The Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD+) mechanism under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) creates a framework through which companies and 
governments can be compensated economically for protecting forests. 
9 Palm oil and rubber are excluded from the REDD+ definition. 
10  The title of okhna was traditionally a title of nobility bestowed by the king and 
that was in 1994 included in a sub-decree in 1994. This title is now granted to 
those who donate 100,000 USD to the government and that have a commitment 
to the greater good. However, and despite the purpose of serving the greater 
good, a number of high-profile okhna have been implicated in land grabs, illegal 





5 Expulsions and Destruction: Overlapping Scenarios 
 
Introduction 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, security and adaptation fram-
ings interact with national realities to shape narratives around land grabs 
differently according to diverse political, environmental, and migratory 
situations as well as according to the diverging interests of the donors 
and investors that manage them. But, how have land grabs unfolded in particu-
lar places and with what particular migratory and environmental impacts? To an-
swer this question, this chapter zooms down to three specific landscapes 
to show how land grabs manifest themselves, the justifications accompa-
nying these land grabs on the ground, and the environmental and migra-
tory impacts that they have on the people most directly affected by them. 
An understanding of how diverse environmental and migratory narra-
tives are deployed to justify land grabs, and their environmental and mi-
gratory outcomes requires an understanding of ‘land grabs as processes’ 
(McMichael 2014). There has been a tendency to examine different 
‘types’ of land grabs in isolation from each other. Studies have focused 
on grabs aimed at different purposes (food, fuel, tourism, mining, con-
servation, special economic zones etc.), on whether their purposes are 
‘green’ or not green (extraction vs protection), on the different types of 
investors (public vs private, domestic vs international), and on their di-
verging impacts on the ground (inclusion vs exclusion, destruction vs 
preservation) (Zoomers 2010). Although these separate categories are 
powerful and useful analytical tools, studies have underlined the alliances 
and interdependencies between different resource grabs (Büscher 2009; 
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Kelly 2011; Corson 2011), and the need to assume a landscape, rather 
than a single project approach to account for cumulative impacts 
(Hunsberger et al. 2016; Baird and Barney 2017). 
In order to capture these overlaps and complexities, this chapter uses 
three cases of land grabs as entry points into more complex landscapes. 
Firstly, the chapter directs its attention to the Senegal River Delta where 
the majority of land grabs in Senegal have taken place. It does so by an-
choring itself within the most controversial project that Senegal has had 
in recent years – that of the Senhuile-Senethanol – which contained land 
granted within a protected area for the aim of biofuel production. Sec-
ondly, the chapter travels towards Cambodia into two landscapes – those 
of Koh Kong Sugar and Tan Bien Rubber – where rubber and sugar 
grabs are employed as anchors (these are the two crops driving the ma-
jority of concessions). Rather than merely analysing the anchor cases at 
face value, each case study is analysed from a historical perspective, 
which is then broadened in its scope geographically, as the means to un-
derstanding the overlapping justifications as well as the outcomes that 
each have had. In doing so, the chapter aims to show not only the 
blurred lines that exist between justifications and resource grabs that 
shape particular outcomes, but also to capture which of these has had 
the most lasting impacts.  
5.1 Senhuile: Un-Greening for Virtual Green Purposes 
The project of Senhuile, formally operating as Senhuile-Senethanol, lo-
cated next to the Lac de Guiers in the Senegal River Delta, has been the 
most controversial and stark example of recent land grabbing in Senegal. 
The company started as a joint venture owned by Tampieri Financial 
Group SA based in Italy (51%) and by Senethanol SA based in Dakar 
(49%) which, in the context of the national biofuel plan, proposed a pro-
ject for sunflower production to produce ethanol for the European mar-
ket. The former CEO of the company had introduced a demand for 
20,000 hectares of land in the rural community of Fanaye (Podor). As 
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part of the deal, the company would have to pay 500 million CFA (849, 
222 USD) to the rural community for a 50-year lease (Interview with the 
CEO of Senhuile, Dakar, 2015). Although the rural council in Fanaye 
approved the granting of 20,000 hectares of land in return for the given 
fee, it only led a consultation process with those who were already fa-
vourable to the project. Once the company started operating, and the 
broader population in the area realised that a deal had been signed with-
out their consent, violent protests occurred resulting in two deaths and 
many people wounded. While many blamed the company, the CEO stat-
ed that they simply did what they were told to do: negotiate with the ru-
ral community and give them the money in advance (Interview with the 
CEO of Senhuile, Dakar, 2015). However, given the violence of unfold-
ing events, President Wade suspended the project in Fanaye but prom-
ised Senhuile-Senethanol to find an alternative solution where negotia-
tions with rural communities could be avoided. 
Given that protected areas are state land - and hence require no rural 
community consultation process - President Wade decided to relocate 
the project to the area of the Ndiaël Reserve (Réserve Spéciale d’Avifaune du 
Ndiaël) located next to the Lac de Guiers. The Ndiaël Reserve was classi-
fied as a special wildlife reserve in 1965 in order to compensate for other 
land conversion that had taken place in the Delta as a consequence of 
agricultural expansion. Farming activities were prohibited within the re-
serve, but traditional grazing activities were still allowed (Benegiamo and 
Cirillo 2018). In 1977, the Ndiaël Reserve had been designated as a Ram-
sar Convention wetland of international importance covering 26,000 
hectares. In 1990, due to the ecological concerns threatening the area, 
the site was included into the Montreux record, which is ‘a register of 
wetland sites on the List of Wetlands of International Importance where 
changes in ecological character have occurred, are occurring, or are likely 
to occur as a result of technological developments, pollution or other 
human interference’ (Ramsar 1971). The site is of great conservation im-
portance, especially for birds, mammals, and reptiles. The Ramsar Con-
vention wetland is also crucial for its economic, cultural, scientific and 
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recreational value, including its vital position for the wellbeing of local 
people, as it provides water for livestock and crops, among other contri-
butions (Ramsar 1971). 
The Lac de Guiers - a lake located adjacent to the Ndiaël Reserve - is 
the most important source of fresh water in Senegal and provides 
150,000 m3 of potable water daily to Dakar (Faye, Mbow, and Thiam 
2016). Despite its importance for biodiversity and for water resources, 
President Wade signed two presidential decrees in 2012 to first nullify 
the qualification of the Ndiaël as a reserve and to then grant 20,000 hec-
tares (out of the 26,500 hectares of the former reserve) to Senhuile. 
When the government granted the Ndiaël Reserve to Senhuile, it did so 
under the guise of the area being uninhabited. This is a recurrent practice 
in places where land grabs occur and is common on lands that are falsely 
labelled as ‘idle’. In this case, 37 villages, populated by 9000 pastoralists 
had been living in the area for over 100 years (well before the classifica-
tion of the Reserve) and the Reserve constituted the only available space 
for grazing in an overdeveloped delta designated for agribusiness devel-
opment and rice cultivation. In addition to grazing land for an approxi-
mate 100,000 animals (including cows, sheep, and goats), the reserve 
lands also provided the populations with firewood, fruit, medicinal plants 
and resin. Although those most directly affected are pastoralists, another 
ethnic group, the Wolof’s, whose main livelihood stems from farming, 
also depend on the reserve for their livelihoods. In total, there are an es-
timated 21,000 inhabitants that have strong links to the Ndiaël (Fall 
2017).  
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Map 5: State Map Depicting Land for Senhuile Company (left, without 
hamlets) versus Community Map (right, with hamlets)  
 
          Source: Maps provided by the Collectif du Ndiaël.  
 
Before being able to understand the current impacts of Senhuile, it is 
important to understand how and why these people came to inhabit the 
area originally. Over the last 40 years, human mobility within the Senegal 
River Delta has been completely transformed. As a result of irrigation 
and the arrival of agro-industries, from 1965 onwards, the waloo (the left 
side of the valley) and the Delta, became zones of immigration. Migra-
tion towards the area was encouraged via state policies of terres neuves, 
which attracted thousands of migrants for whom the SAED built new 
villages whilst also providing them with improved conditions for rice 
cultivation (Tourrand 2000, 58–59; Corniaux et al. 2016, 10). Although 
the new irrigation schemes provided many opportunities for farmers, 
they led to a new rush for irrigated land and resulted in diminishing ac-
cess for pastoralist groups (Cotula 2006, 18–19). The dams also had di-
rect consequences on pastoralists: ‘Before the Diama dam, the water 
from the lake went directly to the marsh and our cows could eat…Since 
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the dam, the lake is always filled and contaminated. Because of all the 
contamination, many cows died in 1992. Before there was one rice sea-
son. Now the season is all year around so the cows can’t go to eat on the 
rice fields as they did before.’ (Interview with the Collectif du Ndiaël, Saint 
Louis, 2015). As a pastoralist stated: ‘It is ok to do agriculture, but not if 
you kill pastoralism!’ (Interview with a Peul woman, Ndiaël Reserve, 
2015). 
As a result of the agricultural expansion and of the droughts of 1972-
73 and 1983-84, many pastoralists were forced to leave their activities 
and to enter wage labour jobs as farmers (Tourrand 2000, 58). Moreover, 
because of the dam construction, annual flooding could no longer be 
relied on, which made the situation increasingly difficult for poor farm-
ers and pastoralists (Adams 1977). In 30 years, the quantity of pastoral 
grazing resources diminished by around 85% in the dry season and 40% 
in the rainy season. The highest quality grazing areas were converted into 
irrigated farming areas (Tourrand 2000, 68). Despite the fact that some 
pastoral hamlets had been established in the Ndiaël over a century ago, 
once agriculture in the Delta expanded, many pastoralists (who had pro-
gressively lost the space required for extensive grazing) were ordered by 
the authorities to move to the newly created reserve. As a result, all of 
the pastoralists who had not assimilated into agriculture increasingly 
moved the Ndiaël Reserve (Benegiamo and Cirillo 2018). 
Today, the pastoralists that inhabit the area, known as Peuls, live in 
habitats that are spread across diverse hamlets with herds moving just 
short distances (around 15km). Their usual livelihood consists of circu-
lating around the area during the wet season, and periodically moving 
towards the left side of the valley; they cross over to Mauritania when 
quality the pasture has been exhausted (Santoir 1994, 239). However, 
their access to water became increasingly difficult due to the construc-
tion of the national road, which created a barrier, and also because of 
farm field expansion at the border of the Lac de Guiers (Benegiamo and 
Cirillo 2014 ). Although Peuls are very attached to their mode of life, and 
many show a resistance at moving to farming based livelihoods, many 
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underline that given the situation of shrinking space for pastoral liveli-
hoods, farming has become necessary to meet their basic needs. Howev-
er, despite multiple demands to the rural council, pastoralists have been 
denied land for farming: ‘We did just pastoralism, but it was becoming 
more and more difficult. We knew that to survive we also needed to do 
farming, so we kept asking for land, but they never gave it to us. And if 
we cannot have land to farm, it is just impossible to survive’ (Interview, 
pastoralist, Ndiaël Reserve, 2015).   
Additionally, as competition for agriculture in the area increased, 
farmers attempted to access the Reserve for agricultural purposes several 
times. Their demands were rejected and people attempting to access the 
Reserve were imprisoned on the purported basis that the area should be 
devoted to pastoral uses and that infringing upon it was thus a crime. 
However, at the time of granting the reserve to the company neither pas-
toral or faming demands created a barrier. According to a representative 
from the CNCR, ‘This is the biggest tenure mistake in the history of 
Senegal. How can we allow to declassify a natural reserve that was meant 
to be protected…And even they imprisoned a farmer that had tried to 
dig a canal with his own funds because they said the area was protected 
and only for pastoralist…They locked him up for a whole week! Not 
even 24 months after that incident it’s a presidential decree that declassi-
fies the reserve for industrial agriculture…In whose name?!’ (Interview 
with CNCR, Saint Louis, 2014). 
The Government justified its privileged treatment of the Senhuile on 
the grounds of the employment opportunities it promised to create as 
well as through the justification that its biofuel production was in line 
with the country’s energy security needs, as outlined within the national 
biofuel plan. Although by law, all projects must carry out an Environ-
mental Impact Assessment prior to commencing their activities, Senhuile 
only commissioned one after their operation had already been running 
for a few months. Senhuile hired the consultancy firm, SYNERGIE, to 
undertake its Environmental and Social Impact Assessment in 2013 (a 
year after its arrival). As I was able to access this assessment via local au-
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thorities, I found that the project narrative situates itself ‘within the na-
tional strategy of biofuel production that aims, amongst other objectives, 
to identify and develop projects of greenhouse gas emissions within the 
mechanisms set out by the Kyoto Protocol’ (Senhuile Environmental 
Impact Assessment 2013, 4). The assessment specifies how the strategy 
is also being followed within India, which foresees 40 million hectares of 
biofuel production, as well as within other countries such as China, Vi-
etnam, and Thailand. The underlying rationale is the ‘questioning of fu-
ture energy sources that are particularly strategic given the rising prices 
of hydrocarbons which are increasingly expensive for economies that are 
already affected by the world’s financial crisis’ (ibid: 4).  
Moreover, the assessment underlines that ‘implementation of green 
energies is a vital axe in the processes of combatting ozone depletion and 
in order to find alternatives to the energy crisis. The government of Sen-
egal, aware of these challenges, promoted the law on biofuels to allow 
the private sector to invest in this domain’ (ibid: 12). It is within this con-
text that Senhuile has launched the ambitious plan to produce sunflower 
oil to be exported and then transformed into biofuels. The project also 
claims to contribute to the Poverty Reduction Strategy of the Govern-
ment, the Initiative on Accelerated Economic Growth, the National Plan 
of Action for the Environment, the National Strategy for Sustainable 
Development, the National Program to Combat Desertification, the sec-
torial Environmental Policy, and the strategy for biodiversity conserva-
tion (ibid: 13-15).  
The document also explicitly states that it contributes to climate 
change adaptation as defined by the United Nations Convention of Cli-
mate Change because ‘sunflower production for biofuels can be analysed 
as an adaptation measure to climate change.’ (ibid: 48).  Beyond this, the 
assessment asserts that the sunflower plantation would be able to con-
tribute to climate mitigation through CO2 sequestration (ibid: 48). It also 
stated that it would contribute to poverty reduction, create employment 
for youth and reduce rural exodus. Despite the fact that the project relied 
heavily on green narratives to legitimise itself, the intended plans quickly 
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failed. As the CEO of the company explained: ‘From 2013 to 2014, we 
tried to grow sunflower, but the soil was too salty, so we had to abandon 
the plan … The previous team had no agricultural training, and since no 
environmental impact assessment was made, they did not envision that 
the production would fail.’ (Interview, Director Senhuile, Dakar, 2015). 
As a result, the company went on to produce rice, corn, and peanuts for 
the local market, in direct and (advantageous) competition with local 
producers. The company thus passed from framing its activities within 
the biofuel and energy security objectives to those of food self-
sufficiency that had also been set by the President Macky Sall. However, 
as of 2015, the Director of the company stated that these productions 
were not economically viable and that they were considering their depar-
ture. But at the same time he explained that ‘we have lost so much al-
ready and had so many problems that it is difficult for us to just give 
up…That is why we are trying to make it work’ (Interview, Director 
Senhuile, Dakar, 2015). 
In-Situ Displacement and (In)Voluntary Immobility 
The arrival of this company signified the end of the Reserve as a safe 
place for pastoralists. The granting of the Ndiaël Reserve to Senhuile has 
broader implications than the livelihoods of the 9,000 people located 
there. As many explained, this represented one of the last battles for pas-
toralist survival within Senegal, as it was one of the few remaining places. 
This loss is exacerbated by the fact that locals had not even been in-
formed that the company was going to arrive: ‘One fine day we got up 
and saw bulldozers. When we asked (what was going on), seven police 
cars came to stop us. Twelve people were put in prison for trying to defy 
the project.’ (Interview Ndiaël Reserve, 2015). Although the company 
never planned to relocate the hamlets, the mere 500 m that separated the 
hamlets from the land allocated to the company meant that their liveli-
hoods would become increasingly difficult. They felt trapped by the 
boundaries set by the company, particularly because they had already lost 
much of their required grazing space and witnessed the damage of pasto-
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ral corridors. Prior to the arrival of the company, these semi-nomadic 
pastoralists only had to move 4 km to meet their cattle grazing needs. 
Following the company’s arrival, however, these pastoralists now had to 
travel between 22 and 30 km north in order to feed their cattle: ‘Before 
(Senhuile) the herds would go out during the day but return at night. 
Today that is no longer possible. Before there were many marshes (mari-
gots), and today there are nearly none at all’ (Interview, pastoralist, 
Ngith, 2015).  
 
Map 6: Mobility within the Ndiaël Reserve 
 
Source: Cirillo 2015 cietd in Bagnoli et al. 2015, 35. 
 
Long distance out-migration for the Peuls is not part of their culture due 
to a deep attachment to both their land and culture. Moreover, while the 
youth are beginning to question the viability of their livelihood strategies, 
they are also struggling more than the Wolofs to find alternative liveli-
hoods due to their lack of education. Given the compounded struggles 
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that they have faced, an increasing number of young people have left for 
Mauritania and Dakar: ‘If they (Senhuile) continue, no one will be able to 
stay here…And if we do not get any land for farming we will not be able 
to survive…’ (Interview, Peul, 2015). The difficulties faced by the Peuls 
have been compounded by the environmental impacts created by the 
company, which are particularly salient and have been visible in forms 
such as cleared grasslands and shrub steppe as well as water contamina-
tion. This is despite the fact that the company’s 2013 Environmental 
Impact Assessment had stated that it would ensure that the clearance of 
grass and shrubland would be kept to a strict minimum, limited to the 
area of production. In actuality, 10,000 hectares were cleared, despite the 
fact that only 2,000 hectares were under production. As a result, local 
populations dub the project as both a social and environmental disaster: 
‘Senhuile is a social and environmental disaster. They destroy natural 
species and contaminate the land and water with chemical products that 
they throw from planes. They have really polluted the Lake too’ (Inter-
view, President of the Farmer Producer Union, 2014).  
Figure 10: Cattle Grazing Within the Ndiaël Reserve 
 
Source: Photo by author, 2015. 
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Importantly, in this context, we see how displacement is not only 
about physically displacing homes, but also about displacing the liveli-
hoods that make life in those homes possible. Although pastoralists have 
always counted on multiple livelihood diversification strategies to coun-
ter environmental difficulties, the lack of the ability to move combined 
with the minimal opportunities that the company has afforded to them, 
has restricted the flexibilisation that they require. Indeed, although the 
majority have remained in place, they have suffered a prolonged multi-
stage process of losses (Lubkemann 2008), that have compromised their 
aceess to land and their livelihoods (Ribot and Peluso 2003). By 
establishing barriers to their movement and limiting the land available 
for their grazing needs, their traditional adaptive strategies are on the 
verge of dissapearing. And although there has been a push for farmers 
and herders to obtain credit in order to survive, populations are deeply 
reticent of this option: ‘There are no banks that come here to take our 
money…We do not want debt! It is difficult for us for two reasons. 
First, the conditions that banks ask to give credits are not compatible 
with the conditions that we have. Second, for religious reasons. Interests 
are prohibited by Islam…No banks here, that is out of question!…But 
the problem is that the younger people now think this might be a solu-
tion…we try to dissuade them. We know that only brings problems’ 
(Focus group, Reserve du Ndiaël, 2015). 
Fake Promises: Return Migration and Lack of Labour 
Upon its arrival, the company promised to create 4,500 jobs with salaries 
of 4000 CFA per day (6 USD). As villagers foretold, the company also 
promised to provide electricity, roads, schools, etc. The main reason that 
some of the Wolofs living near the Ndiaël Reserve had initially been 
supportive of the Senhuile’s project was precisely because of the em-
ployment promises the company had made. For the farmers in the area, 
the expectations that the company would bring employment and infra-
structure created hope, which even ignited the return migration of those 
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who had left to find work in Dakar and Saint Louis. Yet because the 
promises of employment (made by the former CEO) hinged on the pro-
duction of sunflower, which never materialised, the promised jobs did 
not materialise either. In actuality, only 300 people were initially em-
ployed, and during my latest visit in 2015, only 190 people were em-
ployed, according to the company records. People complained that the 
contracts were not stable, and many former employees claimed to have 
worked for 3,000 CFA per day (5 USD), but without a contract. As a 
result of the company’s fake promises, the out-migration of returnees 
resumed again. 
In 2014, the CEO of the Senhuile was arrested on charges of misap-
propriating 200 million CFA (more than 300,000 USD) (RFI 2014). The 
new CEO explained that he was obliged to fire many employees because 
the project was economically unviable. According to him, the former 
team had no agronomic experience whatsoever and under the belief that 
sunflower production would flourish, they sought to reassure local 
communities by promising thousands of jobs that thereafter never mate-
rialised. In practice, the jobs created consisted of daily contracts and the 
company only requires labour for two months of the year.  The company 
director attributes the stark conflicts that arose between local communi-
ties and the company (examined in Ch. 6) to these false promises of em-
ployment: ‘Why did they (the former administration of the company) 
promise jobs when we don’t need labour?! These are not productions 
that are labour intensive. The starting plan has gone completely wrong 
and created terrible problems…100 of the 190 current employers are 
there for security reasons.’ (Interview, Director Senhuile, Dakar, 2015). 
The ‘security’ reasons here refer to safeguarding the company from the 
forms of resistance that populations have been using against the compa-
ny, such as stealing machinery or releasing cattle onto the company’s 
grounds.  
In order to appease emerging tensions, the company’s new admin-
istration signed an agreement of cohabitation with those members of the 
local communities who were not directly involved in resisting the pro-
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ject. In 2014, the company established a department for social responsi-
bility with the aims of: 1) minimising the environmental impact of the 
company on local people; 2) contributing to the socio-economic devel-
opment of local communities; 3) becoming one of Senegal’s preferred 
partners in terms of social and economic progress. Women-only groups, 
designed to boost their socio-economic status, were established as were 
some school classes. According to the new director general of the com-
pany, those who have been most adversely impacted by the project have 
reached agreements with the company: ‘those that complain it is because 
they have not succeeded in being included’ (Interview, Director Senhuile, 
Dakar, 2015).  Moreover, the benefits resulting from these agreements 
have not been distributed equally.  
In fact, what has happened in reality is that some leaders that are po-
litically connected have received irrigation tools and farming land from 
the company, as well as employment as company security guards of the 
company. Certain leaders have even received plane tickets to visit Mecca 
paid for by the company, which is viewed upon as a form of corruption 
by some people (Interview, CNCR, Ngith, 2015). Despite allegations 
from the company that such benefits should trickle down to the remain-
der of the populations, in actuality this has failed to materialise. The vast 
majority of the people in the area have not had such opportunities and 
instead, have only experienced the negative impacts of the company’s 
operations, with respect to their way of life on land that has been within 
their families for generations: ‘That is not true! (that we have received 
anything). Only very few have received, and they kept everything to 
themselves!’ (Interview, pastoralist, Ndiaël Reserve, 2015). The pastoral 
populations asserted that they were doubly cheated: first by Senhuile, 
and then by the chiefs that were meant to protect their interests.  
Intercommunity tensions have consequently emerged between the 
majority who is against the company and the minority who has reported-
ly received preferential treatment and gifts in return for their silence. 
This has created mistrust and even family conflicts between those resist-
ing the project and those who have been granted inclusion within it. As 
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exemplified during a focus group interview, this has led to conflicts even 
within the same households: ‘Tell her, tell her the truth! Tell her you ac-
cepted money from the company to say this!’ (Focus group, Ndiaël Re-
serve, 2015).  
Figure 11: Irrigated Plot Facilitated by Senhuile Company. 
 
Source: Photo by author, 2015. 
 
Moreover, many local people reported an increase in conflicts between 
farmers and pastoralists that were a consequence of the company’s pres-
ence: ‘Before Senhuile, our relationships with the Peuls were fine. They 
had enough space to do their grazing and they could access the lake. But 
now, they keep coming into our fields to graze and this is creating a lot 
of tension’ (Focus group, Ngnith, 2015). 
In-Migration to Family Farms 
Although the company has not been able to contribute to creating the 
opportunities needed for locals to stay at home or to incentivise return 
migration, irrigated agriculture elsewhere in the area has attracted popu-
lations from the inner regions of Senegal that rely on rain-fed agriculture 
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(especially from Fouta, Kaolack, Casamance, Fatick and Diourbel). Gen-
erally, these migrants are young men between the ages of 20 and 30. 
Populations from these regions engage in seasonal agricultural labour 
migration as a way to diversify their livelihoods during the dry season. 
The later arrival of the rains than usual combined with a lack of infra-
structure, irrigation facilities, and access to markets, has made farming in 
their provinces increasingly difficult.  
Many migrants in the area claimed that Dakar had previously been 
their preferred destination. But as life became increasingly difficult in 
urban areas, with growing competition for low skilled urban jobs, they 
preferred to migrate to the Delta. Moreover, they explained that in Da-
kar charges, such as rent and electricity, are costly, whereas if they work 
on family farms these costs are covered. According to the migrants in-
terviewed, in their homes, it is only women, children and elderly that re-
main during the dry season. However, there are also a minority of fami-
lies that come together and live in huts within the fields. All of the 
migrants interviewed preferred to work on family farms as opposed to 
agrobusinesses, primarily because the employment is stable and housing 
and food costs are covered. Other reasons include loyalty towards those 
that had previously hired them and the fact that they feel the work is less 
physically demanding. In the agribusinesses: ‘you know at what time you 
start, but never when you finish’ (Focus Group, Ngnith, 2015).  
Life for these migrants is not without hardship, but agrobusiness 
companies have not provided better alternatives. The salaries they re-
ceive on family farms are around 30,000 CFA per month (51 USD), 
which is around 150,000 and 200,000 CFA (between 256 and 340 USD) 
for the full six-month seasonal stint. Although these salaries are much 
lower than what the companies purportedly provide (around 2,55 USD 
per day as opposed to 6 USD per day), the salaries provided on family 
farms still meet the nationally established minimum salary requirements.1 
Moreover, because they offer stable employment, they are actually much 
more profitable than working sporadically for say 20 days on an agro-
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business plantation, which would thereby exclude the possibility of 
working on the family farm for the full six month period.  
 
Where Do We Go from Here? 
Both pastoralists and farmers are reliant on land and water access to 
maintain their livelihoods and to ensure their food security in the face of 
a changing climate. In a landscape that is seen as highly profitable for 
farming, pastoralist livelihoods have been tainted as maladaptive and en-
vironmentally destructive. Moreover, land regulations have focussed on 
economic productivity and on making land available to those who can 
put it to the ‘best use.’ Many of the tenure conflicts that have arisen be-
tween farmers are linked to the rules that shape the granting or un-
granting of land by the rural councils. According to the 1972 decree, 
those who do not care for or work on their land in a productive manner 
can be dispossessed from it. The meaning of what ‘mise en valeur’ or pro-
ductive use is, however, can be interpreted in a controversial manner in 
order to justify granting land to the most powerful or politically connect-
ed, whilst dispossessing and excluding the most vulnerable. This has ef-
fectively translated into land redistribution for those who were already in 
a superior socio-economic position to start with. The determination of 
what constitutes productive versus unproductive livelihoods, coupled 
with the belief that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) would be able to 
harness food and environmental security, while also contributing to em-
ployment creation and the diminishing the rural exodus, has justified a 
multitude of large-scale land acquisitions in the area. The designation of 
the Ndiaël Reserve as a protected area has de facto unprotected it by 
shrinking the space of local democratic authorities via debate, and in-
stead permitting the central government to grant land to actors like the 
Senhuile without any local oversight mechanisms.  
The case of Senhuile is a paradigmatic land grabbing case whose out-
come was radically different to its stated plan. Not only have pastoralist 
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livelihoods been further cast aside, but the promises of biofuel produc-
tion and massive employment creation have not materialised. Instead, 
environmental and social costs have been high, and both pastoralists and 
farmers have suffered multi-faceted losses that may lead to expulsion. 
Although a massive exodus has not yet occurred, the local populations 
are preoccupied with what tomorrow will bring. As a pastoralist ex-
plained: ‘Today there are already many problems. But our big fear is to-
morrow.  If they continue to exploit this land, what will we do?’ (Inter-
view, Collectif du Ndiaël, 2015). In a similar message, another pastoralist 
showed concern for the future: ‘Without rain or land, where will our 
people go?’ (Interview with pastoralist, Ndiaël Reserve, 2015). Despite 
common media and policy rhetoric that millions of people want to flee 
Sub-Saharan Africa, not one person I spoke with in this area (over 150 
people) has now the plan to attempt the perilious journey. Rather, they 
want to ensure that they can benefit from the resources that their 
country can provide, while making sure that these precious resources are 
given to those who need them, rather than the higest bidder. One of the 
farmers in Ngith even named his farm, ‘Barça,’ in order to dissuade the 
youth from attempting deadly journeys, when they can rather fight for 
their own means of susbistence at home. With an understanding of the 
specific legitimisers and impacts of this paradigmatic case of land grab-
bing in Senegal, this chapter now analyses what paradigmatic cases of 
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5.2 Koh Kong: Overlapping Grabs, Overlapping 
Displacements  
 
The area the Sre Ambel district in the province of Koh Kong in Cambo-
dia drew media and NGO attention in 2006 when the Ministry of Agri-
culture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) granted two Economic Land 
Concessions (ELCs) in the Chi Kha Leu commune to two sugar compa-
nies (Koh Kong Plantation and Koh Kong Sugar Industry). Both of 
these companies are jointly owned by the Thai company Khon Kaen 
Sugar Industry, Taiwanese Ve Wong Corporation and a Cambodian Sen-
ator; Ly Yong Phat – who is well connected to the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and is one of Cambodia’s most in-
fluential businessmen. Although belonging to the same investors, each 
concession was granted approximately 9,500 contiguous hectares in or-
der to bypass the legal limits of 10,000 hectares per concession that the 
ELC sub-decree establishes (EC and IDI 2013). Moreover, the conces-
sions were granted within evergreen forests which are classified by the 
2001 Land Law as inalienable state public land (Dwyer 2015).  
As a result of these ELCs, hundreds of families that had been living in 
the area since the 1970s lost their land. However, as villagers explained, 
this was not the first time they had experienced land dispossession in 
recent years: ‘We were thrown out long before the sugar company ar-
rived…First, the forest administration said they had to save the trees, 
then an NGO wanted to save the animals…After, some of that land was 
given to the company for sugar…Now (I hear) something about 
REDD+…I don’t understand how this works!’ (Interview with a villager 
in Koh Kong, 2016). In order to understand the current conjuncture, it 
is thus essential to take a step back and to analyse the cumulated impacts 
of these multi-layered resource grabs on the current situation. 
The area where the two adjacent sugar concessions are located is con-
tiguous to the Cardamom mountains, which are one of the few remain-
ing, relatively intact forest landscapes in Southeast Asia. Given the cover 
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afforded by deep mountains, forests, and rugged landscapes, this area 
represented one of the last strongholds of the Khmer Rouge where 
many defeated soldiers retreated to (Hanson et al. 2009). Between 1975 
and 1990, the lack of access to international markets and the absence of 
external investment delayed the onset of deforestation in these moun-
tains and therefore, a significant amount of biodiversity, including rare 
and endangered species, have remained (Dudley et al. 2002, 324). As a 
result of their richness in biodiversity, the mountains are considered by 
Conservation International as part of the Indo-Burma biodiversity 
hotspot. Biodiversity hotspots are defined as areas with ‘exceptional con-
centrations of endemic species and exceptional loss of habitat’ (Myers et 
al. 2000a, 853).  
During the transitional period, when new markets opened for invest-
ment, a national road was built (national route 48), and a new influx of 
loggers, poachers and settlers came to inhabit – and re-inhabit – the area.  
In 2002, and in order to protect the area from these new influxes, the 
Southern Cardamom Forest Protection Program was initiated in a part-
nership between the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries 
(MAFF) and an American conservation NGO, Wildlife Alliance (formal-
ly operating as WildAid from 2002 to 2006) (see Map 7). The mission of 
WildLife Alliance, which is financially supported through international 
donors (e.g. USAID, ADB) and corporate matching programs, is to 
‘support law enforcement and provide technical assistance for wildlife 
and forestry protection’ (Wildlife Alliance 2017). The Forest Administra-
tion (FA), is in charge of patrol squads and ranger stations, while the mil-
itary police provide additional manpower and the Wildlife Alliance con-
tributes onsite technicians. Environmentally protecting the Southern 
Cardamom mountains has come with significant social costs. Following 
the forest conservation scheme, which rests on the assumption that the 
presence of people is negative for the environment, many people were 
evicted. In certain cases, houses were burned down, and populations 
were violently expelled through the use of military police force (Inter-
view with Wildlife Alliance representative, Phnom Penh, 2016). Even 
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those populations that have been farming the land since the 1990s, and 
who therefore held possession rights under the 2001 Land Law, were not 
spared eviction (Titthara 2009). 
Map 7: Map of the Southern Cardamom Forest Protection Program  
 
   Source: Map facilitated by WildLife Alliance, 2016 
 
When the Koh Kong sugar concessions arrived in 2006, they razed large 
areas of forest and violated the ELC sub-decree by not conducting a 
public hearing, failing to inform the public via a public announcement, 
and by not conducting an Environmental Impact Assessment (NHRC 
2015, via Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 2016). Although 
the company, backed by the Royal Government of Cambodia, claimed 
that the concessions were located in an abandoned area, 456 families 
from the Sre Ambel district were forcibly evicted from approximately 
5,000 hectares, which were used to make way for the concessions (CLEC 
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and EarthRights International 2012). Local communities were not in-
formed or consulted about the project and without warning, demolition 
workers with bulldozers and excavators, accompanied by armed and mil-
itary police, arrived and began to clear their land and crops.   
Many of those who had previously seen their land confiscated as a re-
sult of new conservation efforts and as a consequence of the commune 
chief granting false land certificates, were dispossessed of their land once 
more. The majority of the people whose land was taken had lived on 
their land peacefully for more than five years, and hence were entitled to 
the right of possession under Article 30 of the Land Law. Moreover, all 
three of the affected villages were located within the Participatory Land 
Use Planning implementation area since 2002, which provides proof that 
the residents’ land ownership was indeed uncontested and publicly evi-
dent (NHRC 2015, via Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 
2016). At the time of dispossession, most of the farmers lost all of their 
vegetable land holdings and ten families also lost their residential land. 
Local residents claimed to have been forced to accept as little as 300 
USD per household as compensation, with those having opposed the 
project not receiving any compensation. In total, 707 families have been 
affected by the dispossession of 3000 hectares of farmland that has left 
these farmers without livelihood options. 
 
 Expulsions and Destruction: Overlapping Scenarios 173 
Map 8: Commune Land Use Planning Map Overlaid with Koh Kong Conces-
sion Boundaries 
 
Source: Dwyer 2015 
 
 
Although the majority of residential land was not cleared, respondents 
unanimously reported extremely difficult living conditions resulting from 
the loss of farmland. As explained by one of the villagers: ‘With the loss 
of land, we lost everything that we had. We don’t have money for our 
children to go to school.  Not enough food to eat. No money to pay the 
interests because for the first time we now have to go to banks. No job 
opportunities…some people are seriously considering suicide’ (Inter-
view, farmer, 2015). Moreover, most of the 42 participants claimed to be 
scared of entering the forest to collect non-timber products, because the 
company requires them to buy a pass to have access.  Those participants 
who had previously had their residence inside of the company bounda-
ries were offered one hectare of land in a relocation site situated in an 
isolated plot in the middle of the forest and 350 USD per household as 
compensation. Without road or water access, the ten families that were 
forcibly moved to this location continue to experience tremendous diffi-
culties.  
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Figure 12: Relocation Site in Koh Kong 
 
Source: Photo by author, 2016 
 
The livelihoods of local communities depend on forest products that 
have significantly reduced since the arrival of the company. In addition 
to the forest that is now located within the company boundaries, the two 
community forests, totalling 1,800 hectares, were also adversely impacted 
by the company and the access of poor populations to the forest has 
been further restricted: ‘The company destroyed the forest as well…The 
company not only destroyed farmland but also destroyed community 
forest. People were dependent from the forest for non-timber prod-
ucts…But now if we try to access, we are fined and products get taken 
away’ (Interview with affected farmer, Chouk village, 2016). As another 
villager noted, ‘We don't have land to make money, so we went into for-
est to get some non-timber products like bamboo and the company stop 
us and ask for money’ (Interview with affected farmer, Chouk village, 
2016). Local communities also have less access to water as the water re-
serves have either been polluted or are in dire shortage due to the exces-
sive use of water by the company for irrigation. 
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Moreover, the majority of land within the concession has not been 
exploited, which makes the ELC a case point of a logging concession in 
disguise. Although the sub-decree on ELCs stipulated that companies 
must present Environmental Impact Assessments (which this company 
failed to do), it also granted concessionaries the right to clear concession 
land (including any forested area within the concessions). ELCs that are 
located next to conservation areas, such as the Koh Kong sugar conces-
sions, are particularly lucrative because ‘protected timber’ can be secretly 
harvested and trafficked under the companies concession permit (Milne 
2015).   




Other abuses include killing cattle, the confiscation of crops, the exclu-
sion of communities from water and forest resources, and the failure to 
provide livelihood alternatives (Dwyer 2015). The water from the 
streams where villagers used to catch their fish has been completely pol-
luted because the chemicals from the company’s operations flow directly 
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into the streams: ‘It is polluted the water and buffaloes dies when they 
drink this. Last year many died…It’s because of the pesticides they use 
to spray the plantation…Some people that drink this water get very sick. 
Before people just drank that water but now people are scared because 
of the chemicals. We have had to dig wells’ (Interview with community 
leader, Chouk village, 2015). As another villager pointed out, ‘Before the 
stream was deep and had many fish. But after the company cleared the 
land, the land fell into the stream and no water or fish there anymore. 
The small water that is left, the pesticides flow into the water and the 
fish die. They don't have fish anymore.’ (Interview with affected farmer, 
Chouk village, 2016). 
 
Lack of Employment, Debt, and Distress Out-Migration  
With the loss of farmland and restricted access on forests, farmers in 
need of livelihoods have been forced to either migrate or accept em-
ployment within the company that brutally expelled them. Approximate-
ly 50% of those who have remained in the villages work for the company 
as sugar cane cutters. However, these jobs are only available three 
months per year and only two people have been engaged in the factory 
in stable working conditions with work contracts. As expressed by one 
interviewee in a focus group, ‘There is sometimes work in the plantation 
from November to February. The rest of the time there is no work at all 
in the plantation. But we have to eat all year. If we just work at the com-
pany, how can we eat?’ (Interview, farmer, Chouk village, 2016). The sal-
ary is around 120 USD/month for hard working conditions that entail 
eight hour shifts (from 8am to 4pm). In fact, to maximally exploit the 
workers, the company does not offer fixed salaries. Instead people are 
paid according to the amount of sugar they collect – receiving 100 riel 
(0.025 USD) in return for 20 canes (one bunch). As a result of targets 
that require strenuous physical activity, there are also strict age limita-
tions: ‘No one in the household works in the company. I want to work 
there because I need money, but the company does not allow me be-
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cause I’m too old (30). They only want young people from 18-19.’ (In-
terview with farmer, Chouk village, 2016). 
    Moreover, villagers report that the company’s labour needs are low all 
year around: ‘They do not need many people to work at the plantation 
because they have machines. The machines cut the sugar cane, they spray 
the fertilizers, insecticides, etc.’ As the community leader reported, ‘It is 
not true that these companies give opportunities to the people. We have 
to let people know that this is blood sugar!’ (Interview with community 
leader, Chouk village, 2015). Additionally, since many villagers have filed 
lawsuits against the company, the scarce amount of employment that is 
available does not tend to go towards local communities: ‘They don't use 
many locals. For the workers, they use people from other provinces. 
Maybe because we complained to the company to get the land. So the 
company does not want us to work there’. (Interview with affected 
farmer, Chouk village, 2016). According to the affected local communi-
ties, the jobs that the company does require are mostly filled by migrants 
from other provinces who are not in direct conflict with the company. 
These people are provided housing within the company’s boundaries 
during the cutting season, but unfortunately I was not given permission 
to access the company grounds in order to enquire directly about their 
conditions.2  
As a result of the loss of the livelihoods of those living in the area, 
many families have been targeted by micro-credit schemes that have 
consequently pushed them into an unsurmountable amount of debt: 
‘The government offered the land to the concession in order to give a 
job opportunity to the people, but, in fact from this development the 
people suffer from the company and we lost our family members. Some 
move to work outside and we don't have income and now we are in 
debt’ (Interview with farmer, March 2015). In the event that they cannot 
pay back the accruing interest, their houses can be seized: ‘Most of the 
people here are in debt. We borrow money from micro-finance and we 
don't know what we are going to do. A few families don't have money to 
pay for the interest and the money lender want to take their house away’ 
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(Interview with landless farmer, Chouk village, 2016). The loss of these 
livelihoods, coupled with an increased amount of debt, has led to an ex-
ponential wave of out-migration that was unprecedented before the arri-
val of the company and is directly linked to the loss of land. As one 
farmer explained, ‘Before there was no migration because people don’t 
know how to do anything but farm, so the possibilities elsewhere are 
very scarce.’ (Interview with affected farmer, Chouk village, 2015). Ac-
cording to estimates from the community leader, approximately 30% of 
the population has left permanently since the arrival of the company. 
Almost everybody of a working age now migrates, especially women, 
while the largest cohort of the population remaining are the elderly and 
children. The main destinations of those leaving include the capital city 
of Phnom Penh, where women have possibilities of employment within 
the garment factories, Thailand, where this is work within the agricultural 
and construction sectors, and Malaysia, where women can work as 
housekeepers.  
 Conducting my interviews during the Khmer New Year enabled me 
to speak to migrants that had returned home for the vacation. They re-
ported extremely poor working conditions in their destination areas, in-
cluding sexual abuse, non-payment of salaries, and very precarious hous-
ing conditions. They equally reported that the profits they used to make 
via agriculture were substantially superior to those that they now make in 
their destination areas; most of them are unable to send any remittances 
home. All of them pointed out that the ‘land grab’ was the only reason 
they had ‘decided’ to leave: ‘Farming the land is much more profitable 
than working in Thailand. If we had agricultural land, we would not have 
left.’ (Interview with migrant, Koh Kong, 2015). As in many other rural 
areas in Cambodia experiencing similar situations, the remittances that 
migrants send are used primarily to pay off debt: ‘Yes, they send some 
money to the family. They use the money to pay the debts. They have 
debts from micro finance and money lenders…’ (Interview with farmer, 
Koh Kong, 2015).  
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Those people who have a relative choice whether or not to migrate, 
and who are not deeply indebted, do not desire to migrate to Phnom 
Penh. Life in the city is not perceived by the migrants as a way out of 
poverty, but rather as a deeper poverty trap: ‘I am not sure if I go to PP 
because we spend a lot for rent and get very little salary. Rent, electricity, 
water, etc. So not sure it’s worth it. That’s why I came back.’ (Interview 
with former migrant, Koh Kong, 2016) The majority of those who had 
migrated to Thailand did so irregularly, which means that when their ir-
regular status is identified by authorities, they are forced to return to 
Cambodia: ‘We go illegally to Thailand, so no passport to get in so it is 
dangerous, and we come back’ (Interview with farmer, Koh Kong, 
2015). Although there is still some remaining hope, if these communities 
are unable to get back their agricultural land, the population envisions a 
massive out-migration, used as a last resort. Under the current conditions 
within the areas of destination, migration is not perceived as a livelihood 
diversifying strategy for migrants nor for their non-migrant families, as 
the departure of relatives is often a traumatising experience: ‘I cry be-
cause I miss my children (woman crying during the interview) this is not 
a livelihood strategy…! It’s the only option we have, and it’s a very pain-
ful one’ (Interview with farmer, Chouk village, 2015). 
 
Overlapping Justifications and Expulsions 
As we have seen, people living in the area where the Koh Kong sugar 
concessions are located have suffered a multitude of overlapping expul-
sions that have been justified on both environmental protection and sug-
ar production grounds – and the confluence between the two. Although 
the aims of both the protected area and the environmental law enforce-
ment NGO is to protect biodiversity, and not to centralise resources into 
the hands of the government or violate human rights, the avoidance of 
politically sensitive issues has facilitated it. By turning a blind eye to the 
root causes of natural resource destruction in these ‘biodiversity 
hotspots’ - namely the endemic corruption of political elites and the 
poverty of local communities (Cincotta, Wisnewski, and Engelman 2000; 
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Fisher and Christopher 2007) – national and local authorities have not 
had to account for their predatory practices. The approach of purported-
ly protecting the environment while avoiding contentious land issues has 
been welcomed by the government. By having a justification to label 
vulnerable populations as ‘illegal settlers’, the government has been able 
to put the blame of deforestation and wildlife trade on local communities 
and on poor landless farmers all while reinforcing a culture of impunity 
for those that are responsible for logging and granting fake land certifi-
cates. 
Other important regulations such as the possession rights granted 
under the 2001 Land Law, the sub-decree regulation on not permitting 
more than 10,000 hectares to a single concession, as well as obligations 
to conduct Environmental Impact Assessments, have been circumvented 
for sugar production. The rise in production of this flex crop for the 
global market – linked to growing demands for ethanol – has taken place 
hand-in-hand with the expulsion of people from their farmlands and the 
consequent loss of livelihoods this entails. Despite promises to meet lo-
cal labour demands, the company has offered minimal employment with 
respect to both quantity and quality, as it is seasonal in nature and re-
quires a strong physique, thereby excluding the elderly and women. Alt-
hough the majority of the local populations did not lose their residential 
land, this case shows that physical eviction is not necessary for expul-
sion. In fact, the loss of livelihoods caused by the loss of farmland and 
access to forests, coupled with the absence of alternative adequate op-
portunities, has led many farmers to migrate elsewhere in order to ensure 
their livelihoods and to contribute towards the debt repayment for those 
family remaining.  
However, the act of migration for the most vulnerable can hardly be 
considered as an adaptation strategy, given the precarious situations they 
find within the destination areas. In fact, migration is perceived locally as 
a last resort option, often leading to situations of bonded labour abroad 
with great risks to their human security. Given that the widespread ex-
tent of land grabs in Cambodia, and that Social Land Concessions 
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(SLCs) originally established as an instrument to mitigate the negative 
potential consequences of ELCs, we now turn to a different case where 
both SLCs and ELCs have overlapped with one another.  
 
5.3 Kampong Thom: A Perpetual Movement of Broken 
Promises.  
The Santuk District of the Kraya Commune in Kampong Thom Prov-
ince was featured at the forefront of media and NGO attention in 2009, 
when families were evicted from the Bonteay Rongeang village. Their 
eviction came following the granting of an ELC of 8,100 hectares to the 
Tan Bien Rubber Development Group (part of the Vietnamese Rubber 
Group) under a cooperation program between the governments of Vi-
etnam and Cambodia. The military and police evicted 1,750 families who 
had reportedly been living in the area since 2004, due to promises that a 
Social land Concession would be granted to them 3  (Interview 
LICADHO 2015; Titthara 2012). Given that the evicted families had 
been living in the area for a relatively short amount of time, while other 
families had been living the area for a longer period and were not evict-
ed, it is first important to understand what brought whom to the area, 
with what rights, and – ultimately – with what variegated impacts.  
First, it is important to note that the province of Kampong Thom 
had been completely devastated during bombardments by Americans 
under the Pol Pot regime (Diepart 2007, 45). Although prior to the civil 
war there were a few families settling in the area, during the 1980s and 
1990s Kampong Thom became a battlefield and many of these families 
were forced to leave again. It was only after the fall of the Pol Pot regime 
that populations - such as those from other districts in Kampong Thom 
and the neighbouring province of Kampong Cham - began to settle in 
the area. This sparsely populated area contained abundant forested land 
that, during the transition period, the government encouraged for clear-
ing for agricultural production. The firstcomers to the area (around 30 to 
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40 families) settled in the village of Son Sang (today known as the old 
village) in 1993 (see the map below). When the Tan Bien Rubber com-
pany arrived in 2009, there were approximately 97 families in Son Sang 
and by 2014, there were 176 families. According to the records from the 
village chief, the majority of people arrived to the village between 2011 
and 2012 in order to buy land (Records from the village chief of Son 
Sang, 2016). As interviewees recall there was no out-migration at that 
time, due to the availability of land and the demand for labour. 
Map 10: Location of Studied Villages in Kampong Thom 
 
Source: Image from Google Earth. Village locations from Open Devel-
opment Cambodia. ELC boundaries (red) from LICADHO. 
 
A separate stream of people, consisting of disabled people, widows, and 
orphans, started arriving to the area in 2006. Previous to their arrival, a 
former influential member of the military, Mr. Kim Kheang, had set up 
Disabled War Veterans Association for Agricultural Development 
(AHADA) in Kampong Thom and promised people that after clearing 
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the forest, they would be able to request a Social Land Concession. The 
word quickly spread around the country, and hundreds of families immi-
grated to the area, with 1,200 families settling in a village called Bonteay 
Rongean. Although most people came from neighbouring province of 
Kampong Cham, disabled landless migrants also came from other prov-
inces. As one villager underlined, ‘People came from everywhere because 
they had no land or jobs in their home villages’ (Interview, farmer, Kam-
pong Thom, 2016). After having cleared the forest, families received 
plots ranging from three to five hectares depending on the size of the 
family. The families grew cashew nuts, mangoes, rice and collected non-
timber products from the forest for primarily their own consumption. 
However, as members from the community recalled, ‘We all knew that 
this was state land, but the leader told us that it was ok and that if we 
held on to the land for 5 years, we would be able to ask for land titles4… 
He gave us no land card or title or anything, but he promised us that we 
would eventually get one…and we believed him…’ (Interview, commu-
nity leader, Serey Mongkoul, 2015). 
However, although AHADA had been recognised as an association 
by the Kampong Thom Provincial government, it never gained recogni-
tion or permission from the central government. Moreover, according to 
the village chief of the current relocation site, the area had long been dis-
cussed for future ELCs: ‘We had polled the area of Tan Bien and other 
two rubber concessions (Ba Ria and Gold Foison) already in 1999. I was 
part of the polling team (maps were shown to me) and the map was sent 
to the government, so they could issue these land concessions…. The 
problem did not start with the company (as many NGO’s and media re-
ported), but with the leader of the disabled association that encouraged 
people to clear land that was not his and made false promises to the 
people. Because of him all these people were illegal’ (Interview with vil-
lage chief, Serey Mongkoul, 2016). Through this case, we see not only 
the confusion that the Land Law generated concerning the meaning of 
‘possession’ versus ‘proprietorship’, but also how influential self-
proclaimed leaders exploited this confusion for their own benefit. 
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As villagers explained in a focus group discussion, ‘The chief of the 
disabled association was selling land to the poor (and not only granting 
land to the disabled) so this is why we came. The disabled paid only 10-
12 USD/hectare, but the poor who were not handicapped paid him 
much more. He completely cheated us!’ (Focus group, Serey Mongkoul, 
2016). The village chief went further stating that: ‘He had interests and 
got lots of money from the disabled and poor peoples. He was selling 
some plots of land for 200-500 USD’ (Interview, village chief, Serey 
Mongkoul, 2016). However, according to the village chief, the provincial 
authorities had indeed already prepared agricultural land in Kbal Lan for 
these disabled peoples: ‘The disabled peoples’ chief had agreed but went 
to the company area anyway to clear land…this way he could make more 
money.’ The leader of ADAHA was eventually imprisoned and he con-
tinues to serve his sentence. However, the villagers condemn the lack of 
information provided by authorities during this time: ‘Why didn’t they 
(the authorities) stop us before if that was the case?... It was great for the 
companies and local authorities that we already cleared land, that way 
they had less work to do when they were finally here!’ (Focus group, 
Serey Mongkoul, 2016).  
When Tan Bien Rubber arrived, families were obliged to accept com-
pensation (200 USD/hectare) and to relocate to the designated village of 
Phum Thmay, which would later be divided into two villages: Serrey 
Mongkoul and Sein Serrey. On the day the company arrived, the com-
munities set on fire some of the company’s machinery as a way of pro-
testing; however this was not part of a long-term strategy to reclaim their 
land. In response to this spontaneous form of resistance, the authorities 
blockaded the area, leaving the communities without any food supply 
(see Cismas and Paramita 2015). Out of 1,200 families, 602 ‘accepted’ the 
compensation money in exchange for their relocation, while the others 
left the area altogether without compensation. Unsatisfied with the 
amount and quality of land that they would receive, many returned to 
their home provinces or migrated directly to other places. The families 
that relocated to the new village were granted plots of residential land of 
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20 x 40 meters; they were also promised 1 hectare of agricultural land for 
households of 1 to 5 members, or 1.5 hectares for households of 5 to 7 
members. However, the granting of the agricultural land was delayed, did 
not happen, or ignited new conflicts. On the one hand, only those who 
had influence and money were granted their agricultural plots (Focus 
groups, Serey Mongkoul and Sein Serrey, 2016). On the other hand, 
many of the farm plots granted by the authorities overlapped with plots 
that were already occupied by previous settlers. In light of the lack of 
agricultural land, many families were in a situation of despair and decided 
to sell their residential land and move out entirely.  
In 2016, nearly seven years after the relocation took place, there were 
only 310 families left in the village. Those remaining possessed the fol-
lowing land status: 39 families had been granted agricultural land and had 
no subsequent conflict; 49 families were granted a plot of land that over-
lapped with other claimers (examined below); and 110 families were as of 
yet still not granted any agricultural land(Records from the village chief). 
These families claimed that other families had paid the authorities to re-
ceive their agricultural land. With such rampant corruption practices, the 
most economically vulnerable are unlikely to ever receive this ‘promised’ 
land. As one villager stated, ‘Those who don’t have anything, don’t get 
anything’ (Interview with farmer, April 2016). Moreover, the agricultural 
land that has been granted is located 10km away from residential land 
site. Given that most people do not have a motorcycle or other means of 
transport, this means they are effectively unable to use their agricultural 
land. Additionally, all 49 respondents unanimously claimed that the 
quality of the land that had been granted was extremely poor for farming 
and that they are also in fear of having this land grabbed once again by a 
Cambodian business tycoon.5 As a result, the relocated families that re-
main in the village have had to enter into wage-labour. Even those fami-
lies that were granted agricultural plots have diversified their livelihoods 
by becoming wage-labourers on the plantation of ‘the rich’, working for 
the company (when there is employment), and relying on loans and re-
mittances sent by migrant family members. 
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Stacked Claims: Whose Land is this?  
Given the multiplicity of actors involved in land grabs in this landscape, 
I decided to examine the contested plots that were granted to the 49 
families from Serey Mongkoul (located around 10km away at the other 
side of Tan Bien Rubber) and speak to the previous owners. Many of 
them were living in a village called Song San where people had started to 
settle in the early 1990s, yet no land titles had been granted there either. 
As their village chief explained, ‘The problem is Serey Mongkoul is very 
strange… They were relocated and then they were granted agricultural 
land, but all that land already had owners so there were a lot of conflicts 
with the first owners of the land. We went to meet the provincial officers 
and they told us that we needed to share the land. Because this was a 
problem, they put much pressure on people so that they would sell land 
to the rich from Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham provinces. I 
didn’t personally sell it but many people in the village did ...The authori-
ties actually forced them to do so and to split the money with the villag-
ers from Serey Mongkoul. For every hectare of land, they would get 
1,000 USD and then give 500 USD to the villagers in Serey Mongkoul. 
Some people from this village went back to their home town because 
they had no land and many from Serey Mongkoul also moved out be-
cause their conflicted land was sold.’ (Interview with village chief, Son 
Sang, 2016). Other villagers from Son Sang clarified that there was an 
explicit logic within this, ‘The local authorities sold the land that was 
meant to be for Serey Mongkoul and Sein Serrey villagers to the rich, 
then took the money and then distributed land to villagers that already 
had two owners on it. This is where all the problems began.’ (Focus 
group, Son Sang, 2016).  
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Map 11: Map of Contested and Granted Plots  
 
Source: Village Chief Son Sang Village. The plots with multiple owners 
appear with a red dot. Photo by author, 2016. 
 
 
Many inhabitants from Thmor Saleang (the first village where the newly-
arrived migrants had settled) explained that they had been compensated 
for the land that had been allocated to the concession, but that they were 
entangled in other land contestations that are rooted in the conflicting 
interests of the local authorities, the forest administration, and ‘the rich’ 
(mainly middle income and higher income investors): ‘People here don’t 
have problems with the company, but with the rich. They have rubber 
plantations of 20-30 hectares. They start planting rubber trees and cassa-
va on villagers’ land and then start making complaints to each other 
about who owns the land. The rich have titles but not the poor’ (Inter-
view, farmer, Thmor Saleang, 2015). This is also the case in Song San 
village (the village to where people were relocated), where stacked claims 
are between more than two owners and beyond conflicts with the Forest 
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Administration. Rather, these land contestations also entail grabs by the 
powerful: ‘The rich said that this was their land. They told the families: 
you are all here illegally and some went to file a complaint’ (Interview 
with farmer, Song San village, 2016). But the rich had somehow received 
the land titles that the local farming populations had long been request-
ing: ‘The rich showed us land titles that were official. We only had land 
cards and they were useless…I heard that if I grow crops for five years 
someone will issue a land card, but I’ve been told so many things I don’t 
know what to believe’ (Interview, farmer, Song San, 2016).  
Expectedly, those without land titles continue to fear additional 
‘grabbing’ by the powerful economic elites: ‘Most people have problem 
with the rich tycoons.6  The rich pay the police and put demarcation 
poles down. The police have guns and try to kick people out. Now it’s 
near the national elections so the police stopped doing this, but it will 
start again after the elections.’ (Interview farmer, Thmor Saleang, 2015). 
In the meantime, the fear of having their land grabbed remains: ‘People 
are scared and worried everyday thinking that another company might 
come, or that the powerful will show up with cards even if no one has 
ever seen them in the area before’ (Interview with village chief, Song San 
village, 2016).  Many of these ‘rich grabbers’ (as they are referred to in 
the area) arrived in 2012 when the previous villagers had given up on 
finding solutions, were deeply indebted and thus willing to sell their land 
holdings: ‘We heard that we could buy land here from the first comers so 
we bought between 5 and 20 hectares: at 1,300 USD/hectare... The 
firstcomers were selling the land because they had no money. At the time 
for the disaster from others, the rich started coming to buy land and we 
got land authorizations from the district level…We had some savings 
and thought that this was a good investment’ (Focus group, Thmor Sale-
an village, 2016). For the most part, the ‘rich grabbers’ originated from 
Kampong Cham and had been business owners prior to moving to the 
area. Today, they serve as plantation managers and hire some locals, 
mostly migrants, to work for them. 
 
 Expulsions and Destruction: Overlapping Scenarios 189 
Environmental, What?  
Although environmental discourses flood political legitimation narratives 
around rubber at the national scales, it turns out that projects managers 
themselves lack awareness of their existence. As the Kampong Thom 
Rubber plantation manager explained to me, ‘We came here in order to 
improve the economy. When we came here there was a lot of forest. So, 
the first thing we had to do was to clear it in order to be able to plant 
rubber trees…’ (Interview with plantation manager of Tan Bien Rubber, 
2016). However, the plantation manager admitted that he had never 
heard of the legal requirement of conducting an Environmental Impact 
Assessment prior to commencing their operations: ‘Environmen-
tal…What? We are legal in Cambodia and have full rights to be here. 
There was no need for us to do that and nobody asked us to.’ (Interview, 
plantation manager of Tan Bien Rubber, 2016). This illuminates the deep 
divide and ambiguity that occurs as projects that have been justified by 
several actors at multiple scales interact on the ground. There was abso-
lutely no intention, or claim made by Tan Bien Rubber company to be 
environmentally sustainable. The Vietnamese Rubber Group (of which 
the company is a subsidiary), however, has understood the importance of 
environmental branding. As a result, it has advertised its operations ac-
cordingly and partnered with the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC, 
which is ‘a global not-for-profit organisation that sets standards for what 
constitutes a responsibly managed forest, environmentally and socially 
(Forest Stewardship Council® n.d.).  
In an attempt to protect the remaining forest (despite difficulties in 
determining where this remaining forest lies), and to reforest the area, 
the Forest Administration (FA) began to reclaim back land from villagers 
in 2006. As one villager explained, ‘Villagers have problems with the FA, 
not with the companies. They put a lot of pressure to get land back and 
accuse villagers of illegally clearing the forest… This is true because the 
government never gave land to the villagers, but then they give it all to 
their friends and to the companies…but we are Khmer. If we can’t have 
land in our country, what do we do?!’ (Interview with affected villager, 
190 CHAPTER 5 
 
Thmor Saleang, 2016). Whilst the FA’s mission is to replant trees on 
contested land and to protect the remaining forest, it seems that other 
lucrative activities are part of their operations as well. As expressed by 
one villager, ‘They grow trees, but they also rent part of the land to peo-
ple to grow cassava…(‘Is that part of their mission,’ I asked?)…They 
don’t grow cassava themselves, but they rent the land for others to do it.’ 
cassava’ (Interview, affected farmer, Song San village, 2016).  As several 
other villagers conveyed, the FA’s involvement in growing trees was a 
cover up for these other more lucrative activities: ‘They grow trees on 
the outside (where you can see) and then on the inside, they clear the 
forest and rent the land to others to grow cassava’ (Focus group, Song 
San, 2016).   
However, while the FA capitalises on growing cassava on land that 
ought to have been allocated for conservation purposes, there are mini-
mal complaints filed due to fear of the repercussions: ‘The FA officials 
hire workers to plant cassava and cashew nuts for them…But if we 
complain, we get arrested. So we don’t know what to do… The FA waits 
for all the land to be cleared and then comes to take it away from us. 
When there are trees they don’t care. They wait for the land to be clear 
so they can make business.’ (Interview with a Tan Bien Rubber company 
employee, 2016). According to the FA, within this area they have re-
claimed on average 100 hectares per month since 2014, which has been 
facilitated by increased budget from the government. However, they de-
ny using the confiscated land for cassava production (Interview, Forest 
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Figure 13: Forest Clearence on a Contested Land Plot in Song San Village 
 
Source: photo by author, 2016 
 
Adverse Incorporation 
As in the other cases examined, a strong justification for the rubber con-
cession has been employment creation. However, the amount and quality 
of jobs promised by the company have not reflected the reality. Accord-
ing to the plantation manager, they employ 600 permanent workers and 
around 100 seasonal workers. Around 30-40 of the technical and man-
agement staff are Vietnamese, while the rest are Cambodian workers. 
However, of these Cambodian workers, the majority are migrants from 
other provinces in Kampong Thom or from Kampong Cham, as op-
posed to being local workers. These migrants arrive to the plantation ar-
ea with their families and the company provides housing, schooling, and 
healthcare for them. As many local villagers explained, the company pre-
fers migrant workers because they settle and live inside the concession 
area and thus are always available. When the company arrived, many em-
ployment opportunities arose for migrants looking for employment: ‘In 
2009 there were lots of jobs to clear the forest and plant rubber trees, 
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but since a year there is hardly anything to do…Before there were 
around 100 families in this block, now only 16 remain…In the other 
blocks it’s the same situation. All of those who had a house or some land 
moved away… (Of) those that stay here, often their husband or wife left 
to work abroad’ (Focus group, workers inside of the Tan Bien Rubber 
concession, 2016). According to the migrant workers living within the 
concession, as well as a few locals who work for the company, the sala-
ries are quite unequal: ‘The company has no policy. One day they tell you 
5 USD and then at the end they give you 1.5 USD. They cheat us all the 
time. And we have no other jobs to do…Some people try to go outside 
to work on cassava plantations, but we cannot go too much because we 
get into trouble. We are allowed (to leave) just when there is no job in 
the company’ (Focus group, workers inside of the Tan Bien Rubber con-
cession, 2016). 
 According to the plantation manager, since 2015 the company no 
longer needs workers because rubber prices have continuously devalued 
in price: ‘While before you could get 6,000 USD for a ton of rubber, 
now you can only get 1,500 USD. There is an oversupply of rubber and 
China (our main market) does not need so much anymore. The same is 
true with cassava….’ (Interview with plantation manager of Tan Bien 
Rubber, 2016). Although the rubber trees within the Tan Bien Rubber 
plantation had reached maturity, the low market prices have effectively 
translated into limited rubber tapping by the company, as they wait for 
higher market prices before proceeding. This of course has profound 
implications on the extent of employment that they are able to provide. 
As the plantation manager noted, ‘The prices are very low and we are 
losing a lot of money. The populations might not be aware of this and 
they just complain and complain that we don’t give jobs, but we are also 
losing out (money) here’ (Interview with plantation manager of Tan Bien 
Rubber, 2016).  The low market prices for rubber have translated into 
lower wages for remaining workers: ‘Other years we would make 125 
USD/month because we had jobs every day. But this year, not much 
work and (we) only make 25 USD/month’ (Focus group inside of Tan 
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Bien Rubber concession, 2016). To put these numbers into perspective, 
it is worth noting that while there is no minimum salary established for 
agricultural workers in Cambodia, the garment sector, which has been 
target of many regulations, established its minimum salary at 182 
USD/month in 2018 (Thul 2018). 
In the case of the rubber plantations, it is those who have greater 
technical knowledge on rubber and a permanent contract that are more 
comfortable financially and content to live within a concession that 
grants them schooling, healthcare, and housing. In fact, a few of these 
workers stated that, ‘We are very happy here…we make much more than 
we would elsewhere, and our house, electricity and food is covered for. 
When we have enough money and time, we can even go and farm our 
own land outside the concession…For other people it is more difficult, 
but if you have knowledge it is good. Both my wife and I have stable 
employment here and there would be no point for us to go anywhere 
else’ (Focus group with Tan Bien Rubber workers, 2016). However, such 
workers with stable employment at the company represent a minority. 
The large majority have deeply suffered from the crop busts linked to 
the declining price of rubber. As the company representative explained, 
‘The price of rubber has gone down so much, we just cannot afford (or 
need) any more workers’ (Interview, plantation manager of Tan Bien 
Rubber, 2016).  
The vulnerability of the landless migrant workers is compounded by 
the amount of debt they possess. As a result, their ability to migrate has 
diminished considerably and many remain involuntarily immobile within 
the concessions: ‘I really want to go to Thailand or Malaysia, but I have 
no money to go there…I’m not happy with the livelihood, but I have no 
choice. I have no land back home. My husband left…This year everyone 
that has a house or land at home left. But all those that don’t are still 
stuck here. The problem is that we do not have a permanent job, but we 
owe a lot of money to the moneylender’ (Focus group, Tan Bien Rubber 
workers, 2016). 
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Family Farms for Locals and Migrants 
In general terms, local villagers preferred to work on the plantations of 
‘the rich’ rather than in the rubber concession, as these tend to offer 
higher salaries and more stable employment. However, rich landowners 
admitted that they have a preference for migrant workers: ‘Our workers 
come from other districts in the same province… I pay them 4 
USD/day. If I have urgent jobs, I pay 5 USD to the locals but, if not, I 
take migrants because I can pay them less…’ (Interview with a landown-
er, Kampong Thom, 2016). Migrants are also regarded as more compli-
ant, because they have been removed from their social nets. The mi-
grants working on these plantations are landless, vulnerable people 
whose only option is to accept harsh living conditions: ‘I came because 
my husband is sick and we had to sell all our land in order to cure 
him…We have been here for nearly 10 years and the land owner con-
structed a house for us inside the plantation. We work every day of the 
month (we have no weekend breaks) and we get paid 4 USD/day…All 
the workers around here are migrants…I want to leave and to have my 
own land, but I just can’t afford it…Most of the money we make is to 
pay back debts that we had before…’ (Migrant worker from Kampong 
Cham, working on a rich landowner’s plantation, 2016). 
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Figure 14:  Home of a Migrant Worker on a Family Farm (right) and Inside 
Tan Bien Rubber (left and bottom) 
 
Source: photos by author, 2016. 
 
However, the situation within the cassava and rubber plantations of the 
middle-income and richer landowners following the crop busts is similar 
to those that the company has been experiencing. The recent fall in cas-
sava prices has affected poor, middle and rich farmers alike: ‘The price 
of cassava last year was of 300 riel/kilo. This year its 150 riel/kilo be-
cause Vietnam buys it at a cheaper price’ (Interview, village chief, Song 
San village, 2016). One of the rich landowners explained that ‘The prices 
are going down because China and Vietnam have a conflict in the China 
sea and the cassava must be transported across Vietnam to reach them’. 
(Interview with rich landowner, Thmor Saleang village, 2016). In other 
words, the combination of the shifting market prices and inconsistent 
government policies, has caused the cassava boom to go bust: ‘Before 
the trucks would carry 40 tons, now the government officials don’t allow 
this and trucks can only carry 20 tons. So, the cassava buyer needs to pay 
a lot for gasoline. Its government policy that doesn’t make much sense’ 
(Interview with rich landowner, Thmor Saleang village, 2016). On top of 
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this, the drought that struck Cambodia in 2016 severely strained cassava 
production: ‘The droughts harm the cassava and the price of cassava 
keeps decreasing…. It’s very difficult for everyone, especially the land 
poor that depend almost exclusively on this crop for their livelihoods 
and there is less work on the plantations’ (Interview, farmer, Serey 
Mongkoul, 2016).  
 
Increased Debt and Out-migration  
Although moneylenders have long existed in the area, microcredit lend-
ers have entered much more recently. Today, nearly all households in the 
area are indebted after borrowing from the Cambodia Micro-Finance 
Association (AMK). As one villager explained, ‘This is the first year that 
they (micro-credits) entered the area and families were happy at the start 
with the microcredit, but then the price of cassava was so bad that they 
couldn’t pay back to the micro-finance and had to leave’ (Interview, 
farmer, Serey Mongkoul, 2016).  It is important to note, however, the 
differentiated social impacts of credit: whilst it allowed middle-income 
farmers and richer landowners to invest increasingly in cash crops, it 
pushed the poor and landless into increased debt. In other words, while 
land investors attribute their increased land holdings to the credit they 
received, the poorest attribute their dispossession to the debt accrued as 
a result of microcredit: ‘A lot of people with debts to the microfinance 
are selling and leaving…They don’t really have another choice’ (Inter-
view, local land broker, Serey Mongkoul, 2016). 
As a result of the loss of land to multiple actors and increased indebt-
edness in the village of Song Sang, today there are only 101 families re-
maining out of the 174 that were living there in 2014. The majority have 
migrated to Phnom Penh to work in the garment factories or within 
construction, while an increasing number are also making the move to 
Thailand and Malaysia. Data from Serey Mongkoul and Sein Serrei 
shows that while 607 families moved to the relocation site in 2007, only 
310 remain today: ‘Nearly all households have migrants. Maybe 30% of 
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families had migrant members before and today more than 70% do. On-
ly older people and the children stay here. Some women are here because 
they have small babies, but their husbands have already migrated’ (Inter-
view with community leader, Sein Serrei, 2015). However, due to poor 
working conditions abroad, some of these migrants have had to return 
home. One 25-year-old woman explained that she had been manipulated 
by a migrant broker to engage in trainings  in order to be employed as a 
house worker, which – in the end – resulted in a job that was close to 
constituting bonded labour: ‘My passport was paid by a Malaysian com-
pany and I had to pay back the company 130 USD per month out of 250 
earnings. I got up at 5am and only had 5-minute breaks… Working 
hours from 5am to 1pm, a 5 minute break for coffee and bread and then 
from 1pm to 9pm.  I did this for 2 years and 8 months. I would save up 
everything I could and after a year I was able to send 1,500 USD to my 
mother who was taking care of my children. But I left because I was so 
tired, so tired…I could not stay anymore… Now I work in cassava plan-
tation and take care of my children, but my husband has had to leave to 
work in another province’ (Interview, returned migrant from Malaysia, 
2016).  
  
Contradictory Justifications and Variegated Impacts 
As indicated above, the area wherein the Tan Bien Rubber concession is 
located has been inhabited by people with very different backgrounds 
and socio-economic profiles. Those most adversely affected by the arri-
val of the concessions were the disabled, widows, and orphans that were 
deceived into believing that their claims for land within a Social Land 
Concession (SLC) would be recognised, which would enable them to 
finally access land and have a fresh start following years of warfare and 
loss. And although the mechanism of SLCs was indeed designed to re-
distribute land to the poorest segments of society, this case indicates that 
powerful elites have also used the mechanism to manipulate the most 
vulnerable to their advantage. The false promises to establish SLCs in the 
area attracted hundreds of migrant families searching for safe access to 
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land. However, and rather than uphold their claims to land, authorities 
have considered many of these people to be environmental criminals. In 
other words, not only were the promises of receiving land access unrec-
ognised under law, but these migrants also lost everything they had when 
the claimant – in this case the company – was granted the land through 
for a rubber ELC. Many of those who relocated to the designated village 
continue to wait for access to farmland to support their livelihoods, 
while those that have been granted farmland have discovered that it of-
ten overlaps with that of previous occupants.  Through this continuous 
chain of broken promises, these landless migrants have had few options, 
other than to work on other farms (in the event that such work is availa-
ble), to borrow money from microcredit lending bodies, or to migrate in 
order to be able to pay back their debts. Those who were granted farm-
land continue to fear that the possibility of yet again losing it to business 
tycoons. For those people who did not lose their farmland (mostly the 
first comers to the area). the company’s promises of employment have 
not materialised and the livelihoods of these people have worsened as a 
result of being unable to access forests upon which they previously relied 
on for their livelihoods.  
Additionally, green justifications have been deployed – albeit incon-
sistently across scales and actors – to justify the expansion of rubber and 
to reclaim land from vulnerable populations. Although the discourse sur-
rounding the green benefits of rubber have spread at the national level as 
a means to justify the expansion of rubber plantations, these rubber 
plantations come at the expense of the natural forests that they replace, 
which contain the most potent environmental benefits. Additionally, the 
Forest Administration, has been reclaiming land from villagers, often in 
order to further extract resources through cassava production. However, 
and although cassava production has been one of the few alternative 
livelihoods for small scale and landless farmers, their dependence on this 
cash crop has made farmers increasingly vulnerable to market fluctua-
tions. At the time of my visit, the crash of both rubber and cassava pric-
es was inducing strong effects on poor, middle-income and high-income 
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farmers alike – with those most vulnerable evidently suffering the high-
est consequences. It is within this context that forced out-migration has 
become the norm, rather than the exception.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated that narrowly focusing the investigation on 
particular types of land grabs in order to understand their justifications 
and their impacts can only produce a partial understanding of the more 
complex and interrelated dynamics that are experienced on the ground. 
Not only do different ‘types’ of land grabs co-exist and overlap within 
the same landscapes (Hunsberger et al. 2016), serving to advertently or 
inadvertently (re)accommodate one another – as we have seen in all 
three cases analysed – but access to resources has been (re)shaped by 
overlapping, and often contradictory, environmental and migratory nar-
ratives and realities. In this scenario, attributing migration to a single land 
grab or one land grab to a single justification is not possible.  
The evidence provided in this chapter shows that land grabs are not 
usually the result of one single justification or driver, but rather the com-
plex consequence of multiple land use changes occurring concurrently 
where diverse narratives overlap and clash with one another. Moreover, 
the very same land grab might receive very different justifications de-
pending on the actor and the scale involved. However, as political inter-
ests in managing population flows and environmental dilemmas increase, 
so does the strength of environmental and/or migratory narratives to 
justify particular resource grabs. However, just because certain land grabs 
they have been justified at the international and national scales by a par-
ticular green or migratory discourse, this does not mean that the dis-
courses travel all the way down to the landscape level or materialise as 
such. In fact, the narratives often become lost in translation.  
Land grabs must necessarily be accommodated within and between 
earlier cycles of national and local processes of extraction and protection. 
They do not replace earlier extractive and protective ventures complete-
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ly, but rather build upon each other as layers that can only partly be sepa-
rated (Escobar 1995). It is not only ‘flex crops’ (Borras, Franco, et al. 
2016), such as sugar and biofuels that are on the rise, but ‘flex grabs’. 
Flex grabs can be defined as those that use flexible discursive frames to 
give one same intervention many different meanings depending on the 
purpose of the actors that use the narrative.  Land grabs may be legiti-
mised by environmental or migratory motives by some actors, while con-
tested for environmental destruction and expulsion by others; they may 
have socio-environmental benefits at one scale but involve socio-
environmental harms at another. For example, although rubber has been 
greened in Cambodia at the national scale in order to legitimise its spec-
tacular rise – a justification that is contested at the international level – 
this has not translated at the company level – in other words, with the 
implementing subsidiary company, Kampong Thom Rubber, not vehicu-
lating green discourses, even when the Vietnamese Rubber Group, of 
which it is a part, does. Moreover, although certain green discourses can 
and are used to legitimise land grabs, as for example was the case with 
biofuels in Senhuile, this does not mean that the company will follow 
through with the intended green aims that justified its existence in the 
first place. In both the cases of Senhuile and Koh Kong, we have seen 
how the placement of the company’s operations inside or contiguous to 
a protected area has actually facilitated their expansion.  
As land grabs shift from one purpose to another they may lose or 
gain environmental and/or migratory justifications in the process. If we 
do not disaggregate interests at multiple scales, then we are forced to in-
fer motivations from seemingly objective or external characteristics of 
the investments or investors themselves, such as that biofuel investments 
are presumed to be motivated by climate mitigation, state-led projects in 
the name of food security (Keene et al. 2015, 132), and/or migration 
control by security interests, etc. Additionally, the fact that many re-
source grabs overlap – and collaborate – with one another, makes isolat-
ing the justification and impacts of one from the other particularly ardu-
ous. This is the case, for example, in Koh Kong, where the location of 
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the concession next to a biodiversity hotspot has led to cooperation tac-
tics between the protections aims of an environmental NGO with the 
extractive aims of the sugar concessions. Moreover, despite the green 
narratives they carry, all of the diverse land grabs studied here have had 
particularly dire environmental impacts at the local level.  
The migratory patterns we are seeing today depend on a wide range 
of factors that include the cumulated vulnerabilities created by all of the 
overlaps that previous projects have created, the tenure arrangement in 
place, the employment opportunities in other sectors, as well as the 
broader economic and political situation of the country in which they are 
located and the labour demands of destination countries. In terms of mi-
gratory justifications given, although the argument of employment crea-
tion - and its linkages to preventing out-migration – has been strongly 
mobilised at the international and national scales, this has not tended to 
translate into a greater number of employment opportunities at the local 
level. Different waves of in-migration to the landscapes have all occurred 
in the midst of the search for land. Whilst not normally considered ‘mi-
grants’, investors are in fact the migrants that most importantly define 
subsequent environmental and migratory impacts. Migration can have 
negative environmental impacts, but the strongest impacts do not come 
from the migrants that we often identify as migrants, but rather from the 
movements of a select few powerful actors.  
Even if not all local people have lost all or part of their land as a re-
sult of diverse land grabs, as possibilities for the agricultural expansion of 
farmers and pastoralists diminish, and as people lose their previous ac-
cess to forest resources and non-timber products, they too suffer a mul-
tifaceted ‘package of loses’ that has led to diverse forms of ‘displacement 
in place’ (Lubkemann 2008). Although not all of the populations have 
encountered ‘enclosure’ or ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 
2005), the penetration of corporate capital has had profound impacts on 
local livelihoods (Hall et al. 2015). This form of in situ displacement 
within an ever shrinking area has pushed the vast majority into ‘semi-
proletarisation’, thereby making them dependant on wage labour, on 
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labour migration, and/or on debt. Expulsion and displacement are not in 
fact solely about the loss of residential land. Land grabs displace people 
in place by displacing the possibilities for livelihoods that people had 
prior to the land grabs occuring. For example, the loss of access routes 
to water resources and grazing land that Senhuile has created, has forced 
pastoralists not only to travel longer distances, but also immobilised 
them due toy the lack of opportunities and options for their future. In 
both Koh Kong and Kampong Thom, those who have not had their 
residential land taken away, have still experienced reduced freedom to 
move as their access to forests has become restrained, due to both 
conservation and rubber and sugar production. In other cases, people 
have also lost their residential land and been physically expelled. 
Although other options have been made available (such as a relocation 
site for those expelled in Koh Kong and Kampong Thom), the quality 
and quantity of the replacement land they have received has made their 
subsistence unsustainable.  
Although ‘inclusion’ within the established concessions and 
plantations has occurred for some villagers, the outcomes of such inclu-
sion for local people are highly dependent on the relative assets they 
maintained prior to their incorporation (Hall et al. 2015) as well as on the 
terms of such incorporation (McCarthy 2010). For example, those that 
have landholdings in Kampong Thom and Koh Kong sometimes work 
on plantations as an additional source of income. However, those that 
depend solely on wage labour to make ends meet find that the 
seasonality and conditions experienced on such plantations are 
insufficient for their livelihoods. Even for those migrants or villagers that 
were included within plantation work, crop busts that have occurred in 
all cases have ultimately led to high unemployment rates, leading 
gradually to the most iconic scenario of exclusion, which occurs when 
the ‘land is needed but the labour is not’ (Li 2011).  
In fact, the people who lose land are often not the same people that 
gain employement (Li 2011). This is because there is a preference from 
employers to hire migrant workers given that many locals are involved in 
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direct conflicts with the companies and that migrants are more 
compliant due to their lack of social ties to support them. In a context of 
progressive loss of entitlements and employment opportunities, in Koh 
Kong and Kampong Thom villagers have become increasingly indebted 
and have had no other option than to sell their small landholdings and to 
move out of the area. In rural areas of the Global South, together with 
(legal and extra-legal) expropriations, indebtedness represents the third 
main mechanism of ‘primitive accumulation’ (Gerber 2014, 734). In 
Cambodia, micro-credit has grown exponentially since the mid-1990’s 
and has made Cambodia one of the top five countries in the world in 
terms of microfinance borrowers as a percentage of the total population 
(Bylander 2014). In the case of Senhuile, the lack of materialisation of 
employment opportunities has translated into an increasing trend of out-
migration.  
Importantly, across all cases, it has been family farming – and not 
large-scale holdings – which have been able to provide the most stable 
employment opportunities and attract or retain migrants. Although the 
conditions and salaries in small-scale farms are not necessarily better 
than those found within the concessions, the stability of the 
employment, and the loyalty of family and small-scale farms towards 
their employees, makes them a more desirable option than working 
inside plantations. This coincides with findings from recent studies on 
rural development that have refuted the argument that pathways of 
development are decoupled from land and farming and that a beneficial 
access to land for the poor does play a complementary role in poverty 
reduction (Sunam and McCarthy 2015; Li 2009). Even if migration tran-
sition models (Zelinsky 1971) (largely based on modernisation theory 
(Rostow 1960)), hypothesised that as ‘early transitional societies’ (such as 
Senegal and Cambodia) – modernise, there will be mass movements of 
rural exodus as people move out of agriculture into industries and ser-
vice sectors, these models are too simplistic in assuming that all societies 
will follow the same path as Western societies towards development. 
Although significant rural-urban migration flows have occurred in both 
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Senegal and Cambodia, they have coincided with limited industrialisa-
tion, high unemployment, and high poverty rates in urban areas 
(Goldsmith 2004; CRUMP and Ministry of Planning 2012). In this con-
text, depriving people from a secure access to the farmland and forests 
on which they depend for their livelihoods has dire negative conse-
quences for the most vulnerable and does not constitute a path towards 
environmental or social sustainability.  
Notes 
 
1 In 2018, Senegal's minimum wage was of 209.10 CFA francs per hour, for 
general workers and 182.95CFA francs per hour for agricultural workers. 
 
2 Researchers, journalists, and activists have long been intimidated in this area. I 
myself was stopped and questioned by the police as to my reasons for being 
there. 
3 Social Land Concessions (SLCs) were introduced as a policy mechanism in 
2003 to distribute land to the landless and land poor. However, their implemen-
tation has been slow and has ignited further conflicts on many occasions (cf. 
LICADHO 2015). 
4 Article 30 of the Land Law establishes that: ‘Any person who, for no less than 
five years prior to the promulgation of this law, enjoyed peaceful, uncontested 
possession of immovable property that can lawfully be privately possessed, has 
the right to request a definitive title of ownership.’ However, in this case, these 
people had not been living in the area for five years and their possession of the 
land was far from ‘peaceful’ or ‘uncontested.’ 
5 They initially suggested bringing me to see first-hand the agricultural land and 
the surrounding situation, but decided not to for fear that something might hap-
pen to us. 
6 Tycoons in Cambodia are business leaders that contribute money to the Cam-
bodian People’s Party (the ruling party). In return, they enjoy support from the 





6 Self-Fulfilling Risks 
 
Introduction 
As demonstrated through previous chapters, land grabs are reshaping the 
distribution of vital resources and creating scenarios of destruction and 
expulsion. While the cases analysed in this thesis are context specific to 
an extent, they can help us to understand broader geopolitical ecologies 
at the global scale. Instead of focusing on how the global inserts itself 
into the local via the national, this chapter turns this relationship on its 
head by examining how the local shapes the global via the national. This 
chapter seeks to understand the key security and adaption implications 
that the above-analysed land grabs have beyond the landscapes where 
they physically unfold. Rather than focussing solely on the actions of 
states and elites within them, geopolitics from below (Routledge 2015, 236) 
forces our attention on the contestations articulated by populations to 
the geopolitical policies enacted by states (in this case the diverse land 
grabs), and the discourses articulated by policy-makers (in this case the 
diverse security and adaptation discourses).  
Analytically, in order to make linkages between local and global phe-
nomena that may appear disconnected, this chapter makes use of Robert 
Merton’s ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ (Merton 1968, 477)1. In the context of 
this chapter, self-fulfilling prophecies become ‘self-fulfilling risks’ when 
these prophecies rest on false security and adaptation framings around 
the perceived risks of environmental change and migration, which then 
lead to interventions that can make both security risks and maladaptation 
a reality – far beyond the landscapes where the land grabs unfold. While 
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these self-fulfilling risks also take diverse shapes depending on the con-
texts in which the land grabs have unfolded and how people have been 
able to resist them, all of the local cases examined can reveal much about 
the global geopolitical ecologies that are shaping our future. 
Through the case of Senhuile, the first part of the chapter shows how 
political reactions from below can potentially lead to the very security 
threats that justify large-scale land interventions to begin with. Through 
the case of Koh Kong Sugar plantation, the second part of the chapter 
illustrates how human rights violations in the name of environmental 
protection can change geopolitical balances, creating the very conditions 
which make our planet insecure. Finally, through the case of Kampong 
Thom, the chapter shows how attaching environmental criminality labels 
to certain migrants (the most vulnerable), but not to others (economic 
and political elites) can hamper global efforts to combat climate change 
and biodiversity conservation.  
6.1 Weathering the ‘Perfect Storm’  
At the global scale, the Sahel is often presented as the location of a per-
fect storm to unfold. Not only are poverty and population growth on the 
rise, but the impacts of environmental and climate changes are having 
disastrous consequences on fragile economies which lack strong govern-
ance systems. And if the situation was not already dire enough, terrorism 
has taken hold of the region, with those most vulnerable being the first 
targeted for recruitment by extremist groups. In the context of increased 
terrorist threats in the region, the Sahel has also become known as a ‘ter-
rorist hotspot’ (Institute for Economics and Peace 2018). In line with 
environmental security narratives, many have also contended that Tuareg 
rebellions are the result of ‘environmental scarcity and the harsh condi-
tions of an expanding Sahara desert’ (Kisangani 2012, 61). According to 
environmental security narratives, pastoralism has often been viewed as a 
contentious adaptation strategy due to the supposedly environmental and 
social problems it can create. Additionally, pastoral groups have been 
pictured as the targets of radicalization and extremism due to their pre-
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existing vulnerabilities. In a global context where both environmental 
security considerations and terrorism threats are on the rise, unpacking 
the problematic assumptions between such causal explanations is of ut-
most importance. How we locate the problem, where we identify it orig-
inating from, and which responses we create to address it all have very 
strong repercussions. The case of Senhuile provides us with some im-
portant insights in this regard.  
By studying the landscape where Senhuile is located, we have seen 
how the purported aim of providing energy and food has compromised 
the environmental security of the delta through the declassification of a 
natural Reserve that is home to a locally adaptive system of transhumant 
livelihoods. So called ‘energy security’ concerns have positioned envi-
ronmental security ones at the margins. This has coincided with present-
ing land-intensive mitigation options, such as biofuels, as possible adap-
tive strategies to avoid presumed conflicts over scarce resources that 
such a scenario could engender. However, the acquisition of land by 
Senhuile has been unable to provide the adaptive energy and environ-
mental security measures that the government and the company had 
claimed to be able to produce. Not only has a previously protected area 
been declassified for failed biofuel production, thereby transforming 
what was once a peaceful habitat for marginalised pastoral populations, 
but furthermore, large areas of land have been degraded as a result of the 
corporations’ operations. The project has also failed to provide its em-
ployment targets, that were purportedly meant to decrease forced migra-
tion. The security and adaptation claims that the government and the 
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From Peaceful to Potentially Violent Resistance 
The ongoing marginalisation of pastoralists, which has been taking place 
for decades, has led local communities to embark on a number of coun-
ter-movements against both the state and the company in order to claim 
their land back. When the project first appeared in the Ndiaël Reserve, 
those pastoralist populations that were the most impacted by the project 
organised themselves to protest the decision; they were received in April 
2012 by the newly elected President, Macky Sall. In fact, his presidential 
campaign had been largely based on attacking previous large-scale land 
concessions that the former President’s government (President Wade) 
had put in place, and which Sall had denounced. In order to appease 
mounting social tensions, the newly elected President cancelled the two 
decrees that had originally granted the Ndiaël Reserve to Senhuile. How-
ever, despite this commitment, by August of 2012 the President had al-
ready cancelled his two cancellation decrees and re-validated the decision 
of his predecessor to declassify the Reserve and grant 20,000 hectares to 
the company. As a result, and despite heavy social mobilisation, the 
company was authorised to occupy 20,000 hectares of land for a period 
of 50 years. Since then, populations have been mobilising for the right to 
continue to occupy the land that has been within their families for gener-
ations.  
At first, protests and marches were sporadic and lacked organization. 
However, in 2014, two years after the arrival of the company, pastoralist 
populations organised themselves into a group of thirty-seven villages, 
called the Collectif du Ndiaël, to collectively join efforts in the protest 
against the company. As one member of the group stated, ‘They want to 
feed a company by erasing 32 villages…They want to kill us!...We will 
not stop until justice is made!’ (Interview, Collectif du Ndiaël, Saint Lou-
is, 2016). At the beginning, the strategies used by the Collectif du Ndiaël 
consisted of sabotaging the equipment of the company and confronting 
the workers of Senhuile. However, since these actions attracted police 
officers and did little to achieve their aims, they then devised a strategy 
to bring international attention to the case, with the support of interna-
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tional NGOs. The opposition campaign to Senhuile is the campaign 
against land grabbing that has received the most support from civil so-
ciety and media coverage within Senegal. The Collectif, has received the 
support of fifteen NGOs and civil society groups - including Wetlands 
International, CNCR, ActionAid, Congad, Enda Pronat, and Panos In-
ternational as well as NGOs, such as GRAIN, Re:Common, and the 
Oakland Institute – that have all released reports condemning the pro-
ject, and have also set up an online petition and met with the Italian 
owners of the company (Bartley 2019). As one member of the Collectif du 
Ndiaël explained, ‘Before we had a slogan: Senhuile = Ebola. We used it 
to raise awareness. We must always have a strategy of resistance’ (Inter-
view, Collectif du Ndiaël, 2015). The Collectif du Ndiaël has also received 
strong support from the CRAFS (Cadre de recherche de l’Action sur le Foncier 
au Senegal) - the coalition of anti-land grab organisations that was set up 
in response to the rising number of land grabbing cases in Senegal.   
Although the main target of their critique has long been the Senega-
lese state, targeting the company itself was useful in order to gain inter-
national attention. The ActionAid focal point for Senhuile stated that ‘It 
is more effective to go against the company than against the Govern-
ment…We know that it is the state that is responsible for this, but it is 
still more effective to go against the company’ (Interview, ActionAid, 
Dakar, 2015). However, company representatives have had strong hesita-
tions concerning the new roles and responsibilities that the communities 
and the state expect of them. As explained by one French expatriate 
worker for Senhuile,  
‘It is not fair for us to be expected to bring social development to 
the area. The state makes it appear as if we should be in charge of the 
education and healthcare of these populations. Of course, there are 
things that we can do to help, but the main aim of a company is to 
make money and profit, not to take care of education and healthcare. 
That is the role of the state! The money we give to the state for rent 
and water usage should go to these communities…The state cannot 
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give up on these responsibilities just because we are here. That was 
not the plan!’ (Interview, Senhuile French worker, 2016).  
Despite receiving support from a wide variety of actors within civil 
society as well as the national and international media attention that their 
campaign received, by 2015 the communities involved within the Collectif 
du Ndiaël were still far from achieving their ultimate aim of having the 
project cancelled and their livelihoods restored. As a result of an uphill 
battle against corporate and state interests, new modes of more violent 
resistance – or at least the threat of their use – were beginning to emerge: 
‘If someone comes to mistreat us, and if I have the possibility to make 
the sky fall, I will do it – they will all die’ (Interview, Senegalese pastoral-
ist, 2016). Considering the location of the Ndiaël Reserve along the Mali-
an border and the well-established relationships between pastoralist 
groups on both sides of the Senegal River, an interest in Tuareg modes 
of resistance was sparked. As one pastoralist explained, ‘Yes, we are in 
contact with the Tuaregs in Mali…They also defend a cause. The most 
important is not the cause per se. But they are also mistreated in their own 
country and they want to rest. This is what unites us: the fight against the 
State’ (Interview, pastoralist, Reserve du Ndiaël, 2015).  
The Tuaregs share many characteristics with the Peuls in the Senegal 
River Delta. They, too, depend on access to water and land for their live-
lihoods and on transhumance for adaptation to a harsh climate. Just as 
occurred in Senegal, the Tauregs have become marginalised from the 
mainstream modernising agricultural development projects and by the 
arbitrary determination of national borders by colonial states (Alesbury 
2013). As a pastoralist explained, ‘By continuously exhausting people, 
one day or the other they will turn against you. And when that day 
comes, they will use all the possible means to hurt you – whatever the 
price’ (Interview, pastoralist, Reserve du Ndiaël, 2016). Although it was 
impossible within the scope of this research to track down and verify the 
existence of such links and the intentions to use them, the fact that they 
were even alluded to already poses a number of important questions. As 
with environmental security more generally, narratives around environ-
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mental security have sought to explain Tuareg rebellions in Mali as a re-
sult of desertification and resource scarcity. However, if we look closely 
at the political history of this part of the Sahel, the causes of marginalisa-
tion and conflict dynamics can be located – just as in Senegal – in the 
agricultural modernisation policies implemented after independence and 
which were based on the assumption that nomadic pastoralism was un-
productive (Benjaminsen 2016, 110). In this view, Tuareg rebellions are 
the result of grievances from their political exclusion from development 
(Benjaminsen 2008).  
Although studies have underlined that ‘ideology is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for the development of jihadist insurgency’   
(Ibrahim 2017, 9), ideology did not seem to be a necessary condition for 
its appeal in this case. As a pastoralist explained, ‘Religion has no place in 
all of this. The only thing that interests us is their experience in terms of 
combat…that is all…Every problem needs a solution.’ (Interview, Sene-
galese pastoralist, 2016). Aware of the role of terrorism as a security risk 
for the state as well as for the West and its population (including myself), 
the interlocutor highlighted that the aim behind establishing links with 
the Tuaregs, lie not in a counterinsurgency against company representa-
tives but rather had the aim of creating a destabilised environment for 
the state that would then place the state in a position to fulfil their de-
mands: ‘Our objective is not to chop the head of any foreigner or to hurt 
anyone. The essential thing is to know that the state is strong. It is so 
strong that we need to find a way to destabilize it. And we know that 
with this link, the state would be destabilized’ (Interview, pastoralist, Re-
serve du Ndiaël, 2016). Outwardly fatigued by interactions between the 
company and the state that have not resulted in an improved the situa-
tion or in land restitution, pastoralists claimed that, ‘The company needs 
to stop using the state as an intermediary. When there is no peace, there 
will never be work…They cannot continue to force us. One must always 
be careful with people that are angry… Until we obtain the truth, I will 
never stop until I’m dead or in prison’ (Interview, pastoralist, Reserve du 
Ndiaël, 2016). However, these local grievances can very well turn into 
212 CHAPTER 6 
 
global grievances. The Peul’s claims against the state and the company 
are articulated within broader struggles for social equality: ‘There is no 
superiority between human beings. Human beings are all human beings. 
We must treat all with respect. How can we accept that some people 
have money in the bank and a nice life? And just next to them others are 
mistreated, dragged in the mud…Its unacceptable.’ This is captured by a 
popular Peul expression that signifies when everything is upside down: 
‘Cows drink with their tail’ (Interview, pastoralist, Reserve du Ndiaël, 
2016).  
Although the aim of large-scale agricultural ventures in the Delta was 
to provide socio-environmental security to an area dubbed as ground 
zero for climate change and conflict, the case of Senhuile shows that 
when these dominant framings translate onto the ground, they can actu-
ally perpetuate the very same risks that they were supposedly designed to 
redress. Conflict between farmers and pastoralists was not a reality to 
begin with in the area, but the project has now created conflicts between 
pastoralists and farmers and conflicts between local communities and the 
state itself. Moreover, an area that was seemingly sealed off to the terror-
ist insurgencies occurring in neighbouring countries, became a possible 
magnet to these insurgencies as a counter-movement strategy when 
more peaceful resistance tactics had failed. The insurgence of these 
threats results not from absolute or relative scarcities of land or water, 
but rather from the continued marginalisation of pastoralism, to the ben-
efit of large-scale commercial farms that have failed to distribute their 
profits to local communities. Moreover, traditional modes of adaptation, 
such as pastoralism, are not associated with environmental degradation 
in the area. However, the company that was meant to contribute to miti-
gating climate change by producing biofuels has indeed damaged the 
protected area. For one, Senhuile cleared 1,000 hectares of land even 
though the company only ended up using 2,000 hectares. Moreover, the 
impacts of the company upon the nearby lake have affected a greater 
number of local people, given that 60% of the water from the lake is 
used within Dakar for drinking purposes. The impacts of the destruction 
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of wetland and biodiversity go well beyond the given landscape. Conflict 
has indeed been created, but its roots lie in other means and mechanisms 
than those typically exposed within environmental conflict narratives. It 
has not been climate change or migration per se that have led to migra-
tion or conflict, but rather those measures presented to purposely ad-
dress climate change and migration, which have inadvertently created 
these very problems.  
 
Responsible Agrobusiness for the Great Green Wall.   
Another persistent idea amongst those supporting large private invest-
ment in agriculture as an adaptation mechanism, has been to highlight 
that the failures that have resulted in land grabbing are due to the misap-
plication of certain policies, and not from the policies themselves. How-
ever, it is not only in their misapplication, but in the actual assumptions 
that underline their design that the problem often lies. In order to ap-
pease social tensions while at the same time continue to promote private 
direct investment in agriculture, in 2014, the Senegalese government 
launched the Project for Inclusive and Sustainable Development of Ag-
ribusiness in Senegal (PDIDAS), which has been financed by the World 
Bank (80 million USD) and by the Global Environment Fund (8 million 
USD). This project is part of the Great Green Wall Initiative that Presi-
dent Wade championed in 2007 and is the first project to receive sub-
stantial funds from the Sahel and West Africa Program that the World 
bank created to support the Great Green Wall (World Bank 2013a). Ac-
cording to the World Bank, the aim of the PDIDAS project is to develop 
inclusive commercial agriculture and sustainable land management prac-
tices in projects areas while improving secure tenure (World Bank 
2013b).  It was also meant to support Senegal’s Growth Strategy by ac-
celerating a diversification of agricultural exports, an increase trade reve-
nues, and a promotion of domestic and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) in the farming sector (World Bank 2013b).  
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At the time of my last round of fieldwork in Senegal, only certain 
consultations between the PDIDAS project and the populations had tak-
en place in potential implementation sites, but the project was taking 
much longer than initially planned to materialise. This was reportedly 
because of the due diligence practices that were being carried out in or-
der to avoid past mistakes (Interview, Ministry of Agriculture, 2016). 
When interviewed, the coordinator of the PDIDAS project reiterated 
that a key objective of the project was to create jobs to act as a deterrent 
for irregular migration. According to her, at least 9,500 jobs would be 
created by the project (Interview, PDIDAS Coordinator, Saint Louis, 
2016). In order to avoid conflicts that had emerged when granting land 
leases of 99 years under the Wade Presidency, this project was intended 
to give 30 years leases to the rural community, who could then choose to 
sub-lease the land for an additional 30 years to investors. While these 
new rules are intended to safeguard the sovereignty of natural resources 
for the Senegalese, investors fear being forced off the land following 
their initial investments. As the owner of a small agrobusiness near Sen-
huile explained, ‘With 30 years of leases and then sub-leases, communi-
ties will negotiate that they leave…If we had to renegotiate right now 
they would ask us to leave. Their objective is to hassle investors…In 
Senegal there is no such thing as land grabs’ (Interview, Director General 
West Africa Farms, Saint Louis, 2015).  
Small-scale farmers, however, underlined the need of government, ra-
ther than private investor support, in order for them to be able to farm: 
‘If the state could just come and do the necessary works so that we can 
access water (irrigation, etc.), it would be much better, but because we 
have nothing we have to do with what we get. It would be much better 
that the state did it and to have financial aid, much better. Farmers try to 
go to the banks but very few can actually get loans or anything…’ (Inter-
view, school teacher, Ngnith, 2015). In fact, the bidding process behind 
the project was perceived as having skewed any possibilities of poor 
farmers having land access: ‘The World Bank should fund farmers, not 
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agrobusiness! (...) With these programs it is normally foreigners that win 
the bids’ (Interview, journalist Dakar, 2014).  
 The populations that had been directly impacted by Senhuile in the 
pilot operation that took place in Ngnith had received certain benefits. 
According to the PDIDAS website in Senegal, it has financed five eco-
nomic interest groups of which two were for women (PDIDAS 2018). 
However, beyond certain sporadic initiatives, and as the project comes to 
an end, the final results published by the World Bank are less than satis-
factory; none of the targets have reached even 50% of their intended 
impacts. For example, in terms of employment creation, which was one 
of the project’s mains aims, only 7,597 jobs have been created on small 
and medium farms out of a target of 20,000, while zero jobs on large 
farms have been created out of a target of 3,000. With regards to im-
proving land security, 35 plots have been secured, which is far below the 
target of 15,000 plots; zero plots have been secured through a tripartite 
agreement between local authorities and investors despite an initial target 
of 4,500 plots.2 However, the system of rural cadastres that it established 
is now inspiring the long awaited tenure reform.  
On the basis of lessons learned, the World Bank is now involved in 
supporting the implementation of a new tenure policy in Senegal that 
proposes a revision of the ‘legal framework to eventually make it possi-
ble to consider usage rights as real rights as soon as the conditions nec-
essary to validate the property are met’ (Teyssier 2019). A new tenure 
reform is on the agenda for the period 2019-2023 within the Plan Senegal 
Emergent; the policy framework of Macky Sall’s government. The aim of 
this plan is to adopt a regulation that is in line with the realities experi-
enced by the Senegalese rural communities, and to prevent land grabs. 
The Senegalese government hopes to achieve this through the gradual 
transformation of rights of occupation into possession rights, investing 
in services for land planning, and by finding a balance between the pow-
er of rural communities and the power of the state for land allocation. 
The objective is to regain social cohesion and create an environment 
which accommodates family farmers and agribusiness. The document in 
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itself acknowledges previous difficulties in creating this balance, but the 
results will remain to be seen (Gouvernement Republique du Senegal 
2014). With regards to Senhuile, in 2018 the company abandoned the 
area due to both financial losses and the social resistance present. How-
ever, it is important to underline that ‘failed land deals are not failed land 
grabs’ (GRAIN 2018). This is because the land often does not go back to 
the populations who were dispossessed of it. In the case of Senhuile, 
some of the land has been redistributed to the local communities, but a 
substantial amount has apparently been granted to a Dutch company.3 
(Personal communication, Ngith, 2018).  
 
Mitigating Environmental Insecurities 
As documented above, narratives around the Sahel build on those of the 
environmental security school that seek to explain the rise in conflict in 
the Sahel region by attributing it to environmental degradation, popula-
tion pressure, and resource scarcities that push people into movement 
and into conflict over scarce resources (Homer-Dixon 1994; Myers 
2002). Although the Sahel has come to be known as a ‘terrorist hotspot’, 
Senegal has continued to remain surprisingly shielded from these threats 
(Institute for Economics and Peace 2018). Yet the continued marginali-
sation of pastoralist populations linked to other socio-economic griev-
ances is increasing the potential for traditionally understood national se-
curity threats to arise from environmental struggles, but not through the 
causal explanatory mechanisms that are often put forth. Instead, inter-
ventions that amplify rather than address inequalities have the potential 
to easily threaten national security at the international levels. The case of 
Senegal in general, and of Senhuile in particular, puts into question narra-
tives that assume that a simultaneous support for both small-scale farm-
ers and large-scale investors is straightforward. Without extensive gov-
ernment support, the expectation that private corporations – which are 
profit-seeking per definition – will meet the basic needs of local impov-
erished populations, remains unjustified. However, vilifying certain com-
panies, risks obscuring the state-capital interactions that shape the 
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broader picture. Although corporations should certainly comply with 
their legal obligations and need to be held accountable, they cannot be 
expected to take the role of development agencies or the state in provid-
ing basic social services. In this context, the flow of aid and development 
interventions should support those most in need and capable of ensuring 
that resources are sustainably used, rather than to those who most ‘pro-
ductively’ use them for economic profit.  
 
6.2 Fortress Conservation and Blood Sugar  
The Cardamom mountains – one of the richest biodiversity hotspots in 
Southeast Asia – adjacent the Koh Kong Sugar concessions, have been 
the target of numerous economic and environmental interventions that, 
as we have seen in the preceding chapter, have not benefitted the envi-
ronment or local populations. The type of conservation on which the 
protection of the mountains has been justified is based on the assump-
tion that local people are environmentally destructive and must be 
phased out, if the forests and other living species are to be protected. 
The concept of biodiversity hotspots has been used to assist planners in 
prioritising areas for environmental funding (Fisher and Christopher 
2007; Marchese 2015). Environmental NGOs, donors, and foundations 
have been quickly seduced by the simplicity of the notion of conserva-
tion hotspots and the significant financial resources that came with 
them.4  
 
Biodiversity hotspots are based uniquely on the presence of species, 
and not on the ‘presence of populations or other taxa’ (Myers et al. 
2000b, 853). This idea - the underlying assumption of which is that ‘hu-
man population size, growth, density and migration are the underlying 
causes of biodiversity loss’ (Population Action International 2012) - has 
had a long history of prominence in the environmental security literature.   
Developed countries now perceive climate change and biodiversity con-
servation as global threats whose tackling can be outsourced to faraway 
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sites, through the protection of the remaining forests and wildlife (Kelly 
and Ybarra 2016). These areas, which are supposedly susceptible to the 
threats of slash and burn and/or destructive peasant lifestyles, must be 
protected to meet the global challenges of ensuring environmental secu-
rity. These areas allow conservationists and governments to decide which 
land-uses are acceptable and which land uses are not.  
 
Resisting Conservation and Mitigation  
As we have seen through the case of conservation in the Cardamom 
mountains, the vision of land sparing over land sharing has been the 
norm. In the process, people who depend on forests for their livelihoods 
have been expelled to protect nature while contiguous areas have been 
spared for economic development. Yet, the security concerns of local 
communities in terms of food security and human security have not been 
met. Given that conservation NGO officials tend to regard land tenure 
issues as being ‘too political’ (Chapin 2004), Wildlidfe Alliance did not 
get involved in delimiting the populations’ rights to the resources that 
they were funded to protect: ‘We are powerful, we are doing law en-
forcement, but we don’t do research. We don’t do survey or research or 
study…We are concerned with the elephants, not with human rights…’ 
(Interview with Wildlife Alliance representative, Phnom Penh, 2016). In 
the absence of greater collaboration between such NGOs and the gov-
ernment, we are instead seeing actions such as the increased fining and 
criminalisation of small loggers rather than that of powerful loggers. As 
stated by one villager, ‘the small fish are caught and the big fish are let 
free’ (Interview, farmer, Koh Kong, 2015).  
 
Although 3,121 ‘offenders’ have been arrested and jailed since 2002, 
those most responsible have been let free (Interview, Wildlife Alliance, 
Phnom Penh, 2016). For example, the commune chief, took advantage 
of the situation by issuing fake land certificates to populations that 
agreed to pay him around 1000 USD/hectare. Hence, these people ac-
quired land certificates that perhaps made them feel safer, but which 
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were illegal and provided a false sense of security. With the collaboration 
of WildAid, the commune chief was taken to court, convicted, and 
thereafter released without a prison sentence or even a fine, at the re-
quest of the government (Interview, Wildlife Alliance, Phnom Penh, 
2016). In other words, the government penalises through law people that 
clear small areas of land, but those who clear thousands of hectares re-
main in impunity. As the NGO admits, ‘we shoot the messenger, but 
there is not much that can be done to track down and convict the pow-
erful’ (Interview, Wildlife Alliance, Phnom Penh, 2016). The people that 
suffered expulsions despite holding a land certificate, not only lost the 
money they had given the government to obtain the land certificate 
(around 1000 USD/hectare), but they also lost the land that they had 
acquired. Despite their non-political stance and their environment-first 
approach, the NGO Wildlife Alliance is facing ethical dilemmas, accord-
ing to leaks from internal reports: ‘…I don’t know if we really violate 
human rights, but for sure, sending complete families on roads, burning 
their houses with their belongings isn’t really fair’ (Finch and O’Toole 
2011).  
 
In an effort to clean its image, the Koh Kong Sugar company has 
sought to build an alliance with Wildlife Alliance. Given their mutual vi-
cinity, and the overlap of their respective operations, both the company 
and the environmental NGO have strategic interests in collaborating. On 
the one hand, the conservation NGO needs to access key routes situated 
within the company’s boundaries in order to stop poachers and loggers 
(Interview with Wildlife Alliance, Phnom Penh, 2016). On the other 
hand, the company would benefit from the possibility of greening its im-
age through its association with the NGO. In fact, at a hearing of the 
National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, the company explicitly 
claimed that it was going ‘to preserve watershed areas and large trees and 
to maintain forest areas within the land concession to ensure fertility into 
the future’ (NHRC 2015, 15 via Business & Human Rights Resource 
Centre 2016). While the environmental NGO has indeed been pushing 
for the company to protect the remaining forested areas within the com-
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pany’s boundaries, it admits that the promises have remained largely rhe-
torical (Interview, Wildlife Alliance, Phnom Penh, 2016). 
Despite the widespread proven human rights violations perpetrated 
by multiple actors in the area, Wildlife Alliance and the Cambodian Min-
istry of Environment signed an agreement to develop and implement 
Cambodia’s largest REDD+ program in the Southern Cardamom Na-
tional Park and Tatai Wildlife Sanctuary – just to the north of where the 
ELCs are located. The goal of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from De-
forestation and Forest Degradation) is to contribute to climate change 
mitigation actions by attaching monetary value to remaining forests 
through carbon credits. Given that the Cardamom Rainforest is one of 
the most biodiverse in Southeast Asia, authorities claim that through this 
mechanism the forest will be worth more left intact. According to the 
Minister of Environment, Sat Samal, ‘REDD+ in the Cardamom land-
scape will be the third effort in establishing sustainable financing support 
for the protection and conservation of forests in Cambodia. It proves 
that Cambodia is ready for performance-based payment in climate 
change mitigation framework.’ (Wildlife Alliance 2017). The Regional 
Director of Asia for Wildlife Works commented that the project has the 
potential to ‘position Cambodia as a global leader in REDD+’ (Wildlife 
Alliance 2017). Given its location in the midst of compelling human 
rights abuses, it is legitimate to ask who is benefitting from these carbon 
credits and at what cost. 
From Bottom-Up Protests to Wider Geopolitical Imbalances 
The communities of Chikor Leu commune have been mobilising against 
the sugar company and the government since 2006. They have used var-
ious tactics that range from peaceful protest, petitions, and filing com-
plaints to the provincial and international courts. However, their protests 
at the local and national levels have encountered severe repression by 
armed security guards which even resulted in shootings, injuries and as-
saults. In late 2006, after another violent confrontation, 48 families were 
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persuaded to accept miniscule cash compensation of between 50-150 
USD, which is below the land market value. These families accepted the 
offer because they were told that their choice was to either accept the 
cash or the government would confiscate the land anyway without giving 
compensation as they had no legal rights to it and it belonged to the state 
(Young 2019). As community members explained, ‘People accepted be-
cause they were sacred. They did not think they had any other choice 
than to accept this’ (Focus group, Koh Kong, 2016). 
The community leader states that he along with several other of the 
most vocal and resistant community members have suffered death 
threats to themselves and their families if they did not bring an end to 
the complaints: ‘They try to intimidate so much… I know any day that I 
might walk out and be killed. That’s the reality of the situation…It is 
very dangerous here and you should be careful’ (Interview, community 
representative, Koh Kong, 2016). One community activist has already 
been killed and there has not yet been any investigation into their death. 
The fact that the concession is a joint operation that involves not only a 
Thai investor but also a ruling party senator, Ly Yong Phat, has made the 
possibilities of resistance against the state especially dangerous. Accord-
ing to the International Labour Organization, in a political context such 
as that of Cambodia, and especially in cases where high level politicians 
are involved, ‘The buyers are the only instrument to change things.’ (In-
terview, ILO, Phnom Penh, 2016).  
The communities have received support from various NGOs includ-
ing Equitable Cambodia, the Community Legal Education Centre, Inclu-
sive Development International, and Hands off the Land Alliance with 
many more signing multiple appeals to diverse bodies to appeal for jus-
tice for these communities. A particularly strong campaign entitled ‘the 
clean sugar campaign’, began in 2011. This campaign consists of  ‘a coali-
tion of affected communities and non-governmental organizations work-
ing to stop human rights abuses and environmental damage caused by 
the Cambodian sugar industry; Bring about a just resolution for the indi-
viduals and communities who have been harmed by the industry; and 
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ensure that the agricultural development and trade policies benefit small-
holder famers and local communities’ (Clean Sugar Campaign n.d.). The 
campaign not only works on behalf of those affected in Koh Kong, but 
also for those who have been impacted by sugar concessions in the prov-
inces of Oddar Manchey and Kampong Speu. The member organiza-
tions include a wide variety of national and international NGOs as well 
as research centres, including Equitable Cambodia, FIAN Germany, In-
clusive Development International, LICADHO, ActionAid and the 
Transnational Institute. Together with the local communities, this cam-
paign has managed to give the case strong international visibility, leading 
to some consequences for companies involved in land grabs. Several 
press articles and petitions were filed against the UK-based sugar com-
pany, Tate & Lyle, which purchased its sugar from the concessions ex-
amined in this thesis, and community complaints and petitions were also 
raised before the European Union. In 2011, a Swedish European parlia-
mentarian, Cecilia Wikstrom, condemned Cambodian blood sugar for 
human rights abuses arguing that the EU should withdraw its trade pref-
erences to the country (Deutsche Welle 2011).  
Tate & Lyle sugar company is one of the two founding members of 
Bonsucro, which is a corporate-led self-regulation mechanism that pro-
motes ‘responsible’ investment (Franco, Park, and Herre 2017, 342). The 
Bonsucro standards contain six core principles: 1) obey the law and re-
spect human rights and labour standards; 2) manage input; 3) be efficient 
with production and processing to enhance sustainability; 4) actively 
manage biodiversity and ecosystem services; 5) continuously improve 
key areas for business. In addition to these five principles, the EU has 
added a sixth: to monitor GHG emissions and biodiversity conservation, 
and to value land with high carbon stock (Ackrill and Kay 2011, 559). In 
March 2013, 200 villagers filed a complaint in England against Tate & 
Lyle and T&L Sugars Limited (a subsidiary of American Sugar Refining) 
arguing that since they remain the legal owners of the land, they should 
receive not only their land back but also a portion of the profits of the 
crops grown on it (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 2016). 
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After multiple pressures and allegations, in 2014, the EU agreed to inves-
tigate the Cambodian sugar industry (Hodal 2014). Another main chan-
nel through which to appeal for justice has been through the National 
Human Rights Commission of Thailand. In fact, before the sugar from 
these plantations reach Europe, the sugar is exported from Cambodia to 
Thailand where it is refined and then sold to the UK company Tate & 
Lyle, incentivised by the EU’s Everything But Arms Initiative (EBA). In 
May 2010, with the assistance of a number of NGOs, filed a complaint 
with the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand against the 
human rights impacts that Thai sugar suppliers were generating in Cam-
bodia (Young 2019). At the time of my last visit in 2016, the EU delega-
tion had conducted an investigation on the ground, but the communities 
were still awaiting final resolutions. 
In 2014, a legal claim was filed before the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) based in The Hague against powerful members of Cambo-
dian society (referred to as the ‘ruling elite’), including representatives of 
the Cambodian government, security forces and government-connected 
businesses (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 2016). The claim 
alleged that since 2000, 770,000 people, or 6% of Cambodia’s popula-
tion, have been affected by land grabbing, including the forcible dis-
placement of 145,000 people from the capital, Phnom Penh (Arsenault 
2017). In an unprecedented move in 2016, the ICC widened its remit to 
include cases of land grabbing, stating that: ‘The Office (of the Prosecu-
tor) will seek to cooperate and provide assistance to States, upon request, 
with respect to conduct which constitutes a serious crime under national 
law, such as the illegal exploitation of natural resources, arms trafficking, 
human trafficking, terrorism, financial crimes, land grabbing or the de-
struction of the environment’  (ICC 2016, art. 7). The impacts of crimes 
will ‘be assessed in light of, inter alia, the increased vulnerability of vic-
tims, the terror subsequently instilled, or the social, economic, or envi-
ronmental damage inflicted on the affected communities. In this context, 
the office will give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome statute 
crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the 
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destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural re-
sources or the illegal dispossession of land.’ (ICC 2016, art. 15) 
Although the decision did not indicate which land grabs in Cambodia 
would be considered for investigation, several NGO sources working on 
the Koh Kong case believe that Koh Kong is a serious contender. Ac-
cording to Cambodian government officials, the complaints to the ICC 
were filed by the opposition party: ‘They are just trying to make our gov-
ernment look bad. They invented fake numbers of people being affected 
by land grabbing and eviction’ (Arsenault 2016). The ICC has not to date 
released any information concerning investigations that are ongoing nor 
any results. If this case proceeds, it will set an exceptional precedent, that 
would enable companies and states involved in such land grabs, human 
rights, and environmental crimes to be prosecuted at the same level as 
those suspected for crimes of genocide (or other serious crimes).  
 
Changing Geopolitical Balances 
Although the inclusion of land grabs as a crime against humanity might 
hypothetically become an unprecedented move, the political situation of 
Cambodia has in the meantime spiralled into increasing authoritarian 
tendencies. In 2017, Cambodia’s Supreme Court dissolved the main op-
position party (the Cambodia National Rescue Party-CNCR) under alle-
gations that it was preparing a coup to overthrow the government. 
Hence, Hun Sen was left unchallenged and without an electoral competi-
tor for the 2018 national elections (BBC 2017). According to those 
working within the government, in 2016, the ruling party conducted a 
poll across the country to better understand people’s voting intentions. 
Given that the result showed a favourable rise of interest in the CNCR at 
the expense of the ruling party, Hun Sen made the decision to imprison 
his main opponent under false accusations. The run up to the general 
elections was also characterised by the increasing intimidation of activists 
and NGOs.5 
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 As a consequence of Cambodia imprisoning its main opposition 
leader and thereafter dissolving the opposition party, the US and EU 
withdrew their funding for the 2018 national election. In January 2019, 
the EU initiated a process to temporarily suspend trade preferences with 
Cambodia as a result of the its failure to respect human rights (European 
Comission 2019). In response, Hun Sen declared that Cambodia would 
continue to flourish even without the EBA:  
‘I have nothing to be afraid of in talking about this. Who is doing the 
monitoring? I have already said that if they give us preferential access, 
it won’t make us rich. If they withdraw it from us, it won’t make us 
dead… Look, when our economy is dependent on others, our inde-
pendence is limited. We are not brave enough to talk to those who 
give us aid because we are afraid that they will cut that aid…But when 
we are independent, having enough to eat, we don’t depend on them 
and have an equal voice and rights, but not to control others. It is a 
voice a family needs, and an independent sovereign state needs this 
too.’ (Chheng 2019).  
Hun Sen’s lack of fear to diminished trade with the EU is largely at-
tributable to the increased amount of loans and aid that Cambodia has 
been receiving from China in recent years. Ever since the financial crisis, 
the disbursement of bilateral loans from China to Cambodia has grown 
spectacularly. As multilateral aid declined, Cambodia’s relationship with 
China continuously strengthened. China is now Cambodia’s largest bilat-
eral creditor contributing to approximately 70% of the country’s total 
bilateral debt stock (FMI 2017). The increased presence of China in 
Cambodia has led observers to qualify the phenomenon as the ‘Chinaza-
tion of Cambodia’ (Kenki 2017). As with many other countries, China’s 
interests in Cambodia grew in the context of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
initiative (OBOR), launched by President Xi Jiping in 2013. While aid 
received from OECD countries tends to be linked to a number of politi-
cal preconditions around improving human rights and civil liberties as 
well as enhancing accountability and transparency, China’s aid flow is not 
correlated to such preconditions. The extensive financial capacities of 
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China linked to their ‘no strings attached’ policies of aid and investment 
and relatively lower standards of environmental and social protection, 
have made relationships with China very attractive to many authoritarian 
regimes around the world (Wang and Zadek 2016; Vigil 2018). 
Given that the OBOR initiatives involve deviating from the ‘harsh re-
quirements’ and interference in the ‘internal affairs and sovereignty of 
applicant countries’ that characterise the Asian Development Bank, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Sidaway and Woon 
2017, 6), it is not surprising that autocratic regimes would leap at the po-
tential economic opportunities that China brings (Vigil 2018a). While the 
exact amount of aid received from China is difficult to assess, according 
to the Ministry of Finance, Cambodia now owes China more than 4 bil-
lion USD. This represents about two-fifths of Cambodia’s outstanding 
debt and the figure is significantly higher than the combined multilateral 
debt owed to institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Develop-
ment Bank. Analysts warn that this growing reliance on China could in-
fluence the country’s policy priorities. Indeed, when the EU announced 
the possibility of suspending trade preferences for Cambodia, China was 
quick to announce that it would support Cambodia in the event that the 
EBA policy would be removed, thereby diluting the incentives for dem-
ocratic reforms demanded by the West (VOA 2018).   
According to well-informed Cambodians, the government will still at-
tempt to grant some concessions for products that might be sold under 
the EBA policy, lest the EBA remains active (which is a possibility due 
to the impacts that voiding it would have on the garment industry in par-
ticular). As a result of these pressures, the Cambodian government has 
aimed to roll-back land grabs, but observers claim that, ‘There is no way 
that Hun Sen will release the opposition leader…He will try to make re-
forms in other areas, but losing power is not going to be part of the 
package. If he can retain the EBA through some concessions in terms of 
land rights, then he will. If releasing the opposition leader remains the 
prerequisite, he will not do it even if the trade preferences are re-
moved…The backing of China has strongly consolidated him…’ (Per-
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sonal communication, government official, 2019). This aligns with what 
one representative from the International Labour Organization already 
stated back in 2016: ‘The Government depends totally on China and 
China doesn’t care (about human rights violations linked to land grabs). 
They don’t care if the International Community will not give them any 
more money. They get it from China…’ (Interview, ILO, Phnom Penh, 
2016).  
However, – as stated above - given that thousands of workers depend 
on a garment industry that remains extremely dependent on trade with 
the EU, the consequences of suspending the EBA are likely to come at a 
big price for Cambodians. In a recent statement of response to United 
Nations, Cambodia used its right to reply in response to state that: ‘the 
EU, UK, French and Australian delegates who fallaciously alleged that 
the application of law in Cambodia has shrunk the space for freedom of 
expression to the United Nations stating that we also need aid and assis-
tance including the EBA scheme (Everything But Arms) for which we 
really value and for which we appeal. But like other States, Cambodia’s 
sovereignty cannot be compromised when it comes to aid and assistance. 
Aid could not be taken as a hostage at the expense of sovereignty’ (Per-
manent Mission of the Kingdom of Cambodia to the UN, 2019).  
 
Questioning Land Sparing versus Land Sharing 
The case of conservation in the Cardamom mountains adjacent to the 
exploitation of land for sugar (within two concessions) shows the con-
tradictions and limitations of having environmental protection and eco-
nomic growth as separate from social considerations. In terms of envi-
ronmental measures, this case underlines the importance of two key 
matters. First, protecting biodiversity while excluding local people from 
being able to sustainably use and access resources and militarising con-
servation in coordination with governments that do not uphold human 
rights obligations, has devastating impacts. ‘Saving the elephants without 
worrying for human rights’, is a worrying strategy to consider for NGOs 
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that are funded internationally and that must - with due diligence - ob-
serve the social impacts of their actions. In these instances, supporting 
grassroots organisations that can articulate their claims from the bottom-
up through local NGO support, for example, has been more useful.  
Land degradation in local areas is often the result of social, political 
and economic processes in other parts of the world that, for example, 
increase the global demand for food and biofuels, thereby leading to lo-
cal impacts such as the expansion of sugar cane concessions in Cambo-
dia. The prices of internationally traded commodities, such as sugar for 
biofuel production, do not reflect the social and human externalities as-
sociated with their production and distribution. Despite fortress conser-
vation measures, such as those in the Cardamom mountains, the prod-
ucts exported by Cambodia are among the ten top with respect to their 
adverse biodiversity impacts (IPBES 2018). Given that the Cardamom 
mountains lie just a few meters away from two Economic Land Conces-
sions (ELCs) for sugar, the limitations of the land sparing versus land 
sharing debate need to be clearly acknowledged.  
 
 
6.3 Reframing Environmental Criminality 
 
At both the local and global scales, protecting forests is of key im-
portance to mitigating climate change. In fact, deforestation is one of the 
major reasons of both climate change and major biodiversity loss. How-
ever, who carries out this deforestation, which trees are defined as being 
deforested, as well as who gets criminalised versus given responsibilities 
over protecting forests and keeping vital ecosystems alive, matters. As 
we have seen, the expansion of rubber concessions in Cambodia has 
been carried out since colonialism for economic purposes. However, in 
recent times and with the weight of donor-driven environmental condi-
tionality enacted upon countries where trees remain, rubber concessions 
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have been re-defined as comprising green intentions, at least at the do-
mestic political level. Moreover, the expansion of large-scale rubber con-
cessions has been the justified by their capacity to create employment. 
However, as the case of Kampong Thom has demonstrated, the expan-
sion of rubber to satisfy the international market demands has come at a 
massive socio-environmental cost, of which both expulsion and destruc-
tion have played a prominent role. In the case of Tan Bien Rubber, the 
resistance strategies applied by the families who were expelled (due to 
having no legitimate claims to the land following misleading false prom-
ises of Social Land Concessions), have had limited success and have re-
ceived only sporadic support from NGOs and international attention. 
 
Who Are the Environmental Criminals? 
Migration has often been presented as a security threat not only for its 
potentialities to produce conflicts over resources, but also for creating 
environmental destruction by increasing population pressures in receiv-
ing areas. The migrants that came to Kampong Thom in the hopes of 
receiving a portion of a land concession have been framed as environ-
mental criminals: ‘They migrate because they are greedy! People from 
Kampong Cham people had already land; they never had enough! They 
are criminals! They come and say they want the land- they are criminals! 
How can they do that!...We say illegal, not criminals. If they do harm to 
environment, then it becomes criminal.’ (Interview, Ministry of Land 
Management, Phnom Penh, 2016). In this case, migrants are not only 
criminalised for believing the widely-touted promises that the instrument 
of Social Land Concessions would benefit hundreds of landless people 
around the country, but moreover, they are also presented as potential 
environmental security threats. In fact, the transition from illegality to 
criminality is justified by the need to protect the environment from mi-
grants who are supposedly destroying it, to thereafter grant the same 
land for rubber expansion to other migrants (Vietnamese in this case), 
who in fact contribute a great deal to deforestation. 
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Although the interviewed populations did not complain of any specif-
ic environmental impacts that the company has had upon their lives, it is 
within the ELC that the most deforestation has taken place. Today, as 
the map below shows, the extreme deforestation that has occurred has 
happened within concesssion areas. Prior to the arrival of ELC’s to the 
area, the clearence of forested land was carried out by the first settlers 
and, what the government now labels as, ‘illegal’ settlers. However, as 
interviewees explained, ‘There was plenty of forest remaining before the 
concessions arrived…It was the companies that cleared most of it….We 
simply were not numerous enough or had enough means to do 
this…Companies with bulldozers can easily strip clear the land, for us 
it’s much more complicated and we also depended on the forest for non-
timber product so we need the forest to remain.’ (Focus group, Thmor 
Saleang, 2015). Driving throughout the area showed that any 
deforestation outside of the concession areas belongs to rich Cambodian 
tycoons or to middle-income and richer farmers that have grabbed or 
purchased the land from previous settlers. In other words, although poor 
farmers had previously participated in clearing that land, it has been since 
grabbed by rich and middle-income investors for profit and by the 
Forest Administration for supposedly conservation purposes. 
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Map 12: Deforestation Within ELCs (Tan Bien Rubber in yellow) 
 
              Source: LICADHO 
 
At the national level, the expansion of rubber plantations has not only 
produced dire human rights violations, which have been documented in 
a report entitled Global Barons (Global Witness 2013), but moreover, it is 
the conversion of land for rubber production that has been the most 
dominant form of forest change in Cambodia (responsible for 42% of 
forest loss between 2000 and 2012) (Grogan et al. 2015). Despite the 
mainstream narrative that continues to blame deforestation on ‘illegal’ 
settlers, ELC’s are by far the main driver of deforestation in Cambodia. 
By 2015, 80% of land concessions had been allocated in production for-
ests or protected areas that remained under forest cover as late as 2010 
(Forest Trends 2015). In 2013, the ELCs covered 2.6 million hectares, 
which was almost four times the amount it was in 2004 and  more than 
60% of the total arable land in the country (Oldenburg and Neef 2014). 
In the period from 2001 to 2014 Cambodia experienced the fastest de-
forestation rate in the world (Hansen et al. 2013) and by 2013, virtually 
all forest clearance was associated with ELCs (Davis et al. 2015). The 
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role of global demand in driving forest change is substantial and acceler-
ating through FDI and large-scale land acquisitions (Ingalls et al. 2018). 
The drivers and actors of deforestation and forest degradation have 
thus completely shifted from small-scale landholders to large-scale agri-
cultural clearances for global markets (Forest Trends 2015). As an offi-
cial at the Ministry of Environment explained, ‘They say the people and 
migrants do it (the deforestation). But that’s not true... High officials 
with power and money hire them to do it and blame the smallhold-
ers…It’s these people that clear forests for them. Deforestation comes 
from ELCs in reality. When populations do illegal logging it’s very often 
for local leaders and authorities’ (Interview, Ministry of Environment, 
Phnom Penh, 2016). In a similar vein, a UN official highlighted that: 
‘They blame migrants, but these things are just incomparable to one an-
other. Migration is a tiny factor driving deforestation. Logging towards 
Vietnam has been huge with a very big increase between 2013 and 
2015...Deforestation is such a big game. The money is too big. Forest is 
like a gold mine. Black wood with good smell. They sell the wood to 
China…Ordinary migrants go there and try to get hold of land. But it is 
not them that create deforestation. Some big landowners hire them to 
cut tress for them and then these big guys sell the log…The small guys 
are being payed to be the face of illegal logging.’ (Interview, UN agency, 
Phnom Penh, 2016).  
It is also important to point out that the area on top of the map 
above in green is an area of intervention of the Tumring REDD+ 
project located at the edge of the Prey Land Forest (cf. Work 2017). 
Although a careful formulation of REDD+, which considers the value 
of natural forests beyond carbon, has the potential to reduce natural 
forest conversion to rubber for immediate gains, it is uncertain whether 
these projects will succeed when market prices for rubber increase 
(Ahrends et al. 2015). As studies have shown, the incompatibility be-
tween increasingly internationalised resource flows for commodities such 
as rubber and sugar, and the disconnected application of REDD+, rep-
resents a substantial and structural limitation to the real possibilities that 
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these schemes can have both locally and globally (Ingalls et al. 2018). As 
it stands, given the ongoing destruction happening just a few kilometers 
away from where a REDD+ project is taking place, it is important to ask 
exactly which degradation that such climate mitigation interventions are 
offsetting, at what cost, and who should be reaping the benefits. 
Moreover, although the sub-decree on Economic Land Concessions of 
2005 stipulated that ELCs must include Social and Environmental Im-
pact Assessments, it gave concessionaries the right to clear concession 
land (including any forested area within the concessions). ELCs situated 
next to conservation areas are particularly lucrative because the ‘protect-
ed’ timber can be secretly trafficked via the concession’s logging permit 
(Milne 2015, 217).  
Environmental and climate regulations have done little in a country 
where the cycle of extracting natural resources, has continued to serve as 
the primary mechanism to gain and maintain control. As one UN official 
put it, ‘Climate change is just another source of money for policy makers 
here. It’s donor language. The government is quite smart and just plays 
along to get money. It’s a donor driven game…’ (Interview, UN Agency, 
Phnom Penh 2016). This is similar to what the Minister of Environment 
stated himself in that, ‘We have been able to make being ‘green’, being 
environmentally aware, we were able to make that sexy and a fashion 
here in our society, and I think that’s the biggest achievement’ (Minister 
of Environment (MOE) quoted in Parkhouse 2017) 
 
Adapting to the Market 
Although rubber and sugar are the most widely grown crops within 
ELCs in Cambodia, outside of the ELCs there are also other prominent 
crops that dominate the landscapes. In fact, if we compare the amount 
and types of crops that have been predominant in Cambodia since the 
year 2000, we can see not only an important rise in the amount of rice 
produced, but also a spectacular rise in the amount of cassava produced, 
which even surpassed rice production in 2017.  
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This spectacular expansion of cassava can be partly explained as a result 
of growing demands for ethanol production worldwide. Cassava is ex-
ported widely to Vietnam, Thailand and especially to China as an alterna-
tive source of fuel. As one official at the Ministry of Environment ex-
plained, ‘In China they are producing a lot of ethanol…It’s to clean the 
environment. In China the big problem is pollution. They need to clean 
the air. Cassava can help the climate…China cannot produce cassava 
(only very little). It is more expensive if they do it themselves because it 
needs a lot of labour and fertilizers. Labour in Thailand (is) now not so 
cheap, so they come to buy it in Cambodia…’ (Interview, Ministry of 
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and its capacity to grow even within poor quality soils, cassava has be-
come a more profitable crop for small-scale farmers, including those that 
have lost good quality land to ELCs, receiving underproductive soil in-
stead. As one villager in a relocation site explained, ‘Before the villagers 
planted rice, and other fruits. Cassava was very marginal. But the quality 
of the soil here is so poor that cassava is the only crop that really allows 
the villagers to make any profit.’ (Interview, farmer, Kampong Thom, 
2016). Through the combination of market demands and poor-quality 
soil, the rush towards cassava cultivation has been exponential since 
2005. As an official at the Ministry of Environment explained: ‘People 
here adapt to the market, not to climate change’ (Interview, Ministry of 
Environment, 2015). 
However, despite the efficiency of cassava as a cash crop, Cambodia 
only possesses one ethanol transformation plant6 and farmers are com-
pletely subject to fluctuating market prices through which the benefits 
are often not equally distributed: ‘There is no fix(ed) price…the cassava 
grown in the area is exported to Vietnam and then China via brokers and 
traders who determine its market value’ (Interview, farmer, Kampong 
Thom, 2016). When changes in market prices occur, small-scale farmers 
that have shifted nearly entirely to cassava production for the livelihoods 
suffer enormous losses and impacts: ‘This year it has been really terrible 
for farmers. In 2015 the price of cassava was 160 USD/ton and this year 
just 115 USD. This is because of China… They released old stock corn, 
200 million tons of poor quality: they drop the price and push all the fac-
tories to use the corn; they stop buying cassava and reduce buying new 
corn…We are really dependent to China decides to drop with cassava. 
China has 4-year plans and corn is the second crop in China…They 
stock it for 4 years. And then old stock becomes spoiled and cannot be 
used for animal food, so they use it for ethanol…That means they need 
no more cassava from Cambodia for ethanol.’ (Interview, cassava expert, 
Phnom Penh, 2016).  
As one cassava producer noted, ‘Prices are set abroad, and farmers 
are extremely vulnerable to market volatility and frequent border clo-
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sures.’ (Interview, cassava producer, Kampong Thom, 2016). In the last 
year, the fall of prices has been drastic, and the crop is worth 50% less 
on average than it was the year before. As an official from the Ministry 
of Environment explained, ‘The price of the gasoline has gone down, 
and cassava is worth nothing’ (Interview, Ministry of Environment, 
Phnom Penh, 2016). Moreover, the cassava sector receives little support 
from the government and farmers have become increasingly indebted as 
a result. Although for economically better-off farmers growing cassava 
can pave the way to more capital-intensive cropping, for poorer famers it 
creates cycles of debt and forced intensification that can lead to dispos-
session. As farmers themselves noted, often after cassava is produced, 
the land on which it was grown cannot be used again for another crop 
due to the soil degradation produced by cassava. This means that farm-
ers become trapped within cassava production and less arable land (Fo-
cus group, Kampong Thom, 2016).  
At a broader level, this case shows the potentially devastating conse-
quences of framing migration as an environmental security threat, espe-
cially when these explanations are disconnected from the drivers of envi-
ronmental destruction, which are found in the expansion of ELCs. As 
witnessed in Kampong Thom, and in Cambodia more generally, legal 
regulations have been used to criminalise people (particularly the most 
vulnerable) and to permit widespread extraction and deforestation for 
concessionaires. Although increased population pressure can indeed in-
crease pressure on natural resources, it is of utmost importance to clearly 
delineate who is creating what amount and type of pressure, so that envi-
ronmental measures do not criminalise nor equate small extents of dam-
age with that of colossal destruction. Moreover, while the production of 
certain biofuel crops, such as cassava, can prove to be economically ben-
eficial for poorer farmers, when such transitions happen at a rapid rate, 
as have been occurring in Cambodia, and moreover, when the occur 
without consideration of broader market fluctuations and at the expense 
of food crops, they can lead to both food and economic insecurities 
while further contributing to environmental destruction.   
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Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to show some of the key implications that par-
ticular land grabs can have on security and adaptation well beyond the 
landscapes where these unfold. Although many potential links ranging 
from the local to the global could be made through this analysis, this 
chapter has drawn on the most evident links that each case has illustrat-
ed, and which are relevant not only within the landscapes and countries 
involved, but also beyond them. Through the case of Senhuile, we have 
seen how the marginalisation of pastoralists, perpetrated through agricul-
tural modernisation policies at the expense of pastoral livelihoods, which 
legitimised a project for biofuels, can result in a self-fulfilling prophecy 
whereby international insecurity becomes the reality. When repeated at-
tempts at peaceful resistance fail, those groups that have been left behind 
could very well develop strategies that bear the seeds of violent confron-
tation. However, violence or conflict in this case is not the result of re-
source scarcity or of the impacts of climate change in one particular 
place. Rather, it is the result of measures implemented to stabilise the 
relative scarcity of resources of the world’s most polluting countries at 
the expense of the poorer classes, who bear the brunt of its most severe 
biophysical and political impacts.  
The case of conservation and sugar production in Koh Kong draws 
on the profound limitations that a land sparing approach based on neo-
Malthusian arguments of population pressure can have on both envi-
ronmental and social security. When fortress conservation measures are 
implemented to safeguard against a small number of poor people – who 
are also those often better positioned to protect natural resources –while 
simultaneously overlooking the profound destruction happening in the 
same landscape for extractive aims, the environmental efforts are negli-
gible at best, and destructive at worst. The case shows how problematic 
it is to grant REDD+ projects within landscapes that are possibly being 
investigated for crimes against humanity. In such contexts, until social 
grievances have been addressed and redressed, environmental measures 
only risk further entrenching - rather than addressing - the root causes of 
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vulnerability. Although the threat to suspend the EBA agreement on the 
basis of such dire human rights violations could potentially pressure the 
government to address the injustices, the massive amount of ‘non strings 
attached’ development aid flowing in from China reduces the possibili-
ties of such EU-led strategies, which in turn places a greater burden on 
the millions of people in Cambodia who depend upon the EBA for their 
livelihoods.  
Finally, the case of Kampong Thom Sugar exemplifies the problemat-
ic framing of migrants as environmental security threats. Despite recur-
rent claims by the authorities as to how migrants are among the causes 
of deforestation, evidence demonstrates clearly that Cambodia has be-
come one of the countries in the world with the highest deforestation 
rates due to ELCs – often in the interest of investors that are also mi-
grants – resembling the patterns of colonial migration. At a time when 
both environmental destruction and migration are higher than ever on 
international political agendas, it is of utmost importance to distinguish 
which migrants are doing what, if we want to avoid legislations that con-
vert the weak into criminals while permitting the powerful and destruc-
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Notes 
 
1  According to the renowned sociologist, Robert Merton, ‘The self-fulfilling 
prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new be-
haviour which makes the originally false conception come true’ (Merton 1948, 
195). 
2  The official results of the PDIDAS project can be found here: 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P124018/senegal-agribusiness-development-
project?lang=en   
3 At the time of my last fieldwork, there were also rumours that much of the land 
from Senhuile would be granted to the CSS (Compagnie Sucriere Senegalaise) 
and to the World Bank’s PDIDAS project. Right now, who will receive access to 
this remains unclear. 
4 See for example, Dalton R 2000; Kareiva and Marvier 2003; Brooks et al. 2006) 
5  This includes Equitable Cambodia, which was one of the partners for the 
MOSAIC project.   
6 This ethanol transformation plant belongs to a Korean company in the North 
of Cambodia that has applied for funding under the Clean Development Mecha-




 Conclusion  
 
‘Frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world. 
Reframing is social change. Reframing is changing the way the public 
sees the world. It is changing what counts as common sense’  
(Lakoff, 2004)  
 
This dissertation has aimed to understand: Why and how environmental 
change, land grabs, and migration shape each other, both materially and discursively, 
and with what consequences? The short answer to this question is that the 
material and discursive interrelations between these phenomena are in-
herent to the tensions that exist, in different contexts and at different 
times, between capital accumulation and political legitimation. These in-
terlinkages have been discursively and materially co-constituted through 
the deployment of certain security and adaptation frames that – by locat-
ing the roots of the current socio-environmental crisis in population 
growth, market failures, or technological inefficiency – have served, ad-
vertently or inadvertently, to justify land grabs in the name of migration 
and/or environmental protection. Although both environmental and 
migration justifications have been used since colonialism to expropriate 
land to make way for continued capital accumulation, these justifications 
have gained momentum at a time when both environmental change and 
migration are, understandably so, higher than ever on international polit-
ical agendas. However, whether migration or environmental justifications 
prevail over one another depends not only on the broader geopolitical 
ecological context, but crucially on the migration system that each coun-
try is embedded in and on the interests of its main donors and corporate 
investors. Despite intrinsically opposed assumptions between dominant 
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security and adaptation frames with regards to migration, this research 
has illustrated how they can both interact with environmental justifica-
tions in ways which can perpetrate forced migration and environmental 
destruction. Moreover, this research has shown that land grabs have cre-
ated self-fulfilling risks which can result in insecurity and maladaptation 
becoming a reality in locations beyond the landscapes where land grabs 
unfold, shaping geopolitical ecologies in the process. In these concluding 
pages, I will elaborate on this short answer to my dissertation question in 
order to highlight the main findings of this research as well as its main 
implications.  
 
Overlaps Between Frames 
As this research has shown, the way in which certain phenomena are 
framed in terms of security and/or adaptation is deeply political. As a 
result, it is necessary to go beyond an analysis that refers to an ‘objective’ 
reality of security and adaptation, and to instead examine how the very 
enunciation of these concepts organises social relations into security and 
adaptation relations – often independently of whether an adaptation or 
security situation existed in the first place. This work has examined the 
impacts of both neo-Malthusian security and neoclassical adaptation 
framings in shaping the interrelations between environmental change, 
land grabs, and migration by opposing these framings to with that of a 
variegated geopolitical ecology framing. In this section, I will underline the 
main research findings this approach has enabled to unveil in order to 
demonstrate why analysing these framings in tandem adds both empirical 
and theoretical depth to the understanding of phenomena that tend to be 







Creating Internal and External Borders  
As this research has shown, security framings have been deployed since 
colonialism in order to determine who can access what natural resources 
and for what purposes. Understanding environmental destruction and mi-
gration in terms of population growth and absolute resource scarcity has 
led to interventions which transform not only the internal, but also the 
external bordering of territories. In line with the literature in political 
ecology that has examined the phenomenon of ‘fortress conservation,’ 
this research has demonstrated how natural reserves and protected areas 
have served not only to expel local communities, but also to direct popu-
lation movements into areas where their labour is needed for further 
capital accumulation. For example, during colonialism in both Senegal 
and Cambodia, taxes, concessions and protected areas all served the pur-
pose of directing the labour force onto plantations. At the same time, 
these measures were also designed to sedentarise those populations that 
were deemed as inefficient, environmentally destructive, and difficult to 
tax - primarily pastoralists in Senegal and shifting cultivators in Cambo-
dia. The idea that land should be spared for the protection of natural re-
sources, and that land should be granted for the most economically prof-
itable activities, has been supported by narratives that portray the 
vulnerable and poor as both environmentally destructive and economi-
cally inefficient.   
This double purpose of natural reserves as means through which to 
shape access to natural resources as well as steer populations move-
ments, has persisted through time. For example, the Reserve du Ndiaël 
in Senegal was initially seen by the government as a way to contain the 
movement of pastoralists into a demarcated area, in order to spare land 
for agriculture in the Senegal River Delta. The concept of mise en valeur, 
based on economic efficiency, is the mechanism through which local 
populations are dispossessed of their land in favour of capital-intensive 
ventures. In Cambodia, conservation in the Cardamom mountains has 
led to the violent expulsion of local communities for the protection of 
biodiversity under narratives that portray landless farmers as environ-
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mental criminals without simultaneously questioning the environmental 
impact of those deemed economically efficient. These global environ-
mental security objectives come into contradiction with local security 
objectives by displacing populations from their basic means of subsist-
ence - often violently. Through land sparing and fortress conservation, 
environmental security is divorced from human security by tainting those 
least responsible for environmental insecurities as those most destructive 
and uses this to justify their forced displacement. Additionally, in recent 
years, the links between national security and environmental security 
have become entrenched in narratives that portray population growth, 
environmental degradation, migration and national security as intimately 
interlinked, serving to add a layer of justification to increase border con-
trols and the externalisation of borders, particularly to Sahelian countries 
with populations seeking to reach Europe.  
 
Immobile and Mobile Adaptation 
Although based on very different assumptions, dominant adaptation 
framings have also long been deployed to determine who can access what 
natural resources and for what purposes – albeit with different logics and 
outcomes. According to certain adaptation narratives that this research 
has examined, it is the mobility of investors, touted as the most capable of 
putting resources to ‘good’ use, that carry the potential not only to miti-
gate the worst impacts of environmental change, but also to reduce mi-
gration as well as national and environmental security threats in the pro-
cess. As this research has shown, one of the main arguments behind 
large-scale plantations for biofuels or food crops is not only that they 
contribute to climate mitigation and adaptation, but that they also con-
tribute to employment creation in the places where these plantations are 
established, purportedly creating the conditions for people to remain at 
home. In Senegal, this has been the key justification behind initiatives, 
such as the Plan REVA, and agricultural policies, such as GOANA. In 
Cambodia, the idea that Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) will create 
employment has also been one of its main justifiers. However, across all 
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of the cases examined, employment creation has been minimal, unrelia-
ble, and of low quality. Additionally, when employment is offered by a 
company, those who receive the jobs are often not the same people as 
those who have lost their land to the company. This is due to both the 
direct confrontations that arise between the companies and those ex-
pelled by them, and also because companies tend to prefer employing 
migrants from other areas who are more socially isolated and malleable. 
Those locals that do successfully manage to become incorporated within 
companies are often those that have landholdings and use plantation 
work as an additional, but not primary, source of income. Moreover, ad-
aptation framings linked to environmental and migration justifications 
are not limited to creating the conditions for people to stay at home. 
Although employment creation in situ is a main justification for large-
scale commercial farms, adaptation through mobility is also deemed essen-
tial for states in order to ensure both an inflow of socio-economic remit-
tances and to spare land for more economically ‘efficient’ usages.  
 
Variegated Geopolitical Ecologies 
Despite the insights that a separate analysis of the impacts of security or 
adaptation frames can provide, neither of them influence the interrela-
tions between environmental change, land grabs, and migration in isola-
tion from one another or in socio-temporal and geopolitical vacuums. 
An understanding of why one framing may prevail over another at a par-
ticular time, and how land grabs impact both environmental destruction 
and/or migration, needs to be understood through a processual ap-
proach that accounts for how ‘geopolitical ecologies from above’ and 
‘geopolitical ecologies from below’ shape each other. To capture these 
overlaps, this research has taken a multi-scalar and circular approach by 
analysing not only how broader geopolitical ecologies are inserted into 
specific national contexts, and how these then translate differently into 
three diverse landscapes, but also to illustrate the impacts that specific 
land grabs can have well beyond the landscapes where they unfold.  
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Geopolitical Ecologies from Above  
By taking a comparative approach between countries which are located 
within very different migration systems and where donors and investors 
have differing interests, I have been able to capture the relative im-
portance of one frame over another as well as account for the explanato-
ry variables that shape these differences. In doing so, the research has 
shown that although both environmental and migration narratives have 
been utilised by different actors in both countries, advertently or inad-
vertently to justify land grabs, today, migration justifications are more 
prevalent in Senegal, while environmental justifications prevail in Cam-
bodia. In Senegal, the migration as adaptation framing gained promi-
nence prior to the global financial crisis, not only because the country is 
highly dependent on socio-economic remittances for its domestic devel-
opment, but crucially because the European labour market was in need 
of a constant supply of cheap and malleable labour to ensure its contin-
ued capital accumulation at minimal costs. Although this remains true in 
many respects, the global financial crisis was accompanied by European 
fears of migration inflows from a region that has been presented as a 
hotspot not only for climate change and environmental destruction, but 
also for potential terrorist threats. 
In this context, European countries have used national security narra-
tives in order to support development and investment packages within 
the originating countries of migration, which are primarily targeted in an 
attempt to keep their populations in place, while also enabling investors 
to make profits in a context where biofuels and large-scale farming are 
presented as solutions to both energy and food insecurities. In Senegal, 
this has translated into tenure, environmental, and agricultural reforms 
which have supported large-scale land investments as ways to create em-
ployment in situ, reduce rural exodus and irregular international migra-
tion, and ensure food and energy security both domestically and interna-
tionally. This framing is also used domestically to maintain a balance 
between capital accumulation and political legitimation, given that the 
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perilous journeys towards Europe, and the conditions that those most 
vulnerable find upon arrival, has led populations to change their aspira-
tions in relation to their capacities to migrate successfully, and to rather 
demand employment creation at home.  
In Cambodia, the prevalence of one justification over another is 
marked not only by the importance of forests as carbon sinks for global 
climate mitigation, but also by its location within a migration system that 
still relies on an abundant inflow of cheap and docile labour for its 
growth. The devastating conflict period in Cambodia, which kept the 
country isolated, also resulted in a relatively untouched forest and biodi-
versity sector, which later became vitally important globally as the donor-
led transition towards neoliberalism occurred. Tenure and environmental 
policies were designed with the purpose of maintaining the environmen-
tal endowments of a country that nonetheless required them for power 
maintenance and economic growth. Although environmental and tenure 
reforms can be regarded as good technocratic work, these reforms have 
done little in a country where the extraction of natural resources has 
been key to maintain the legitimacy of the regime by granting vast 
amounts of arable land through ELCs. Although the argument of em-
ployment creation in order to reduce out-migration is sometimes used as 
a justification for large-scale land investments, in the context of Cambo-
dia, international migration is seen not only as an escape route from pov-
erty, but also by the government as an escape valve from potential do-
mestic political contention and as a way to make room for more 
economically-viable ventures. As a result, while the environmental as se-
curity threat arguments are mostly used against internal migrants in 
Cambodia, it is international migrants in Senegal which rather are vilified 
through these arguments. In an interesting reversal, while the adaptation 
as immobility narrative prevails in Senegal, it is the migration as adapta-
tion narrative that prevails in Cambodia. Despite these differences, in 
both cases, the externalisation of environmental protection and of migra-
tion control becomes linked to tenure, environmental, and agricultural 
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policies by effectively re-territorialising space according to international 
and domestic accumulation interests.  
 
Flex Grabs: Overlapping Justifications  
Although paying attention to the location of particular countries within 
different regional political economies is helpful in understanding the 
prevalence of certain narratives over others at the national scale, this re-
search has shown that particular land grabs are not always the result of 
one single main legitimiser or driver, and that the very same land grab 
often receives very different justifications depending on the actor, and 
the scale involved. For example, Senhuile is greened by some actors (i.e. 
as part of the biofuel program by the government and former the com-
pany representatives), but not by other actors (i.e. the new management 
structure). In the same line, while employment creation was a key justifi-
cation for the company to gain access to the site, it has quickly been 
abandoned by management that would rather take advantage of the ben-
efit of mechanization. The example of Kampong Thom Rubber shows 
how rubber has been flexed nationally for supposedly green purposes 
even though these green justifiers clash with international definitions and 
with those justifications given by the company. However, the very idea 
that rubber may be used for carbon credits has served to justify the ex-
pansion of concessions at the national level. It is hence also important to 
underline that the implications of flexing may occur not only when flex-
ing has been carried out and is material or even anticipated, but also 
when flexing is just hypothetical or imagined.  
The case of sugar in Koh Kong shows how the material flexing that 
takes place within international markets is very removed from the discur-
sive flexing done at the national or company level. For example, alt-
hough the growing demand for sugar can be explained as part of the 
global sugarcane complex that results from the growing global demands 
for ethanol production, the justification for ethanol from sugar is far re-
moved from national or corporate justifications. At times however, the 
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international discourse filters down and influences that of the company 
or national level, such as in how the placement of the sugar company 
next to the protected area of the Cardamom mountains has incentivised 
a greening in their objectives in order to mitigate the company’s damag-
ing social and environmental impacts. What all these cases show, is that 
similarly to how ‘flex crops’ have been flexed materially and discursively 
to fit changing political agendas and market demands, so are specific 
land grabs more generally. Land grabs can be justified by environmental 
or migratory narratives by some actors, while contested for their envi-
ronmental destruction and expulsion by other actors; they may have so-
cio-environmental benefits at one scale, but also involve socio-
environmental harms at another. Here the concept of flex grabs can allow 
us to draw attention to how justifications differ according the accumula-
tion and legitimation needs that different actors pursue; and to highlight 
how these needs are often in tension with one another.   
 
Overlapping Impacts  
Assuming a broader landscape approach is not only necessary to under-
stand multiple justifications, but it is also essential when analysing the 
impacts of land grabs on migration patterns and the environment. As the 
research has illustrated, environmental destruction and migration cannot 
be solely attributed to one single land grab. Rather environmental and 
migration outcomes are better explained as a result of more complex 
land use changes occurring at the landscape level and beyond. For exam-
ple, Senhuile happens in a context where the mobility of pastoralists has 
been shrinking since colonialism. Although the Reserve du Ndiaël has 
provided temporary protection for pastoralists, Senhuile has challenged 
the safety of pastoralism as a livelihood as it infringes in one of the few 
remaining areas that they felt safe to call home. While the project has not 
displaced the pastoralist populations per se, the historical multifaceted 
package of losses that they have experienced, means that Senhuile has 
become the epitome of the ultimate challenge to the protection of pasto-
ralism as a livelihood. The environmental impacts of the company are 
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magnified by the many negative impacts that other agro-industries in the 
area have inflicted on the land and the lake, on which both farmers and 
pastoralists depend for their livelihoods. In the case of Koh Kong Sugar, 
many of the families displaced by the company had previously been dis-
placed by conservation in the Cardamom mountains. In the case of 
Kampong Thom, it is false promises of the granting of Social Land Con-
cessions (SLCs) to landless people from other provinces that has attract-
ed the migrants that would then be violently evicted from the area by an 
ELC. This case also demonstrated that much of the land has not been 
grabbed or lost to companies, but rather to the Forest Administration, 
and that conflicts over access to land are often the result of the same 
plot being granted to different people. In both of the Cambodian cases, 
it was the company that created the greatest environmental impacts 
through deforestation. The deforestation that occurs at the borders of 
concessions is either carried out by economically well-off farmers or by 
migrants that are hired by other powerful actors to be the visible face of 
deforestation. 
Across all cases, and independently of context specificities, it is the 
cumulative effects of conservation and extraction that have shaped ex-
pulsion. Although not all people within the areas have lost access to resi-
dential land, they have all lost access to farmland, grazing land or forest 
areas, which together constitute their livelihoods. In the process, house-
holds - especially in Cambodia - have accumulated an unprecedented 
amount of debt, while many of those that did have secure access to land 
have been forced to sell it and move, in an effort to repay their loans to 
microcredit lending bodies. Although migration does and can constitute 
an adaptation strategy, findings across all cases illustrate that it is those 
who had the most socio-economic assets, and a secure access to land, to 
start with that have the potential to benefit the most from migration, 
while those that are landless and most socio-economically vulnerable can 
easily end up in situations which degrade, rather than improve, their ad-
aptation. Moreover, in the three cases examined, it is small-scale farms, 
rather than large-scale farms, that have provided the most employment, 
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creating livelihood opportunities for those who never had, or have lost 
their, land access, while also attracting and employing migrants from 
other regions.   
 
Geopolitical Ecologies from Below 
A landscape approach not only enables us to see the overlapping justifi-
cations and impacts of specific land grabs as they are shaped by broader 
geopolitical ecological imperatives, but it also enables us to illuminate 
impacts that go well beyond the landscapes where land grabs occur. 
Similar to the definition of a self-fulfilling prophecy, self-fulfilling risks 
have been defined in this work as prophecies that rest on false security 
and adaptation framings around the perceived risks of environmental 
change and/or migration, and that lead to interventions which can make 
both insecurity and maladaptation a reality. Although the potential impli-
cations of precise land grabs on broader geopolitical ecological 
(im)balances are potentially very broad, this research focussed on the 
most salient connections that the empirical data revealed for each of the 
landscapes examined.  
Firstly, through the landscape of Senhuile, the research showed that 
there is indeed an interaction between environmental and national secu-
rity, but that this interaction does not unfold following the causal expla-
nations given in dominant security framings. Instead, it is the continued 
marginalisation of local forms of adaptation (namely pastoralism) in the 
name of combatting non-existent threats (namely local conflicts between 
farmers and pastoralists as well as potential terrorist threats from the Sa-
hel), that have led to interventions which - by further impoverishing local 
communities - have brought about serious grievances. These grievances 
have the potential to assume linkages to terrorism as a ways of protesting 
capital-state interactions. In this context, the currently unfolding inter-
ventions in Senegal under the Great Green Wall initiative are bound to 
fail, unless these interventions address the underlying and socio-
economically constructed vulnerabilities in the process.  
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Secondly, the human rights abuses propelled by the Koh Kong Sugar 
case in Cambodia have led to both national and international upheaval, 
and the case is considered to have inspired the decision of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) to begin investigating land grabs as crimes 
against humanity. Moreover, cases such as the one in Koh Kong have 
also contributed to the EU’s consideration of suspending its preferential 
trade with Cambodia through its Everything But Arms Initiative. Alt-
hough the inclusion of land grabbing within the category of crimes 
against humanity could become an unprecedented move for environ-
mental and social justice, the threats by the EU to cancel its trade agree-
ments with Cambodia have been limited in effect, given the context in 
which China is now the main donor of and lender to Cambodia. It is still 
too early however, to assess the longer-term implications that a shift in 
geopolitical influence from Western donors to China will have on land 
grabs, environmental destruction, and expulsion in Cambodia. What it is 
clear, is that the rise of China as an economic power in the region and 
beyond will shift the global geopolitical ecological configuration in the 
years to come, thereby potentially creating the national security threats 
and struggles over geopolitical influence that traditional geopolitics is 
characterised by. Moreover, the case of Koh Kong Sugar calls into ques-
tion the current land sparing approaches for carbon sink purposes, as 
these do not account for the human costs that are involved in allowing 
consumers to mitigate their carbon impacts in places tainted by dire hu-
man rights violations and environmental destruction. In these contexts, 
which are certainly not specific to Cambodia, we need to seriously ask 
what these carbon credits are offsetting and at what broader environ-
mental and social costs.   
Lastly, the case of Kampong Thom Rubber exemplifies the broader 
dangers of an environmental security framing that does not distinguish 
between those migrants who are responsible for the vast deforestation 
that Cambodia has experienced, and those landless migrants, whose rela-
tive environmental destruction in the form of clearing lands for subsist-
ence must be understood as resulting from their lack of options. Without 
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such distinctions, legal regulations passed to supposedly protect natural 
resources exclude the most vulnerable, for the benefit and profit of the 
most powerful and degrading actors. In the process, labels of environ-
mental criminality serve to justify exceptional measures taken against 
those whose rights to access have been dismissed in the name of contin-
ued capital accumulation. Not only does this make invisible, and hence 
untameable, those who are responsible for environmental destruction, 
but it also widens the pre-existing inequalities and vulnerabilities that are 
responsible for turning hazards into disasters. Additionally, the case of 
Kampong Thom Rubber demonstrates how granting of the best quality 
land to concessions, in a context of increased global demand for cassava 
production to meet the ethanol market demands, has pushed farmers 
into growing cassava crops. This is a problem given the high volatility of 
cassava prices, which has led to increased food insecurity, the burden of 
debts, and ultimately, the need to decide whether a livelihood at home is 
possible.  
Across all of the cases examined, a stark contradiction arises: aiming 
to keep people in their place while simultaneously granting the best re-
sources in that place to corporate investors and political and economic 
elites that are unable to meet the employment needs of a growing popu-
lation, has created intense pressure on the most vulnerable. Population 
growth is perceived as a problem for local populations, but not in terms 
of the environmental destruction that increased population will provoke, 
but rather in terms of the needs that vulnerable populations will increas-
ingly have to access their own resources, when vast amounts of their ter-
ritory are being used to meet global food, energy, and climate adaptation 
and mitigation imperatives. This is magnified in a context where the im-
pacts of climate change already pose an existential threat to the resources 
and livelihoods of these populations. What determines whether interven-
tions aimed at environmental protection or the reduction of distress mi-
gration will succeed is largely dependent upon whether capital accumula-
tion or social and environmental welfare are prioritised.  
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Implications 
The findings of this research point to several implications for research 
and for policymaking. For researchers, this study highlights the im-
portance of cross-disciplinary and comparative work as well as the in-
sights that are to be gained by situating oneself at the boundaries of two 
well-established fields: namely the ‘environmental migration’ field and 
the ‘land grab studies’ field. It was through a continuous conversation 
between these well-established bodies of work that my propositions, 
questions, and research were formed, and through which connections 
could ultimately be made. In so doing, the research has aimed to cross-
fertilise these fields by making explicit the important and intrinsic con-
nections that exist between them – but which had to date remained over-
looked. Theoretically, in order to achieve this, the variegated geopolitical 
ecology framework drew on multiple perspectives from political econo-
my, political ecology, critical geopolitics, and political geography, which 
have long provided alternative frameworks, through which the links un-
der study could be analysed.  
However, it is in their fusion, and not in their isolation, that the analy-
sis of this research was able to proceed. By bridging perspectives, includ-
ing those that have dealt with more macro historical-structural tenden-
cies of migration and environmental change (i.e. world systems and 
world ecology), with those constructivist multi-scalar critiques concern-
ing the influence of discourse on material realities (i.e. critical geopolitics, 
political geography and political ecology), with those more micro-based 
considerations (i.e. political ecology), the methodology used in this re-
search consisted of a historical, multi-scalar, and circular approach that 
aimed to bridge the macro with the micro and vice-versa. This approach 
enabled me to embed environmental change, land grabs, and migration 
in a historical perspective, while also capturing the variegated tendencies 
that these have followed, and – importantly – the reasons for this varie-
gation. Although this theoretical and methodological procedure does not 
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come without its limitations and complications, a positioning that aims 
to bridge the past with the present and the local with the global can allow 
us to see the broader implications of the interrelations under study and 
to better locate points of contention and contradictions.  
For those working in the broadly defined field of ‘environmental mi-
gration’, this research further highlights the need to go beyond an analy-
sis that focuses on the biophysical impacts of environmental change on 
migration, and to pay more attention to how dominant security and ad-
aptation framings around environmental change and migration shape the 
very material realities under which migration unfolds. Without giving 
distinct focus to the power structures that underline environmental de-
struction and forced migration, the interventions enacted to solve them 
can reinforce both environmental destruction and the inequalities that 
drive forced migration. Therefore, at the theoretical level, this research 
calls for a deeper and continued engagement of the broadly defined ‘en-
vironmental migration’ field with that of political ecology. The focus on 
land grabs in this work has mostly shed light on the impacts of security 
and adaptation frames around environmental change and/or migration 
on agricultural and tenure reforms. However, future research could go 
further in this respect by analysing how these interrelations unfold in 
other socio-political settings, as well as by focussing on the impacts that 
these frames can have in other policy domains. Finally, and importantly 
for modelling efforts in the field, this study shows that if current rates of 
land grabs persist, then those impacted by environmental and climate 
change in the years to come will not be the same people who inhabit 
these areas today. This further supports the evidence that making quanti-
tative projections based on demographic growth and climate models, 
does not provide an accurate account of whom might inhabit which 
places in the years to come.  
For the broadly defined ‘global land grab’ field, the findings of this re-
search highlight the importance of analysing green and migration grabs in 
tandem since the existence of one is usually inseparable from the exist-
ence of the other. As this research has shown, migration narratives are at 
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least as prominent as environmental ones in justifying land grabs. More 
attention to how and why this occurs, and a deeper engagement with mi-
gration studies could enhance an understanding of both the justifications 
and impacts of land grabs. Moreover, the research has highlighted that it 
is important not only to analyse land grabs in a particular landscape at a 
particular time, but rather to understand land grabs as processes which 
gain and lose diverse justifications throughout that process and that also 
entail differentiated impacts at different geographical scales. A deeper 
engagement with critical geopolitics is essential in understanding the 
drivers and impacts that land grabs have on adaptation and security at 
the international level. Although the research has located a number of 
consequences of geopolitical ecologies from below, by locating certain 
possible linkages between specific land grabs and broader geopolitical 
configurations, further research attempting to draw and document such 
links would provide a fruitful direction. Future research in this direction 
could engage with the broader implication of vast geopolitical ecological 
projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative or the Great Green Wall of 
Africa, and the variegations that occur not only in sight of diverse geo-
graphical positionings, but also based on the diverging agendas and 
needs of changing investments. Lastly, an analysis of how different geo-
political ecologies from below shape the subsequent directions of land 
transformation processes would be another fruitful area for future re-
search.  
Beyond academic considerations, the findings of this research point 
to the urgency for policymakers to addresses the structural causes, and 
not the symptoms, of both environmental destruction and forced migra-
tion. The positioning of this research between the agricultural, migration, 
and environmental policy-making fields calls for urgent synergies be-
tween them if the ‘self-fulfilling risks’ and/or trade-offs are to be avoid-
ed. Acting upon environmental change, land grabs, and migration in iso-
lated or binary manners can increase, rather than alleviate, pressures on 
those most socio-environmentally vulnerable. For those working in the 
broadly defined environmental policy field, this research highlights the 
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importance of designing environmental policies that focus on reducing 
social inequalities and in redistributing their benefits amongst the most 
vulnerable, if these mechanisms are to be more than purely ‘technical 
and incremental’ fixes that have done little to curve emissions to date. 
Without this, land-intensive environmental and climate interventions can 
lead to the third injustice of climate change whereby the most vulnerable are 
not only the least responsible for, and the least affected by, environmen-
tal change, but also the front-line victims of environmental and climate 
policies. Not only will interventions that entrench inequalities fail to 
meet their environmental targets, but they also risk contributing to a del-
egitimisation of the most existential cause that humanity faces. Im-
portantly, this research adds to the evidence that emission accounting 
mechanisms will continue to be fundamentally flawed, unless they ac-
counts for both the environmental and human rights extraterritorial im-
pacts of food and energy production. 
 For the migration policy field, this research underlines the urgent 
need to separate and clearly distinguish between migrants whose envi-
ronmental footprint constitutes a global threat, and those whose usage of 
resources is minimal and a vital part of their livelihoods. With heated 
debates around migration throughout the world, putting the migration 
label exclusively on poor and vulnerable people, while failing to label po-
litical elites, investors, and corporations as migrants when this equally 
applies to them (i.e their movement to places where land and labour are 
cheap), contributes to strong misconceptions of the impacts of migration 
on the environment. Additionally, this research has shown that granting 
the best available land resources to large-scale and land-intensive agro-
businesses in order to reduce migration can be counterproductive. Not 
only do these interventions expel those who need, and are better placed 
to protect, land resources, but such ventures do not provide employment 
in quantity or quality. Moreover, investments that are essentially con-
cerned with short-term economic profit are at the very basis of the envi-
ronmental and climatic changes that result in disasters and displacement 
in the places where they unfold, and also well beyond them.  
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In light of this, there is an urgent – and existential – need to reconfig-
ure land tenure and agricultural policies that can simultaneously protect 
the natural resources and the populations which have been systematically 
destroyed. For the most vulnerable, land redistribution and secure con-
trol over natural resources are the most important insurance that deter-
mines whether potential movement becomes adaptive or maladaptive –
especially in the context of the global land rush and of climate change. In 
a context where other economic sectors in many developing countries 
are not able to absorb the labour from rural areas, it is of the utmost im-
portance to support the small-scale farms that use resources sustainably 
and that provide the labour opportunities necessary for those who wish, 
or who have no other alternative than, to stay. Environmental and social 
justice are two sides of one same coin; one will not be realised without 
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